Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume X

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, October 26, 1946, 11:30 a.m.

Nanking, October 26, 1946, 11:30 a.m.

Also present:	Colonel Caughey
	Mister Chang

General Marshall: Doctor Stuart and I have seen various members of the third party during the past few days who reported on the various aspects of the present state of negotiations.

General Chou: Mister Shao Li Tze has told me of an impending trip of the Generalissimo to Sunghwa¹⁹ (his birthplace) on the 31st.

General Marshall: I know nothing about that. I knew about the Formosa trip three weeks in advance. I persuaded him to postpone his trip at the last minute when I found that you were coming back. The Generalissimo told me he would come back on four hours’ notice if I wired him. I did not do that because I preferred that the procedure of mediation be direct through the Third Party rather than through me. By his original plan he is due to return today, but it now seems that he is coming tomorrow, Sunday.

General Chou: Do you have any further information on the military situation?

General Marshall: I have read reports in the paper, not from Executive Headquarters, of an assault on Chefoo and from Executive Headquarters of the operations around Paoting, and a rumor from Executive Headquarters of operations in the vicinity of Antung. Has General Chou any information on military actions that he wishes to tell me about?

General Chou: I have heard about the following military operations:

1. In the vicinity of Antung. The Government has sent three armies to lay assault against that city along three routes. The north route has already occupied Tunghwa and is driving from Hsinhsin toward Antung. The central route through Penhsi, and the third route from Kaiping. All three routes are closing on Antung. The assault was started on October 22nd.

2. Around Chefoo. The Government sent one force over-land from the Tsinan-Tsingtao railroad through Laiyang toward Chefoo. Another route is by sea. A CNRRA²⁰ ship was enroute to Chefoo on October 16th carrying relief supplies and personnel and I have not heard of its safe arrival. I learned that the coastal warfare took place on October 23rd or 24th. I have not received any details as yet.

General Marshall: Are you asking me about the CNRRA ship?

General Chou: No, I am merely expressing my concern.

3. In North Kiangsu. There has been war around Tungtai for some time. It started prior to October 10th and the assault is still going on. Also assault has been launched against Lienshun which is to the northeast of Huaiyin and to the north of Nantung. The area was occupied during the last three days.

4. Along the Peiping-Hankow Railroad. The Government is endeavoring to push through the whole strip of the railroad. From the south it is attacking from Anyang northward endeavoring to capture Tzu Hsien and Taming. In the northern section the fighting is going on between Peiping and Paoting.

5. In North Honan. The Government is fighting from the Peiping-Hankow railroad westward along the Tao Tsin railroad toward the Chiaotso coal mines. At Taiyuan fighting is taking place along the northern bank of the Yellow River. The Government’s attitude is to fight through from the railroad down to the Yellow River.

6. Along the Tungpu railroad. General Hu Tsung Nan’s forces continued driving northward occupying Hungtung and Chaocheng despite previous casualties they have sustained.

Since the occupation of Kalgan, the over-all picture is still a continuation of the Government’s drive along all fronts. Thus far in the month of October, the Government has occupied 19 cities in China Proper and in Manchuria. The picture has completely changed since the attack against Kalgan and it shows that the Government is determined to continue the war. Therefore, the last time you called on me in Shanghai, I already anticipated that the situation would not improve and I also explained to you that a suspension of the drive against Kalgan for 10 days under the two conditions of the Generalissimo would not produce results. It so happened that after your return here, Kalgan was occupied and that the Government issued the call for the National Assembly. It then appeared that everything was finished, but through the efforts of the Third Party, I could not overlook a chance, and therefore I came back to Nanking.

I have already acquainted Doctor Stuart with my views pertaining to the Government’s eight points and I assume that he has transmitted my views to you. I do not need to repeat them here. From its outward appearance, the Generalissimo’s eight points look like an ultimatum because it called for an agreement to those eight points before a cease fire would be issued. Also, the contents of those eight points are not fair minded. While the Third Party is exerting every effort, the Government’s military actions are still being continued in an active manner. This shows clearly that the Government’s objective is to take Antung, Chefoo and the railroad lines. This is evidence that whatever cannot be obtained by negotiations will be taken by force. Since this matter relates to military affairs, I cannot wait for the Third Party. Since the Committee of Three is formally still in existence, I have the responsibility to report the situation to you. Should these military advances be continued, I could see no necessity for the continuation of negotiations. I feel that the Committee of Three should take certain actions regarding this matter.

