Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall
Dear General Marshall: Your memo OSE 479 dated October 2, 1946,37 which you directed Colonel Caughey to send to me and which was attached with a memo from President Chiang under even date, has been duly received.
President Chiang’s memo not only refused to reply to my demand expressed in my memo dated 30 September calling for an immediate termination of the military operations against Kalgan, but instead went so far as to raise two claims which directly run counter to the PCC resolutions and the Army Reorganization Plan. For this reason I refrained myself from making an immediate reply, but merely instructing Mr. Wang Ping-nan to deliver verbally my comment to Dr. Stuart, with a view to looking forward that you and Dr. Stuart would further exert fair and impartial efforts for the peace in China.
As was transmitted by Mr. Wang to Dr. Stuart, we could not accept President Chiang’s terms for the following reasons:
- 1)
- According to the principles of the previous agreements, the Chinese Communist Party and the Democratic League must hold fourteen out of the forty seats in the state council, that is a little over one-third of the total vote, in order to ensure that the Peaceful Reconstruction [Page 346] Program would not be revised unilaterally. However, the Government proposal of thirteen seats could not provide such a safeguard. To regard one of the non-partisan members as belonging to the Chinese Communist Party or the Democratic League is also not in accord with the PCC resolution.
- 2)
- The list of National Assembly delegates can be produced only to the reorganized Government, and even so not until the draft constitution has been revised by the PCC, acknowledged as the only draft to be presented to the National Assembly, and the distribution of the membership of the National Assembly has been finally agreed upon. Whereas such is the procedure stipulated by the PCC resolutions, President Chiang demanded that the list of National Assembly delegates be produced to the one-party government, obviously in violation to these resolutions.
- 3)
- For an effective implementation of the Army Reorganization Plan, it is essential to determine as to where the troops of both parties will be located during the process of reorganization, and not to determine merely the location of the Communist army, while Government troops are being granted the freedom to move around, to menace at any time and to attack at will the Communist troops and the populace in the Liberated Areas.
It was certainly not our expectation that that hope of ours was being misplanted. On 7 October, I received your memorandum to Dr. Stuart under date of 6 October, thereby learning that President Chiang agreed merely under the condition that his two aforementioned demands would be carried out to postpone his military drive against Kalgan for ten days. This is obviously an ultimatum to force us to surrender. We feel therefore compelled to reject firmly that proposal.
Now, apart from instructing Messrs. Tung Pi-wu and Wang Ping-nan to transmit my views regarding this matter to you, I wish further state the following, which I also request to be transmitted to President Chiang Kai-shek:
- 1.
- In my memo under date of 30 September, I have already made it clear that the military operations by the Government troops against Kalgan is a demonstration of the Government determination not even to abstain from forcing a national split. At this hour, only an immediate calling-off once for all the drive against Kalgan coupled with a withdrawal of the attacking troops back to their original positions would bear ample evidence to the effect that the Government is willing to break the way for fresh negotiation and to avert a split. Failing which the responsibility for all serious consequences will automatically rest squarely with the Government.
- 2.
- With a view to showing its utmost sincerity and concessions,
the Communist Party is willing, on Government[’s] immediate
calling-off once for all its drive against Kalgan, to attend the
Committee of Three and the informal five-man committee or the
PCC steering committee, to join the simultaneous discussion on
the two subjects: cessation of hostilities and implementation of
the PCC resolutions. Regarding
[Page 347]
these the Chinese Communist Party has the
following proposals to make:
- A.
- Cessation of Hostilities (to be discussed by the
Committee of Three):
- a.
- Both armies shall restore their positions as of January 13 in China proper, and as of June 7 in Manchuria.
- b.
- The location of both armies, instead of that of the Communist army alone, during the reorganization shall be determined.
- c.
- The Government troops having been moved against previous agreements should be ordered to return to their original positions, so as to facilitate reorganization.
- B.
- Implementation of PCC resolutions (to be discussed by
the PCC Steering Committee or informal five-man
committee):
- a.
- The Chinese Communist Party and the Democratic League shall occupy fourteen seats in the state council, in order to ensure that the Peaceful Reconstruction Program would not be revised unilaterally. The distribution of these fourteen seats will be decided jointly by the Chinese Communist Party and the Democratic League.
- b.
- The reorganization of the Executive Yuan will be taken up along with the reorganization of the state council.
- c.
- The draft constitution, which is being revised by the PCC draft constitution reviewing committee in accordance with the principles and the stipulated procedure of the PCC resolutions, will be presented to the National Assembly as the only basis for discussion. All parties and groups further pledge that they will ensure the adoption of that draft.
- d.
- The final reconvening date of the National Assembly and the distribution of the additional National Assembly membership will be decided by the PCC steering committee.
- e.
- After the government has been reorganized in accordance with paragraph B, items a, and b., the various parties will produce to that government lists of their National Assembly membership following the arrangement of paragraph B, item d.
- f.
- The local administrations will in accordance with the provisions of the Peaceful Reconstruction Program maintain a status quo, pending the introduction of local self-government after the reorganization of the Central government.
- g.
- In order to ensure that the four promises regarding people’s freedom and rights made by President Chiang at the PCC session on January 10 will be carried out first of all and without delay political prisoners should be released, the outrageous incidents occurred since last January should be thoroughly investigated, the culprits punished, the special service organizations should be abolished, and the newspapers, magazines, news agencies, bookstores and people’s organizations banned since last January should be restored.
- h.
- The PCC military resolution governing the divorce of military affairs from civil administrative affairs should be carried out, in order to effect demobilization.
All the afore-mentioned proposals in connection with the two big subjects, which originate from the Cease Fire Agreement, Army Reorganization Plan and the five resolutions of the PCC, are indeed the most infallible measures for solving the prevalent crisis. If the Government authorities still has sincerity in implementing those agreements, there should be no reason why they do not accept them. If instead, they are but making idle talk about political settlement and implementation of the PCC resolutions, while actually they gear everything to military settlement and overthrow of the PCC resolutions, without even hesitating to force a national split by resorting to civil war and dictatorship, the Chinese Communist Party would feel itself forced to put up stubborn opposition till the very end.
With best regards
Faithfully yours,
- Not printed.↩