893.00/8–1346
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent)40
| Participants: | Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador, |
| Dr. Tan Shao-hua, Minister-Counselor, Chinese Embassy, | |
| Mr. John Carter Vincent, FE. |
I had luncheon yesterday with Dr. Koo and Dr. Tan at the formers residence.
At the conclusion of the luncheon, Dr. Koo handed me his acknowledgment41 of the President’s letter of August 10 containing the President’s message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Dr. Koo then launched forth into a lengthy discussion of the situation in China, virtually along the same lines as those followed by Dr. Tan in his conversation with me August 10 when I handed him the President’s letter. He stressed the difficulties of reaching any agreement with the Chinese Communists because of their untrustworthiness, [Page 24] their ambition to gain control of the Chinese Government, and their subservience to Moscow. He emphasized the international angle to a solution of China’s internal problem and dwelt on the danger from Russia. His attitude towards the National Government’s sharing its present monopolistic control of China was completely defeatist. He did not seem to be able to envisage that the Government would be able to share its present authority with the Chinese Communists even on a limited basis without seriously endangering the governmental structure in China. He concluded by saying that the principal and long-range objective of dealing with the present situation in China should be the prevention of China’s coming within the orbit of Russia.
I told him that our policy in endeavoring to promote the emergence of a strong, united, democratic China was obviously calculated to achieve the same objective; that one might debate the methods used but that one could not doubt that our objective was to prevent China from becoming a serious problem in international relations; that the President’s statement of December 1542 had been issued with that thought in mind; and that General Marshall’s efforts to promote the creation of a coalition government to bring about political and military unity were also pursued with that objective in mind. I stressed the point that we had hoped that these developments could be brought about under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government. I told him I did not share his fears that a coalition government would mean the end of the Kuomintang as the principal party and political influence in China provided that party was alive to its own responsibilities.
Dr. Koo asked me what the President had in mind in saying that it might be necessary for him “to redefine and explain the position of the United States to the American people”. I told him I did not know what the President had in mind but it should be clear to him (Dr. Koo) that, if the present unsatisfactory situation in China continues, the President might find it necessary to make some statement to the American public on our policy, as indicated. I went on to explain that, insofar as I knew, no one had any idea of a reversal or major alteration in the President’s policy statement of December 15 and that there was no intention to abandon or “wash our hands” of the China problem. Our interest in the Far East, and its relation to world peace, overshadowed any immediate feeling we might have concerning the inability of the Chinese to settle their internal problems and we would therefore continue to have a profound and active interest in developments there. In what special manner that interest would express itself I couldn’t say.
I called Dr. Koo’s attention to the fact that his remarks so far had been based almost exclusively on the apparent assumption that President [Page 25] Chiang would not be able to give the President an encouraging reply. He again spoke of the difficulties in reaching a solution. I told him I certainly hoped that a solution along lines advocated by General Marshall could be found; that in General Marshall they had the very best this country could afford in helping them seek a solution; and that we meant to stick with them and the problem until it was solved in spite of the present discouragements and difficulties.