893.00/10–1546
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 31.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my despatch no. 182 of October 963 and to report in brief, which General Marshall has reported in detail, the latest developments in our mediation efforts.
General Marshall’s trip to Shanghai to see General Chou En-lai was fruitless in its immediate purpose but it did not fail to impress the public with his willingness to go to any length in persuasive endeavor. Indirectly it stirred minority party leaders and others to make a similar attempt and thus avert a final break. They were apparently about to succeed when by an unfortunate coincidence the fall of Kalgan and the promulgation of the National Assembly order happened on the same day (October 12). The former caused a violent emotional reaction; the latter a decided dispute as to whether the President had the right to fix the date for the Assembly without consulting [Page 371] the leaders of the other parties. These saw in his unilateral action high-handed dictatorial tendencies and the Communist Party utilized this feeling to rally the minority groups towards its side.
President Chiang’s explanation to me, however, was that he had originally last autumn fixed the date for the Assembly on May 5, 1946. No one then questioned his right as the head of the Government to do this. When the PCC met in January this date was quietly ratified. Again on April 24, when it became evident that arrangements for the Assembly could not be completed, he announced a postponement, informing the representatives of the other groups of this action in which they then acquiesced. In July he announced that the date would be on November 12, and according to a regulation already adopted that an official notice be issued one month in advance he confirmed this on October 12. To his mind all this was consistent with the initial proclamation by him and within his recognized authority. But when I explained this to one of the most influential and broad-minded leaders of the Democratic League he contested the facts and made it very clear that there was to his mind in this apparently trivial matter an issue of principle which he and his associates felt to be vital.
This incident illustrates the nature of the topics upon which there is disagreement and the long and often acrimonious discussions over them. Of course, underlying all these minor points of controversy there are very real ideological divergences and struggles for power, all intensified by personal or party hatred. But they add to the perplexity of trying to form a judgment as to whether these details, disputed in an atmosphere of fearful distrust and bitter antagonism, are the causes of Communist reluctance to cooperate, or whether there is something else of far more serious import. That there is something more can be safely assumed, but how much more and from what source?
General Marshall and I have meanwhile been in consultation with some of the leaders of the minority groups as well as with President Chiang who is about to issue another more irenic open letter to the Communist Party based on a suggested draft by General Marshall.64 Dr. Sun Fo is at work in Shanghai in what is almost literally a last-minute attempt to save the situation.
Respectfully yours,