893.00/10–746: Telegram

The Ambassador in China ( Stuart ) to the Secretary of State

1608. Following is text of release by Communist spokesman Chen Chia-kang in Shanghai on October 2 setting forth Communist view concerning Government proposal for reorganization of State Council and implementation of cease fire agreements sent to Communists (see Embtel 1580, October 3):

“Regarding the two ‘utmost concessions’ cited in the government statement of October 2, Communist spokesman, Chen Chia-kang, opined that they are not concessions at all but another unreasonable demand in contravention of the PCC resolution:

A. Distribution of State Council seats:

1.
There has been an understanding between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party at the time of the PCC which recognized that a little over one-third of the vote in the State Council (14 seats among 40) was to be given to the Communist Party and the Democratic League in order to ensure that the peaceful reconstruction program of the PCC would not be infringed upon [in] the State Council transactions. This so-called ‘concession’ based on the counting of a nonpartisan seat as Communist, really reduces the promised number to 13, thus utterly throwing overboard the previous understanding.
2.
Regarding the Communist and the Democratic League seats in the State Council, two propositions have been suggested in the PCC: (a) the 14 seats will be distributed between the Communist Party and the Democratic League by their own deliberations; (b) to appropriate two additional seats to the two parties so that the Communists will hold 10 and Democratic League 6, totalling 16 seats. Both these propositions did not meet with the approval of the Government. However, there has never been such a proposition that the Communists will hold 10 and Democratic League 4 seats. As to the 8–4–4–4 formula, it was merely advanced by the Government alone, never secured the consent of the Communist Party and the Democratic League.
3.
According to the PCC resolution, the nonpartisan State Council members will be nominated by the President of the Government, but in case a nominee meets opposition of one-third of the State Councillors [Page 304] chosen from the various parties the President has to make a renomination. Thus the nomination of the non-partisan candidates necessarily required the approval of the various parties. The so-called ‘compromise plan’ prescribing that one of the non-partisan seats which being recommended by the Communist Party will be considered as accepted if he is approved by the government, is obviously an infringement upon the PCC resolution.
4.
If the one non-partisan seat thus appropriated is to be considered as a Communist seat, or a pro-Communist and Democratic League seat, then following the same reasoning, all the non-partisan members nominated in accordance with the PCC resolution, i. e., recommended by the Government and approved by the various parties and groups, would also have to be considered as Kuomintang or pro-Kuomintang seats. Thus, instead of increasing the seats of the Communists, it actually increases the Government seats. While nominally being a concession, it actually merely betrays the plot of the Government.

B. Disposition of troops:

1.
It should be pointed out that the position to be held by Kuomintang and Communist troops respectively in truce and the garrison places to be entered into by the Kuomintang and Communist troops after the implementation of the Army reorganization are two entirely different matters, which should not be confused with one another.
(a)
As to the position to be held by the Kuomintang and Communist troops in truce: The second general directive of Executive Headquarters specified that in China proper ‘commanders of both sides should by all means restore the position as of midnight of January 13’ [and] during June negotiations, both parties agreed to reaffirm this stand. As to Manchuria, both parties [apparent omission] and agreed during the June negotiation, that troops of both parties should withdraw to positions as of June 7. These had all been recorded, no cheating can be permitted.
(b)
Army disposition, after the implementation of the Army reorganization plan, requires that the armies of both parties should, in accordance with the Army reorganization plan and the principle of separating civilian and military affairs, march to the neighborhood of large cities after the commencement of the Army reorganization plan in order to undergo reorganization and training. The local security of places thus vacated will be maintained by the peace preservation corps, while the local governments will remain the same. Thus it can be seen that the principles governing the disposition of the armies have been laid down in the various resolutions a long time ago.
2.
A dispute regarding Army disposition did not arise only until:
(a)
During the June negotiations the Kuomintang distorted these Army reorganization principles, by demanding a unilateral assignment of Communist garrison areas. Apart from that they further advanced a four-point demand, which was later on enlarged to five points, forcing Communists to evacuate from a number of liberated areas, while at the same time it went beyond the scope of the Army reorganization plan by demanding the abolition of the popularly-elected governments in these areas.
(b)
Realizing that by means of negotiations alone they would not attain the purpose of dominating China, the Kuomintang thus embarked upon a course of begging for American arms, instigating civil war, and assaulting Communist cities and countrysides, while at the same time making it known that during the negotiations they must hold all places now under their occupation.
3.
If the Government wants to keep faith in peace agreements they should immediately pledge themselves to abide by the cease fire agreement, withdraw troops in China proper to positions as of January 13, and in Manchuria to those as of June 7. Instead of pursuing such a course, the government statement of October 2 tries to avoid the question of the disposition of the Kuomintang and Communist troops, and merely raises the question of Communist Army disposition after Army reorganization. Such a stand is nothing but a repetition of the old tune of the four-point, five-point and other unreasonable demands which, being synchronized with the military drive on Kalgan, serve the sole purpose of forcing the Communists to sign a document of surrender.”

Stuart