868.00/5–346
The British Embassy to the Department of State 76
Paraphrase of Telegram from Foreign Office to His Majesty’s Ambassador at Athens Dated April 15, 1946
I have been considering the next step in our policy towards Greece and particularly our attitude towards the question of the plebiscite. If I were asked for my advice on the method and timing of settling the constitutional issue, giving full regard to all relevant facts including the recent elections, I still would have nothing to add to the advice I gave in November of last year i.e. that the plebiscite should be postponed until March 1948.
Nevertheless I do fully appreciate the position and the wishes of the recently elected government for, as I have repeatedly made plain, I am anxious that the Greek Government should increasingly, and as quickly as possible accept full responsibility for the government of their country and I have therefore given further study to the emerging position. There are arguments in favour of an early settlement of [Page 138] this contentious issue. So long as this question remains unsettled Greek political life, it may be argued, cannot be expected to settle down nor is the Greek Government likely to give its full attention to economic and financial reconstruction. Moreover it is becoming increasingly clear that we shall have the greatest difficulty with the King and the constitutionally elected government if we seek a postponement until next year. Nevertheless I am impressed by the passage in the report of the International Observers Mission recommending that all registration lists in Greece should be completely recompiled before the opinion of the Greek people is again sought on a matter of national import, so as to remove all possible justification for charges of fraud based on inaccurate registers in the future.
If the plebiscite were to be held with our acquiescence before the electoral rolls have been revised both we and the Greek Government would lay ourselves open to strong and justifiable criticism not only from the left-wing in Greece, the Soviet Government and their communist friends in all other countries but also from otherwise friendly quarters.
In these circumstances I am considering the desirability of an approach to the Greek Government on the following lines: we understand their anxiety to settle the constitutional question once and for all but for the reasons referred to above an immediate plebiscite held without any adequate revision of the electoral rolls would not only damage the interests of Greece but make it necessary for His Majesty’s Government to reconsider their attitude towards the regime. We should therefore suggest that if they consider they must set aside our advice previously given the Greek Government should make immediate arrangements for the revision of the electoral rolls; and that they should invite the powers whose representatives participated in the International Observers Mission to supervise and check the arrangements made by the Greek Government for the revision of the electoral rolls.
I propose to discuss my suggestion with Mr. Windle on his return, but shall be glad of your views meanwhile. If the Greek Government agreed to proceed on these lines and subject to what is said below concerning economic reconstruction His Majesty’s Government would consider the holding of the plebiscite at any time after the revision of the electoral rolls was complete.
In this case there would of course be a danger that during the period of I suppose about six months before holding the plebiscite, the Greek Government might neglect reconstruction measures. In return therefore for the help in revision offered, His Majesty’s Government would have to require the Greek Government to bind themselves fully to implement the economic and financial plan agreed last January.
[Page 139]I shall be glad of your very early comments. On their receipt I propose to discuss the matter with the United States Government.
- Received in the Department on May 3.↩