Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Mr. Hu Lin10 at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, October 22, 1946, 6 p.m.
| Also present: | Dr. Stuart |
| Col. Caughey |
Mr. Hu opened the meeting by indicating his gratefulness, and that of the Chinese people, for General Marshall’s efforts in bringing peace to China. He said the Third Party is now exerting their effort toward assisting the American mediators attain that peace. Mr. Hu stated that he had been in newspaper work for 35 years without participating in politics, but that since his return from the San Francisco Conference, and because of appeals from various Chinese individuals, he had taken active interest in helping to resolve the present situation.
Mr. Hu stated that the solution of the present problem was faced with unusual difficulties in that fighting had been going on in China for 20 years. Another difficulty in the way of the present negotiations arises from the fact that both the Kmt and the Communists got their origin in Russia; the spirit and technique of both are similar and both had been formed as a result of revolutionary development, which, of course, left both motivated by destructive, rather than constructive, impulses. Mr. Hu stated that the Third Party had now come into being as a consolidated force in an effort to act as a neutralizing buffer between the Kuomintang and Communists in order that a peaceful solution could be obtained.
Mr. Hu stated that for the past several days, he had been dealing with Communist and Government leaders in Shanghai and he believed the objectives of both parties were quite close; however, he added that a lack of trust, a deep suspicion, and an imagined fear of the other side, kept the two apart. This is where the Third Party comes in, in that it can guarantee fair treatment. Mr. Hu stated that the Third Party favors giving the Communists an opportunity to try out in various selected areas their idea of democracy. He said that this would probably be good for the country in that the desire of both sides for a continuation of aggressive action might subside if some territorial division could be made.
General Marshall agreed with Mr. Hu that suspicion is the root of most of the difficulties. In view of this, and because he felt it necessary for the Third Party to actively participate under the leadership of persons like himself (Mr. Hu) and other non-party men of high standing in China, he felt it was necessary to take Mr. Hu into [Page 410] his confidence in order that he would have a firm understanding of the entire situation. General Marshall continued by outlining the development of the Five Man Group under chairmanship of Dr. Stuart which he had proposed. It had been most difficult to get the Generalissimo to accept this idea and then when he had accepted it as a concession to the Communists, the Communists greeted the proposal with deep suspicion. When the Communists reacted in this fashion, then the Government made an issue over the fact that the Communists had refused.
General Marshall then outlined his efforts to halt the advance on Kalgan. After having arranged this with the Generalissimo, again as a concession by the Government to the Communists, the Communists then adopted the attitude that this truce had been designed by the Government for the sole purpose of permitting reinforcement and resupply of Government troops. As a matter of fact, the Government thought that the Communists would use the truce period for reinforcing its forces, and it was for that reason that General Marshall had incorporated into the proposed truce agreement the idea that Executive Headquarters field teams could control the situation around Kalgan during the truce period.
The most recent example of suspicion, General Marshall continued, concerns the Government’s eight-point statement to the Communists. Actually, approximately half of the eight points are concessions on the part of the Government to meet what were known to be Communist desires in connection with any continuation of negotiations. The Communists now refuse the eight points entirely on the superficial grounds that they cannot accept parts of the agreements tentatively reached in June without acceptance of all tentative agreements reached in June, and because the eight points are “too limited”. It was tentatively agreed in June that Nationalist forces could establish symbolic forces in Harbin. General Marshall added that this was probably the major issue in the Communist attitude at the present moment since they would probably not agree to National garrisoning of Harbin unless the Government gave up Kalgan to the Communists.
Since the Communists have turned down the Government’s eight points, General Marshall continued, the Government now takes the attitude that their initial contention, that the Communists would abide by none of the agreements reached, is proven in fact. In this connection, the Government cites the Communist capture of Changchun, their failure to submit military lists required by the 25 February agreement, and violation of the 7 June truce agreement in Shantung Province. General Marshall stated that the hope in the present situation was an outstanding group of Third Party members under the leadership of a good steering committee.
[Page 411]General Marshall continued that another serious factor in the problem now is that the Communists are basing all of their logic on their own propaganda. Even General Chou En-lai is swayed by the Communist propaganda and the Communist forces in the field are so wrought up over anti-Americanism that it makes it practically impossible for Executive Headquarters to carry out its function. This propaganda also has the effect of stirring up the high leaders on both sides to the point where negotiations are virtually hopeless.
General Marshall referred to his four weeks trip to Washington in order to arrange for loans and legislation which he hoped would be beneficial to China. Even while he was in Washington, the various leaders began agitating in the press and in the field to such an extent that the United States stopped a great portion of this assistance due to the confused conditions in China.
General Marshall referred to the surplus property transaction and told Mr. Hu that he had never discussed this matter with the Generalissimo or Government representatives except Dr. T. V. Soong, and with him only concerning the percentage of costs which the Chinese Government would have to bear in the transaction. The Chinese Government could have signed such an agreement as early as January of 1946, but it always waited for a more advantageous percentage rate, delaying until it was necessary in August to accept the transaction or to drop it entirely. The Communists now are using the surplus property transaction as a theme in their propaganda as a direct contributing factor in the present war. This is not the case, as shown by the fact that it was not used by General Marshall as an instrument in the negotiations, and also by the fact that the property, which incidentally does not include munitions, cannot be made available to the National Government for months to come. This is on account of the shipping and reconditioning factors involved.
General Marshall then suggested that Mr. Hu might be able to break down this particular theme of propaganda through judicious application and treatment of this subject in his paper. General Marshall stressed that his concern in the surplus property transaction was to help the people of China—not any political party—in avoiding economic collapse which was bound to occur if some rational development in thinking did not soon occur.
General Marshall then told Mr. Hu that the Generalissimo’s trip to Formosa had nothing to do with the current negotiations. The Generalissimo had planned the Formosa trip for a long time, had even cancelled it, but reinstated it due to the reaction of the Formosans. The Generalissimo did not know that General Chou was planning to return to Nanking, and when this fact was made known to him, the Generalissimo cancelled again, for 24 hours, his trip in [Page 412] order that he could see General Chou. General Marshall concluded by saying that the Generalissimo planned to come back to Nanking in a few days.
- Editor, Ta Kung Pao. ↩