General Marshall: As to the Generalissimo’s trip to Formosa, I regretted very much his going at this time. Previously there were two occasions during which I thought his absence from Nanking was most unfortunate; notably his long absence at Mukden and Peiping. I took very positive issue with the Government on that occasion. I also was concerned over the delay in his return to Nanking from Kuling and the delay in coming to Nanking from Chungking when he made the trip to Hsian. The most serious question, of course, was the protracted stay at Mukden. This occasion, I am absolutely certain, has no connection with your return to Nanking.

In the first place, until Saturday evening at 7:30, our information was that you were not coming back here at all. It was about 8 o’clock that we learned that you were returning on Monday morning. The Generalissimo’s trip to Formosa had been a matter of knowledge to me for about three weeks with the date set for October 20, so it had no relation whatever to your return, which was decided upon by you at the last moment. I was partly instrumental in having the Generalissimo delay his departure so he would actually be here when you returned. However, his seeing you personally was his own arrangement. He did not tell me about that. He did tell me that he would return on four hours’ notice if I telegraphed him. I did not telegraph him because I was not a party to the negotiations. His schedule required him to return today or tomorrow. He is returning tomorrow; maybe today. He had started his trip to Formosa; one plane had left, the other was loaded and it was just 15 minutes before his departure that he decided to await your return. I do not think that the trip should be judged as a deliberate action with relation to the negotiations. Had the Third Party reached a point in the negotiations where his presence seemed imperative, I think it would have been easy to bring him back. I counsel against judging that trip as having an important bearing on the present negotiations. I would suggest that you keep in mind that your own plans were entirely uncertain with no indication here whatever of what you were going to do other than to remain in Shanghai.

Before I go any further, it is 12:30. I want to ask you if you will have lunch. Lunch will be about 1 o’clock.

General Chou: Yes. I will.

General Marshall: I do not quite understand you in your reference to the Committee of Three, whether or not you are proposing an immediate meeting. But before hearing your answer to that question I would like to say this: Dr. Stuart told me of his conversations with you the other day and I gained the impression that there would be little purpose in my arguing with you regarding various aspects of the situation because your mind seemed to be closed to any view other than the view you had already expressed to me in Shanghai. Your reactions regarding some of these matters are so far from facts as known to me in which I happened to be the principal actor. For example, your reaction about the Kalgan truce was in some respects almost the opposite of the actual circumstances. The Government did not want a truce. It was, in fact, bitterly opposed by the military leaders, I think. The Government only came to the consideration of the truce when it was confronted with an absolute demand on my part that it must offer some compromise.

I did not like a truce. As a matter of fact I was opposed to a truce in the form of arrangement to meet the circumstances, so in the end there was a compromise, but it was a very unwilling compromise on the part of the Government. Yet the proposal was judged as a government device. It would be very difficult for me to argue with you about something that I know to be a matter of fact and not conjecture, and there was much more to it even than I have stated. I am not discussing whether or not the truce proposal was a proper proposal. I am merely stating what actually happened.

Next, the eight points. It is very difficult for me to comprehend your view regarding those eight points. I can easily understand your concern regarding the Harbin issue in Manchuria in relation to Kalgan. What I can’t understand is your reaction to most of the other points. The Generalissimo has been insisting for some time on the point concerning the announcement of delegates to the National Assembly. Heretofore, he merely made that demand, but when it came to these eight points, he compromised that with the agreement to immediately reconvene the Constitutional Draft Committee and added the statement that that draft would be the basis for the discussion before the National Assembly. Those two points, I had understood, were Communist desires and upon which, up to that time, I had been unable to secure from the Government a positive statement in confirmation of the PCC agreements. Another point related to local governments. That had been the stumbling block, practically wrecking the negotiations in June, with relation especially to Kiangsu. This time the local government issue is cleared for China south of the wall, and while it is true Manchuria was excluded, to which I did not agree, nevertheless a very broad Government commitment was made.

