Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Notes by General Marshall of Meetings With Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on September 28 and 30
On his return to Nanking from the summer absence I called on him at his house at 11 o’clock on the 28th, outlining the situation at that time. General Chou En-lai remained absent in Shanghai and insisted upon a meeting of the Committee of Three before any other meeting should be held; in other words, that an agreement for the cessation of hostilities should first be reached before entering into negotiations regarding the reorganization of the Government. The Generalissimo briefly discussed the situation and stated that he must be prepared for one of two courses of action—one, if General Chou refused to return to Nanking and negotiations were terminated and the other what action the Government should take to break the present stalemate. He thought that some public statement by him would be advisable and that he was giving careful thought to the matter. He stated that he wished that I would consider such a course of action and give him the benefit of my advice.
I replied that I had already considered such a course of action and had taken the liberty of preparing a statement9 (copy attached) which I thought he might well make. I stated that my principal purpose in preparing such a draft at this time was to illustrate what I thought should be the attitude of the Generalissimo at this moment in the negotiations. I felt that whatever is said there should be an evident spirit of tolerance and a careful avoidance of provocative or irritating statements. I also felt that it was necessary that definite positive action be proposed rather than the usual course of generalities. I suggest that it would be best for him to have my draft translated into Chinese so that he could read it at his convenience and discuss it with me later. He expressed pleasure over the fact that I was ready with a proposal, and I then withdrew.
The evening of the same day, General Yu Ta Wei, my liaison with the Generalissimo, called to discuss the statement and have me explain just what was meant by its various expressions. I made clear that it was intended that if the Communists expressed agreement to the general terms and procedure indicated, that hostilities should cease immediately and the discussions by the Five Man Committee and the Committee of Three should be opened.
[Page 257]A day later, the Generalissimo requested my presence at his house at 11 o’clock. He stated that he had given careful consideration to my draft, but he felt that it should include a statement that the several agreements indicated should be completed before there could be a cessation of hostilities. In other words, the Committee of Three would have to reach a complete agreement on the redisposition of troops and for the demobilization and integration of the armies before there could be any termination of the fighting and that the Five Man Committee would likewise have to reach an agreement before there would be such a termination. I replied that this would completely cancel the entire purpose of my proposed statement and that rather than amend or qualify the paper as drawn an entirely new approach should be considered. He asked me if I had such an approach in mind and I told him I did not, that I had included in this proposed statement conditions which I thought sufficiently protected the Government and which I also thought might well be accepted by the Communist Party. I added that his proposal would in effect transform the statement, in which I had endeavored to place him on a high level before the world, into a procedure which was merely a prolongation of what we would call “horse-trading”.
The Generalissimo then stated that he thought the time for such a statement had not arrived and that he wished me to convey to the Communist Party his willingness to accept “my proposal” for a simultaneous meeting of the Five Man Group and the Committee of Three. I replied that in the first place, I thought such a proposal would lead to no solution and further that I would not carry such a message orally to the Communist Party. If it was given to me in writing I would transmit it without remark, but that the proposal was not to be referred to as mine since the procedure indicated was merely one piece of a general proposal, the other and vital portions of which had been omitted. I stated that I not only thought that his proposal would lead to no agreement for the termination of hostilities, but that I could not continue under the circumstances in my role as a mediator and I would be forced to report to my Government that I should be relieved of further responsibility in this affair. I also stated that if the written proposal was given me for transmittal to the Communist Party that he should instruct the Minister of Information, Mr. Peng, to avoid any reference to this proposal as mine and that if Peng did so, as had occurred in the past, I would officially deny it. This terminated the interview.
I had dinner with the Generalissimo on the evening of the 30th and while it was not a business meeting, he stated to me before my departure that he had decided not to release any public statement at this time regarding the simultaneous meeting of the two committees.