In my desire that you should be fully informed as regards the latest
phase of the Greek internal problem and the possibilities of a speedy
and satisfactory solution to it, I am sending you the enclosed Aide-Mémoire summarising my views on this
subject.
It would be a source of much satisfaction to me if you would consider the
views expressed therein with the same interest which I know you reserve
to all that concerns my country, whose position in the Mediterranean
renders her worthy of especial attention.
[Enclosure]
The King of the Hellenes (George II) to the Secretary of State
Aide-Mémoire
In his capacity as Head of State, the King of the Hellenes carried
out all negotiations with the Allies before and during the war,
supervised the military re-organisation of his country, and led it
with unshaken steadfastness throughout all the phases of the
struggle against the Axis.
Yet when Greece was about to be liberated, the principal Allied
Governments advised the King of the Hellenes not to return to his
country forthwith; and shortly afterwards, at the end of December
1944, it was insistently demanded of the King that he should appoint
a Regent “for the period of emergency” and that he should remain
abroad until the “free expression of the national will”.
The King acceded to the pressing advice of his Allies and agreed to
this course, issuing his Proclamation of the 29th December 1944.
After repeated postponements during the second half of 1945 and
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the beginning of 1946, the
Greek people were finally called upon to express their will; and in
the elections of March 31st 1946 the people returned the Royalist
parties by an overwhelming majority. Those parties which went to the
people with a clear monarchist programme polled about twice as many
votes as all the other parties added together, and among these other
parties there were some that did not define their position clearly
as regards the regime question. Furthermore, these elections, which
were held under the supervision of Allied Observers, were “free and
fair” according to the Observers’ report, and the volume of
abstention, estimated at 9% by the Observers, “could not have
altered considerably the result of the election”.
2. It is therefore not possible to dispute on any reasonable grounds
that the free expression of the national will has in fact taken
place in Greece and that its implications furnish the King of the
Hellenes with the right and the duty to resume the exercise of his
constitutional functions in Greece.
Nevertheless, in his desire to take into consideration the friendly
counsel offered him, and in his concern that the question of the
regime should be kept completely above party, the King has announced
his decision to await the holding of a plebiscite to confirm yet
again the expression of the popular will in his favour. It is, of
course, understood that this plebiscite should be held as soon as
possible. Any delay would amount to a frustration of the popular
will which has been so recently and so categorically expressed; it
would be quite contrary to the principles of self-determination of
peoples, so often proclaimed during this war; it would embitter
without reason the majority of the Greek people; and finally it
would constitute most unfair treatment towards a Sovereign who has
been at the forefront of the Allied struggle from first to last and
who would now be obliged, against his people’s will, to remain
abroad for a long time, when the Sovereigns of enemy States like
Italy and Japan have not been meted such treatment.
3. In addition to reasons of a moral nature which do not permit a
lengthy postponement of the plebiscite, there are also arguments of
political advisability which militate for its being held
quickly.
The experience of the last few months has shown that the
constitutional problem which has completely absorbed public opinion
in Greece cannot be solved simply by being shelved. Around this
question are bound up all the main differences which have divided
the Greek people for many years; the continuation of the uncertainty
over this question therefore prolongs an explosive atmosphere, which
is being suitably exploited by both extremes so as to confuse the
situation even more. After the liberation of Greece, Allied policy
has
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been based on the hope
that with the passage of time and with the economic reconstruction
of the country, spirits would calm down and the solution of the
regime question would become easier. Time, however, has shown that
on the contrary, it was the prolongation of the institutional
anomaly that has impeded economic reconstruction. Reviewing the
year’s work of UNRRA in Greece Mr.
Maben, head of the UNRRA Mission
in that country, stated on the 2nd April 1946 that “work has been
hindered by the repeated changes of government”, and spoke of “the
disastrous influence of unstable political conditions on the
country’s economy”. The situation was in no way easier at the
beginning of 1946 than in the middle of 1945, and this is the main
reason why the British Government arrived at the conclusion that no
further delay of the elections was justified and insisted on their
being held by the end of March.
4. The elections have fully justified the hopes based on them from
the viewpoint of stabilising the situation in Greece. The recourse
to the popular verdict has been marked by a substantial easing of
the atmosphere from the stifling tension of the last few months.
This is precisely the most suitable moment, during the relative calm
that has followed the elections, to settle the fundamental question
of the regime, which will poison the atmosphere anew if it is left
in abeyance. The majority in the newly-elected Parliament has been
returned with a specific pledge to the people for the holding of a
plebiscite by May; not to hold the plebiscite speedily would
therefore place this majority in complete contradiction to itself.
Many Ministers in the Greek Government have announced their
intention to resign both from office and from Parliament should the
plebiscite be postponed as a result of Allied pressure. The leaders
of the extremist right will find fertile ground for bringing
pressure on the Government, while at the same time the extreme left,
which following its defeat at the elections has now diverted all its
energies towards averting a plebiscite, will find considerable
encouragement in the uncertainty entailed in any postponement. What
it would accept to-day without too much difficulty following the
still fresh expression of popular sovereignty, would actually become
the object of intensive exploitation in a few months and would
obviously be linked with a demand for the dissolution of Parliament
and the holding of fresh elections. Instead of being eased the
situation would thus proceed to fresh complications.
5. It is imperative that Greece should find herself completely
settled internally during the next few months. The vivid example of
other countries has demonstrated how difficult is international
assistance in a country where the internal situation permits its
resistance to be
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sapped
from within. Having now entered the road of stability through the
elections, Greece must not find herself in such a position in a few
months. Once the Greek people have expressed their preference for
the nationalist parties, these must not be put, as a consequence of
the objections of the Allies to satisfy the clear wishes of the
Greek people on the question of the King, in an impossible position
politically, from which will inevitably arise many complications
weakening Greece’s international position.
On the other hand the solution of the question of the regime at a
time when this is a relatively easy matter, would remove the main
obstacle which has so far impeded collaboration between the
Monarchist and the other non-communist parties, and as a consequence
would render a normal political life in Greece much easier.
London, April 1946.