Regarding the location of troops, I had always been very careful to report to you and your associates what I thought was the Government attitude so that there would be no misunderstandings and no consequent surprise action. As a matter of fact, in the eight points, that particular condition provided for a negotiation of the matter by the Committee of Three.

The fact of the matter, and I am now dealing with facts, was that those points I have just mentioned regarding the draft of the Constitution and its being made the basis of the discussion in the National Assembly; regarding the local governments, except for the exclusion of Manchuria; and regarding the question of the location of troops being left open to later negotiation, were not included in the original points considered by the Government and it was only through the utmost pressure on my part that they were clearly stated among the eight points so that there could be no uncertainty about them. There was very determined opposition on the part of powerful members of the Government to such statements at this time and it was no easy matter to persuade the Government to commit itself in that manner. Now again I am not trying to argue as to whether or not those were proper statements. I am merely trying to make clear that the assumption that they were proposed for an evil purpose is not correct.

I am certain there was no devious purpose in the proposal concerning the tentative agreement on the troop dispositions in Manchuria (leaving out the issue that was raised later on in the summer by the Generalissimo as to the local government in Antung). As I understood it, the one issue (aside from the local government in Antung) on which there was no clear understanding was the location of Communist troops in Yenki rather than in the larger city to the north.

I do not think it is profitable for me to discuss with you the merits or demerits of the various problems. I repeat again, all I am trying to make clear is that you have misjudged, I think, almost entirely what led to the Government statement of those particular eight points and that is why Dr. Stuart and I feel completely baffled. It was never so evident as in the case of the Kalgan truce. The Government thought it would not only lose the advantage of the momentum of the successful advance but that the Communists would profit by the delay. You stated, I think (I know that Mr. Tung Pi Wu did), that you felt that the Government had proposed the Kalgan truce in order to improve its military position by reinforcement and by the movement of supplies. There is a good example of being completely defeated by an overwhelming suspicion.

I question the advisability of my having discussed these issues now but it seems so hopeless to make an effort and then have it completely misjudged. The misjudgment, however, is not confined to one side.

General Chou: I agree with you that to argue about the facts would not be practicable at this moment and that no argument would change the situation. It would only help us to explore the true facts. On the other hand the situation changes because the fighting is being enlarged. Therefore, I would prefer to say a few words about the present state of affairs.

You just asked me whether I have in mind to propose a reconvention of the Committee of Three. It seems to me that this is not the issue. As you have said before, to call a meeting at this moment would only lead to further argument. However, I do not, in any way, object to the reconvention of the Committee of Three, but I do not see any profitable outcome of this meeting at this moment because the Government has no intention to stop the war.

The Third Party has asked the Government representatives why the question of the local governments in Manchuria should form an exception. To this Dr. Wang Shih Chieh replied that prior to the cease fire order, Manchuria would not be committed to such a clause. In case the cease firing order was issued we would expect the terms of the Government to be so written that, while the present position in north and Central China will be maintained, in Manchuria the Government would demand acceptance by the Communists to the previous terms—that is, the Communist troops would be concentrated to three points—Yenchi, Tsitsihar and Hailar and to the region of the 2½ provinces. This would not be acceptable to the Communists. Since it is not acceptable, it is obvious that the Government would simply push on with force. What I would like to tell you at this moment is that it seems an established fact that there will be a nation-wide split because this has been ordered by the Generalissimo.

I am particularly concerned now with the present military situation. I would like to know if there is any chance, according to your view, of rescuing it. Only such a hope would brighten the prospect of the efforts made by the Third Party. I would like to hear your view on this.

The next point I would like to speak about is the 10-day Kalgan truce. I am aware of what has been going on. You thought there was a misunderstanding on my part. It was actually not like that. I perfectly realize that you have made a great effort on this matter, but the Government demanded that the truce be effected under conditions it had imposed. You also notified me to this effect. I made an oral reply opposing such conditions and immediately following that you issued the public statement which left no room for subsequent negotiation on that point. That was the fact regarding that.

