Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall
My Dear General Marshall: Your memo OSE 446 dated September 19 has been received.
The extremely serious situation at this moment, as I see, has gone far beyond the scope that it can be resolved by a discussion on government reorganization or any other similar procedure. Instead, the key to it rests with cease firing—a prompt and immediate cease firing. Inasmuch as the sole legal agency handling cease firing matters is the Committee of Three, you as its chairman are therefore called upon to hold joint discussion with the two Chinese parties on this paramount and most urgent problem, no matter what their respective views will be.
I wish to recall that it was largely due to your assuming the chairmanship [Page 213] of the Committee of Three in early January, that the cease fire agreement was concluded, and that the Executive Headquarters in Peiping and the various field teams became established, which in turn secured the implementation of that agreement, and ushered in the incipient rays of peace to China proper. It was due to the same event, that the prospect was opened for the fulfillment of the primary part of your mission in China. Again it was this course of events that entailed the successful conclusion of the PCC and the signing of the Army Reorganization Plan.
As the matter now stands, however, we find ourselves facing a state, which can only find a parallel in days prior to January 10, if not even worse. The only proper approach toward disentangling the many complexities lies therefore in effecting a prompt cessation of hostilities. The function as well as the past record of the Committee of Three further underscore your obligation to call its meeting at once. And the reasons are:
- (1)
- The Committee of Three has been in adjournment for nearly three months, it thus not only bars the prospect for peace, but utterly deprives the Executive Headquarters and the field teams a guiding light amidst this turmoil.
- (2)
- There is no precedent in the record of the Committee of Three that any Chinese party has ever rejected your invitation to its meeting. Nor is it conceivable that anybody would ever boycott such a meeting. In particular, the Chinese Communist Party has never undertaken such a step.
I feel therefore all the more justified in requesting a prompt meeting of the Committee of Three at this moment.
As to the rejoinder that the Committee of Three should not be convened until there has been a meeting of the informal five man committee headed by Dr. Stuart, and some progress has been made towards an agreement for the organization of the State Council, it is but a too obvious unwarranted excuse, which I believe you are fully aware. For plainly the informal five man committee would not by itself bring forth a cessation of hostilities. At best, it would only open the way for a discussion on truce,—being still far off from our true objective of cessation of hostilities. Speaking about the reorganization of the State Council itself, it is not a complicated matter at all, unless the Kuomintang government would lavishly play an obstructionist policy. If the Kuomintang would agree to appropriate fourteen seats of the State Council to the Chinese Communist Party and the Democratic League, thus definitely ensuring a one-third vote to safeguard the PCC common program from being infringed upon, the whole issue of the State Council can be settled almost overnight. Would such a course be adopted, I am sure, that Dr. Stuart as the [Page 214] preassigned chairman of that committee can very well confer with both sides for a settlement. If a different course be chosen, then even the abandonment by the Kuomintang of its previous claim for a 8–4–4–4 ratio does not rule out the possibility that it may wreck the whole proceeding by substituting that claim with other terms. Facing such a situation, the debate would just go on endlessly without ever resolving the State Council issue, let alone the cessation of hostilities.
Time and again I have explained to Dr. Stuart, that the resolution of the State Council issue does not call for a formal meeting, as it can very well be achieved by informal talks with the two parties, thereby facilitating the discussion on the principal cease-firing issue. Any insistence on placing the informal five man committee before the Committee of Three is not only unwarranted, but merely a pretext for the purpose of obstruction.
In view of the foregoing I earnestly request that you would immediately call the Committee of Three together, and favour me with an early reply.
Should the Committee of Three nevertheless fail to meet, I can hardly convince myself that there is still a second way leading to cessation of hostilities. By reaching such a stage, I would feel myself forced to make public all the important documents since the armistice in June, in order to clarify the responsibility and appeal to the general public for judgment. I wish hereby to serve notice of my contemplated action.
Faithfully yours,