Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
The Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Vincent ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Acheson )
In reply to your inquiry as to what is our view on the question which Chiang Kai-shek asked General Marshall (“If the present Government is broadened by the inclusion of representatives of minority parties and of other individuals of high standing, would that be considered by the United States as bona fide action towards the establishment of a coalition government, if the Communist Party or representatives were not included?”),75 my thinking is as follows:
The manner and circumstances in which Chiang might issue invitations broadening the base of the Government would of course determine whether we considered his action a bona fide attempt toward the establishment of a coalition government. I dislike prejudging the case, but I am extremely doubtful that he could issue an invitation which would be considered “bona fide” by any except his own partisans. I mean by this that not only the Communist Party but also the Democratic Federation would take a very “dim” view of the invitation unless it were done in conformity with the resolution of the People’s Consultative Conference. That resolution provided for the establishment of a state council and a coalition government not as a result of an invitation by Chiang but as a result of inter-party decision.
The real substance of Chiang’s question, however, is whether we would give material support to a coalition government of the type he has in mind, and I find it easier to answer that one. Quite apart from the bona fides of the Government and quite apart from any question of continued recognition of the National Government, I would speak strongly against our giving any substantial material support to that Government while it was engaged in large-scale civil war. We should not, of course, even consider any recognition of the belligerency of the Chinese Communists but on the other hand I think we should carefully avoid being drawn into the conflict through material support of the National Government. If I thought any good, from our national or from an international point of view, would come from all-out support of Chiang, I would be for it, but I can see only trouble, trouble, trouble coming from inconclusive action.
I think we must bear and stay with the situation, try to avoid seeing it as all black or white, and hope that a period of several months of civil war may have a chastening effect on the extremists in both the Government and in the Communist Party. Wiser counsels may then [Page 59] come to the fore that will make possible an advancement of General Marshall’s mission.
Incidentally, Mr. Tsui, the First Secretary of the Chinese Embassy and an old friend of mine, was in yesterday (protesting that his visit was purely personal) to make a poorly concealed attempt to get an answer to the question you have asked. I think I disabused his mind of a few misconceptions without telling him too much.