As to the eight points you state that some are the concessions on the part of the Government. These points are related to the stipulations of the PCC which have been violated by the Government. Promises regarding these eight points should not be considered as concessions. For example, you have often mentioned that the Communist side did not submit the Army list. In the past we did not submit this list only because of the war in Manchuria. Later on, if the armies are to be reorganized and the Communists did submit the list, this could not be considered as a concession on the part of the Communist Party.

With regard to those eight points, there are three formulas the Government adheres to:

• First, the Government would not withdraw from areas now occupied. On the other hand, the Communist troops would have to be withdrawn into certain positions, such as the 2½ provinces in Manchuria.
• Second, whatever we had promised to the Government in June, they would insist upon, such as Harbin. On the other hand, what we asked for in June and what was promised us, would not be given to us now, such as the restoration of the January 13th and June 7th positions.
• Third, whatever the Government demanded in June and to which we made no promise would be insisted on. For example, the evacuation of troops in North Kiangsu, or withdrawal of local governments from certain places in Manchuria. What we demanded from the Government and to which they made no promise would be refused to us, such as the garrisoning of Chengtu by the Communists.

So the result would be that, while in China Proper where they say the fighting would be stopped on the spot, the troops would be stationed as proposed by the Government; and with regard to local governments, the Government would have the whole province under their control in cases where the capital of that province is in its hands. If that formula is followed, there would not be much left in China Proper under the control of the Communists. In Manchuria, the Communists would be in the 2½ provinces and nothing more than that.

The Third Party group are not so well aware of these circumstances, but you are very well aware of it, and you know also that this could not be accepted by the Communists. Whatever form the Government adopted in presenting its demand, whether it be two or eight points, the result would always be just the same. The reason we previously made such a big concession with regard to the army reorganization plan was that we hoped the Government would reciprocate with regard to local government and self-administration and the coalition government so that the country could be well along on the road to democracy.

According to the present formula of the Government, not only will the Communist troops be separated and surrounded by the Nationalist troops, but also the area of the local self government will be reduced to a minimum. Within the coalition government itself, the Communists would also be reduced so as to exercise no influence at all. This is tantamount to forcing the Communists to surrender. The Government feels that it has scored a victory by occupying so many cities. But, as a matter of fact, the Communists have never surrendered—not even in 1927 when they had no rifles in their hands. How can they expect us to surrender at this time?

Speaking of the military situation, the fact that they have occupied so many cities is due to the fact that we are on the defensive while they have all the initiative. They are launching attacks along all the fronts, concentrating their forces and striking at particular places. On our part, we have been putting up local resistance; wherever they would attack we would resist; wherever they did not attack we also refrained from attacking, such as in the Yenan Border region. But in case there is a total break, we would not feel committed as we previously had felt and we would also adopt an all-out resistance. We know there are many places under the Government control where they have only a small force which are weak points and which could be very well exploited to our advantage.

(Adjourned for lunch.)

General Marshall: I will not undertake to discuss the various points you brought up because I feel we will be going somewhat in a circle. I merely say that part of your contentions I accept as correct from my point of view, and part I do not. I find great differences between myself and the Government and between myself and the Communists. What I most deplore is allowing any small thing, any matter of form, to delay or prevent an understanding for a cessation of hostilities. The question then is. “What are the small things and what are the large considerations?”

As to the Committee of Three, I was not suggesting a meeting. I feel in regard to that very much as you do; unless we have some good sound basis of understanding before we start, there is little likelihood of success in such a meeting and more likelihood of ill-will being generated. My question regarding the Committee of Three simply related to your remark regarding that committee.

I know you have felt (I have often commented on the fact) that there are certain Government leaders who are convinced the Communist Party will not keep any agreement, and that the Government’s solution to the situation is a policy of force. As a matter of fact, some of them have stated that publicly. That point of view therefore has to be contended with in dealing with the government. On the other hand on the Communist side, I am well aware of the suspicions and fears regarding being placed in a position where military force can practically extinguish the party, or where the secret police can greatly oppress, if not terrorize.

