Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Notes of Meeting With Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking, October 6, 1946, 11 a.m. 92
Dr. Stuart and General Marshall saw the Generalissimo at 1100 hours, 6 October, to discuss the matter of truce for the operations against Kalgan. General Marshall did not favor such a procedure. He thought that a short truce would not permit of successful negotiations, particularly with the threat of a resumption of aggressive military action and that he also thought a long truce would be too difficult of accomplishment in view of the complications presented to the military commanders in the field—not to mention their aggressive attitude. General Marshall brought up again for discussion his proposed statement for the Generalissimo which was submitted on September 27th93 and which involved an immediate cessation of hostilities once the Communists agreed to the procedure specified. The Generalissimo did not think it was the proper time for such a statement, besides he could not agree to such a statement on the basis that the Communist agreement to such a procedure would mean an immediate cessation of hostilities. He then insisted that the cessation of hostilities must depend on the successful completion of the meeting of the Five Man Group and of the Committee of Three. This, General Marshall said, completely vitiated the purpose of the statement.
[Page 301]The Generalissimo stated that he could not issue such a statement without convening the military leaders from the field as well as the political leaders which would be a time-consuming procedure. He stated, however, that he could order a truce without such a meeting. He proposed that a truce of 5 days be announced on the basis of a Communist agreement to the meeting of the Five Man Group and the meeting of the Committee of Three as outlined in his memorandum of October 2nd. General Marshall insisted that five days would bring no useful result and would only lead to additional misunderstandings and added bitterness. The Generalissimo agreed to a week and General Marshall insisted on a minimum of 10 days. The Generalissimo stated that if, as the end of the 10 day period approached, it appeared that the Communists were in no mood to negotiate, he would lengthen the period; but no such intimation should be given in the beginning. He then requested that the announcement be put forward as a proposal from Dr. Stuart and General Marshall rather than from the Government. To this Dr. Stuart and General Marshall agreed, though it was not their proposal, merely the best terms they could secure.
General Marshall stated that if such a truce were to be carried out, there were several provisions that would be essential. One related to the responsibility for the observation of the truce to be assumed by Executive Headquarters and the special organization of field teams for this purpose (See memorandum, OSE 491, of October 6th to Dr. Stuart). Another condition General Marshall insisted upon was an agreement by the Government and by the Communists that the publication of the terms of the truce was to be left to Dr. Stuart and General Marshall without comment by either side.
At the termination of the meeting, Dr. Stuart returned to the Embassy to request an immediate visit from Mr. Wang Ping Nan in order that the question of the truce and the conditions could be explained to him without delay.
Upon returning to his quarters, General Marshall immediately dictated a memorandum (OSE 491) to Dr. Stuart outlining the conditions of the truce as he understood them, in order to avoid any misunderstanding between Dr. Stuart and himself as to just what the Generalissimo had agreed to. Dr. Stuart confirmed by telephone that his understanding was similar to the written statement just received from General Marshall, that he had seen Wang Ping Nan.
The following morning,94 General Marshall learned that Wang Ping Nan had not been shown a copy of the written statement of conditions (OSE 491), therefore a copy was sent to him and another copy was sent to General Chou in Shanghai.