Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Notes on Meeting Between General Marshall and Mr. Liang Shu-ming and Mr. Yeh Tu-yi91 at General Marshall’s Residence, Nanking October 17, 1946, 4:20 p.m.
| Also present: | Colonel Caughey |
| Captain Soong |
Mr. Liang said he had just received a telephone call from Mr. Carsun Chang92 in Shanghai. Mr. Chang informed him that the members of the Third Party Group—members of the Non-Party Group, Young China Party and the Democratic League—held a meeting this morning to discuss the statement made by the Generalissimo. This statement, together with the visit of the three Government representatives in Shanghai, is extremely important because it may lead to either a successful conclusion of the negotiations or a total failure.
Mr. Liang said that the Third Party members at Shanghai had then paid a visit to General Chou En-lai. The reaction of the Communist Party to this visit was that they may have something to add to certain stipulations in the statement, but they gave indication that the proposal was unacceptable. Therefore, the members of the Third Party had agreed to ask Dr. Stuart and General Marshall to come to Shanghai for a conference with them. They felt many issues regarding the military aspects are only known to him, and, also with General Marshall’s presence in Shanghai together with the Government representatives and the Third Party members, there may be a better chance for success. Mr. Liang said that he was asked by the members of the Third Party in Shanghai to represent them in inviting General Marshall and Dr. Stuart to attend the Third Party Conference. Mr. Liang continued to say that it was his impression that Dr. Stuart felt the time is too early for the American mediators to make such a trip. However, Mr. Liang felt that if Dr. Stuart and General Marshall would go tomorrow, they would arrive at Shanghai one day after the three Government representatives had arrived. This would not be too soon.
General Marshall assured Mr. Liang that he would do everything in his power to help to bring to an end the hostilities and to facilitate negotiations. He appreciated the invitation and understood the circumstances [Page 385] perfectly. However, he shared the same opinion as Dr. Stuart.
General Marshall felt that, at the present there should be a pause in American efforts during which the Chinese should conduct the discussions themselves. Following this discussion, certain points would be arrived at. Then, it would be the appropriate time for the mediators to step in.
General Marshall commented on the present views of the Communist Party regarding his impartiality in the negotiations. If he should participate in the present meeting of the minority, the Communist Party would feel that General Marshall is attempting to win over the Democratic League from the Communist Party.
General Marshall then elaborated on how the Communist Party had capitalized on the surplus property transaction in its propaganda. He explained that the surplus property transactions either had to be closed during August or not at all, and that he had decided to close the transactions because he did not want to deny the Chinese people the only fair opportunity to recover themselves economically; that the negotiations had been going on since last December; that the Government had been the delaying factor and that the material could not reach China in time to be effective in the war effort.
Mr. Liang said that he could believe what General Marshall had just explained. However, this surplus property transaction had left deep impressions with both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. It had served as an encouragement to the Kuomintang and it had given the Communist Party a spiritual set-back. General Marshall replied that all of this was a boomerang from the Communist propaganda.
General Marshall then commented on the Communist Party propaganda line to the effect that the present Government military campaign was being conducted by United States trained soldiers. He explained that this propaganda did not have a sound logic because the training of the Chinese soldiers by the United States was dictated by him, as U. S. Chief of Staff, back in 1943 for the purpose of the more effective prosecution of the war against Japan. Now the Communists were propagandizing an action of several years back and for a totally different purpose.
General Marshall then commented on the withdrawal of Marines from North China. He said he had actually arranged to begin this withdrawal around the 15th of April, and the first transports arrived for that purpose. At that time, General Marshall requested General Chou En-lai’s (of the Committee of Three) acquiescence in allowing the Government to replace the Marine garrison at Tsingtao, the Government had only four thousand troops there and the Communists 50,000 or more in the vicinity. General Chou En-lai declined. Therefore, [Page 386] the Marines had to be retained. However, the actual withdrawal of the Marines did begin in June when the Government reinforced its garrison at Tsingtao, because of the Communist offensive of June 9 to 14 despite the truce of June 7th, by transporting the Government troops from Wu-sung to Tsingtao by its own vessels. Such withdrawal continued until the Anping incident.93 However, despite this attack, the United States continued to relieve the Marines confidentially so as to avoid encouraging Communist attacks on Marines similar to that of the Anping incident.
General Marshall then said the United States combat Army personnel in China now only totalled two and one half companies of Military Police performing guard duties in Shanghai, Peiping and Nanking.
Mr. Liang thanked General Marshall for his explanation and said that he had two more points to make.
- 1.
- He understood that the Communist Party was faced with a dilemma. On one hand, they knew that good relations must be kept between China and the United States, yet on the other hand, they were rooting themselves deeply in hatred against the United States. The Democratic League sees this clearly and is willing to serve as a bridge between the United States and the Communist Party so that such conflicting viewpoints can be eliminated.
- 2.
- He wanted General Marshall to know that the political situation in China today cannot exclude the Communist Party and that it is wrong if the Kuomintang feels that it can form a government together with the Young China Party, the Non-Party Group and other minority parties without the Communist Party.
General Marshall said that he agrees with Mr. Liang’s statements; in fact this was the basis for all his efforts in negotiating to date. General Marshall then mentioned that the principal trouble in the negotiations was that neither side appreciated the fears of the opposing side in judging the reasons, purpose of actions or proposals, and that overwhelming suspicion had made it difficult for both sides to accept any proposals made by General Marshall and Dr. Stuart.
General Marshall then emphasized the extreme difficulty in persuading the Generalissimo to issue the present statement. He added that it is extremely important for the Communist Party to view it carefully without suspicion. The order for a total cessation of hostilities could be obtained by the Committee of Three within two hours upon its meeting if the Communist Party could agree to the procedures indicated in the Generalissimo’s statement.
Then Mr. Liang said that he would send Mr. Yeh back to Shanghai by tonight’s train to confer with the other members of the Third [Page 387] Party Group. He then asked that, if the Third Party made progress and obtained encouragement from General Chou En-lai, would it be possible, then, for General Marshall to make a trip to Shanghai?
General Marshall replied in the affirmative.