So in all of these matters we have two positive and conflicting beliefs or views. The struggle has been, so far as Dr. Stuart and I are concerned, to compromise now to the point where we could get an agreement for the cessation of hostilities and then proceed with negotiations. That, however, has to be a compromise procedure. I have nothing to offer at the moment except again to deplore bringing into the discussion any points that are not vital, that are not vital to the fundamental requirements of the two sides. The distrust exists, and I think it is greater now than it ever has been before. Therefore there is all the more need to find some method to which both can agree of stopping the fighting. The issue now is so confused, so many points have been brought into the discussion, exceptions have been taken to so many points of view of one side or the other, that the situation presents an almost impossible prospect for agreement unless it is divested of every detail that is not vital to either party.

In a few words: the Government feels that practically anything it proposes will be turned down by the Communists, and the Communists feel almost exactly the same regarding the Government. The trouble is that both differ as to the respective merits of their cases. From my point of view, both sides have been pretty wrong. Neither side accepts that point of view except as it relates to the other side. Now the distrust and bitterness has increased to such an extent here recently that it makes any form of negotiation one of extraordinary difficulty. I am certain that half the trouble on both sides is “distrust”. To express it more accurately, I had better use the word “misconception” or “misconstruction”. It accordingly had been my last hope that this third party group might be able to find some basis of compromise. And that, of course, would be infinitely preferable to a mediation procedure by Americans because it would be Chinese settling their own difficulties. The Third Party group appear to be endeavoring to act in a strictly impartial manner. I think it would be a great mistake for you to go back to Yenan within the next few days because with the discussions that have already been held, with the Third Party people, with Government representatives, and with the Generalissimo’s return so that they can discuss matters with you, it may yet be possible to do something to bring the fighting to a halt and then discuss outstanding issues.

That is all I have to say at this time.

General Chou: There are two points I would like to speak of. The first is that if in the next few days the Third Party group can construct some compromise formula and if the formula has a sound basis, though I do not see for myself how it can come about, I would like to discuss it with them. That is the purpose for my remaining here. The second point is regarding the military situation, which you have not answered. As it now stands, the situation is getting more and more serious. It appears that the Government is taking the liberty of attacking any place it desires. If that situation continues there will not be any room left for any kind of negotiation. In that case my presence in Nanking would seem to be superfluous. I would like to draw your attention to that for—

General Marshall: In relation to your comment that I have not given a reply to that portion of your question, the solution to the military situation so far as I could foresee it, was to bring the fighting to a halt. My struggle has been to find some basis for accomplishing this. Your proposal is 13 January. The Government declines that. Now my search has been to find some basis the Government would agree to which possibly the Communists would also agree to. That was the best I could do under the circumstances. My effort had been to find some quick way to stop the fighting with a minimum of discussion. I know of no other approach. That was the reason I took such drastic steps to find some way, even though it was not the way I would have preferred, to halt the operations before Kalgan was captured.

I do not know any other method of approaching the situation. It grows worse hourly. Dr. Stuart and I tried to find some preliminary step, in early July, as a basis from which might lead up to a cessation of the fighting. The Government was first unwilling and then finally agreed. General Chou would not agree. Then the fighting grew worse. As a last desperate measure, I dealt with the issue of Kalgan. You felt that the truce was a capitulation. I insisted that sitting down at the table did not involve agreement, it merely meant the initiation of a discussion regarding a Government position. Now we have reached another somewhat similar situation. What we want to do is stop the fighting. I have done my best to try to bring that on. Now my hope is that the Third Party group can do it.

General Chou: It has always been my belief that the quickest way to lead to a cessation of hostilities is an unconditional truce, but the negotiation since June has proven this is not possible. The only way I see is to lead to a conditional truce which would contain conditions acceptable to both sides. If this course were followed, there would also have to be a period of time during which the tension of the situation would have to be reduced. But now, instead of lessening, the situation is tighter although the Third Party group is striving to bring about an agreement. I still wanted to raise these points with you since we are both on the Committee of Three.

Meeting was adjourned.

19. Fenghwa, Chekiang.
20. Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.