868.014/4–1846
The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State
No. 2531
[Received April 29.]
Sir: I have the honor to invite the attention of the Department to a report No. 68–46 of March 26, 1946, submitted to the War Department by the Military Attaché to this Embassy, which incorporates the text of a lengthy memorandum on Greece’s northern frontiers prepared by the Greek General Staff. The memorandum itself is too voluminous to copy for transmission to the Department without [Page 140] considerable delay, and will be available in the files of the War Department in any event. However, a transcript of comments78 by the Assistant Military Attaché, Captain William H. McNeill, and a map79 showing the various proposals for boundary changes, are enclosed herewith. Reference is made to the Embassy’s confidential despatch No. 1487 of September 4, 1945,78 on the same general subject.
The memorandum of the General Staff may form the basis of Greek claims at the coming Peace Conference. It contains little if anything that is new, the memorandum being chiefly remarkable for the total extent of the territorial claims put forth. The northernmost blue line on the map represents the maximum sought by the General Staff, with various alternative lines in green or yellow, while the present frontiers are shown in brick red.
Supplementing the Military Attaché’s comments it may be stated that, however adjusted, Greece’s northern frontier would remain indefensible against a powerful aggressor by any forces which this country or its probable allies could muster in time. The Greco-Italian campaign was no exception when considered, as it should be in a military sense, simply as a part of a much larger conflict. Greece was overrun in a matter of three weeks when the Axis chose to shift sufficient forces to this area. The northern frontier is of strategic importance only against a weak adversary, and it may be hoped that at the very least the UNO will be able to prevent such a conflict. A further practical consideration is that the maintenance of a modern army of 50,000 men is already well beyond Greek financial resources and that several times that number, all well equipped, would be required to make even a pretense of defending the northern frontier as a whole.
A further point that cannot be too strongly emphasized is that frontier adjustments at the expense of Bulgaria or Yugoslavia are not at present within the realm of practical politics. Only a profound change in Russia’s attitude, which seems improbable by the time the Balkan frontiers come up for discussion at the Peace Conference, would permit consideration to be given to Greece’s claims, and to obtain any serious hearing such claims would have to be much more modest than those of the Greek General Staff. A very small shift in the Yugoslav frontier, however, would give both countries some of the defensive advantages of the Vardar Pass (see magenta line on map) while no minor change in the Bulgarian border would be of particular benefit except possibly in the southwestern corner of that country. An adjustment at this point presumably would be feasible only if Greece were obtaining substantial territory from Yugoslavia as well. [Page 141] The frontier at the southeastern corner of Bulgaria is admittedly artificial but does not readily lend itself to improvement in favor of Greece.
The Greco-Albanian border belongs in a somewhat different category from those just mentioned. There is little need to repeat here historic, ethnic, geographic and moral considerations, already familiar to the Department, which argue in favor of a revision of this frontier in Greece’s favor. However, there appears to be a very real danger of underestimating political consequences of a negative attitude toward this not unreasonable Greek claim. Sentiment in Greece for the acquisition of “Northern Epirus”, however that area may be defined, is exceedingly strong and all but universal. Moreover, the Greeks believe that they have shown exemplary forbearance and confidently expect that justice will be rendered to their cause at the Peace Conference. Should, therefore, a negative verdict be returned on that occasion, or the question shelved on grounds of expediency, one consequence would certainly be a very profound revulsion of feeling in Greece against the Western Powers, coupled with a decided strengthening of the Greek Left and of the prestige of the Soviet Union posing as the champion of alternative Greek claims in Eastern Thrace. Nor would the issue of Northern Epirus be dropped, for no Greek Government in prospect could afford to do so. Admittedly, the issue is inconvenient and embarrassing from the viewpoint of the Western Allies for the same reasons as in the case of the Bulgar and Yugoslav frontiers, and for the additional reason that they are committed to the maintenance of a sovereign Albanian State, which would certainly not be feasible if that already diminutive country were even further reduced in size. Nevertheless, the issue must be faced.
Geographically the Albanian frontier is as logical as any other in the same general region, but there is still an appreciable Greek minority on the Albanian side (despite Albanian efforts to reduce, disperse or absorb Greek elements) and there is also the very real question whether Albania can exist as a truly sovereign state in view of its small size, lack of resources and general backwardness. Certainly there would seem to be strong arguments in favor of leaving no minorities at the mercy of a primitive majority in a country such as Albania. Except for the possibility of giving the town of Korce (Korcha or Koritza) and immediate vicinity to Greece (see magenta line on map), there is no natural frontier to the west and north of the present border short of one which would turn over to Greece something like half of Albania. The yellow line running from Lin on Lake Ohrid (Ochrida) in a southwesterly direction to the coast south of Valona, which is an alternative suggested by the Greek General [Page 142] Staff, would cross most of the rivers and valleys at right angles, leaving the upper reaches to Greece and producing a highly artificial situation.
The United States is pledged to support Albanian independence, but the country may nevertheless cease to exist as a sovereign power as a result of Communist techniques. In a purely practical sense this may be just as well. Albania has as strong a moral case for independence as Macedonia, and one perhaps almost as good as that of Montenegro, but the fact remains that there is no prospect of this little country’s being able to stand on its own feet. If, therefore, as a result of the initiative of Russia or Yugoslavia, Albania should “ask” to become a “federated” state of a Slav “union”, the United States Government might well insist upon the reconsideration of the whole Albanian question. A partition of the country would transform the present Moslem majority, which occupies the central portion, into a minority within some larger national state. This would have undersirable aspects, but the existence of a few hundred thousand people of one race and religion in a given area is not in itself sufficient practical justification for setting up a sovereign state. Albania was brought into existence in 1912 not out of consideration for its people but primarily to prevent Serbia from obtaining an outlet to the Adriatic. Neither Greece nor Yugoslavia has sound ethnic claims on the central part of the country, but in the event of its partition there is certainly no more reason for giving Moslem-inhabited areas to Yugoslavia than to Greece.
The Greek General Staff’s maximum claims against Albania extend to the Skumbin River plus a corner to the north of that river near the present Albanian-Yugoslav frontier (see blue line on map). This corner would not come into consideration unless Yugoslavia were also making very substantial concessions of territory to Greece. Curiously enough, the General Staff appears to have overlooked the fact that the natural frontier between northern and southern Albania lies a few miles north of the Skumbin River. The latter is a comparatively small stream, and is neither an important defensive barrier nor a logical economic frontier. The watershed immediately to the north (see magenta line on map), extending from Lake Ohrid in a northwesterly direction along the present Albanian-Yugoslav frontier to elevation 2257 meters, and thence in a general westerly direction to Cape Laghi (Kep i Lagit) would appear to furnish the most logical basis for Albania’s partition and would not necessitate changes in the present frontier between Greece and Yugoslavia.
It should be possible to find some solution to the vexing problem of the Greco-Albanian frontier which would be reasonably satisfactory [Page 143] to all of the peoples and nations involved, including the Russians. Certainly the effort must be made. If no solution can be found, then American and British diplomacy should, at the very least, so conduct the case as to place responsibility for failure squarely and obviously at the door of Soviet intransigence.
Respectfully yours,