767.68119/9–2646: Telegram

The Chargé in Turkey (Bursley) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

1035. There follows translation Soviet note on Straits:

“The Soviet Govt has carefully studied the note of the Turkish Govt dated August 22, which was the response to the note of the USSR Govt of August 7 of this year on the subject of the regime of the Straits of the Black Sea (Détroits de la Mer Noire).

In its note of August 7 the Soviet Govt took up a number of cases on the use of the Straits, in the course of the last war, by the states at war with the USSR and its allies. It was at that time a question only of cases which have been the object of representations and specific protests to the Turkish Govt by the Soviet Govt during the years 1941–1942 and 1944, which does not at all include the cases of the use of the Straits by Germany and Italy for the passage of their warships [Page 861] and their auxiliary warships into the Black Sea and in the opposite direction. It is sufficient to mention the repeated passage through the Straits of German fast pinnaces (péniches) in 1942 and 1943, as well as other similar acts.

The Turkish Govt has given its explanations on this subject. However, these explanations have not denied the statements set forth in the Soviet note of August 7 as far as the concrete facts are concerned. The reference contained in the note of the Turkish Govt and according to which Turkey undertook, upon the demand of the Govt of Great Britain, measures against the passage through the Straits of German vessels destined for servicing the German fleet and for the transportation of German troops while recognizing that the passage of certain of these ships through the Straits had been authorized prior to the said protest on the part of Great Britain only confirms the justice of statement of the Soviet Government that, during the last war, the Straits Convention did not prevent the enemy powers from using the Straits for purposes of the war against the Allied states.

Consequently the Soviet Government considers it necessary to record also the fact that, during the war, the Turkish Government ceased to furnish the belligerent states with reports on the movement of vessels in the Straits although Turkey was required to do this in accordance with article 24 of the Convention.

In its note of August 22, the Turkish Government indicates certain circumstances which in its opinion rendered control in the Straits difficult. Thus it is pointed out that in the Naval Annual there are no names of warships and auxiliary war vessels which illegally passed the Straits during the war. However, the Turkish Government certainly is not unaware that official annuals containing the complete list of warships and [of auxiliary ships, do not exist] especially during wartime. The note of the Turkish Government also states that, in accordance with the Convention, the only form of control of vessels passing through the Straits is the sanitary control but it is known on the other hand that the Turkish authorities, by their notices to mariners dated February 25 and May 6, 1941 and June 27, 1942, established for transit vessels compulsory stops and the use of Turkish pilots in the Straits. The customs authorities also carried out control of vessels in transit. If these control measures were, however, insufficient, one is nevertheless obliged to record that, during the course of the war, the Turkish Government did not once raise the question of whether it was necessary to strengthen the measure[s] for the control of the passage of vessels through the Straits.

In the note of the Turkish Government it is stated that during the Second World War the Soviet Government made no declaration to [Page 862] the Government of the Turkish Republic concerning the existence of the threat to the security of the USSR in the Black Sea region. From this, the said note draws the conclusion that Turkey discharged during the war the task of guardian of the Straits and that the Axis countries, in view of the attitude taken by Turkey, did not decide to infringe the regime established in the Straits.

The Soviet Government does not consider this point of view justified and draws the attention of the Turkish Government to the fact that the repeated representations which the USSR made to Turkey on the subject of the passage of enemy vessels through the Straits during the war prove the contrary. As to the extent of the above-mentioned threat, it is sufficient to recall the fact that the Soviet High Command, having in mind the repeated cases of free passage of enemy warships and auxiliary war vessels through the Straits during the war, found itself obliged to withdraw an important number of military effectives from the principal sectors of the war theater for the defense of the Black Sea region.

All the foregoing confirms that the Straits regime established by the Montreux Convention does not respond to the security interests of the Black Sea powers and does not assure conditions in which it will be possible to forestall the use of the Straits for purposes hostile to the Black Sea powers. The explanations given by the Turkish Government have not overcome, according to the Soviet Government, the above stated conclusion. These explanations moreover do not furnish the reason why the Government of Turkey should be relieved of the responsibility which rests upon it for the violation of the Straits regime during the war.

In the note of August 7, the Soviet Government expressed an opinion on the subject of the five principles which it proposes to advance as a basis of the establishment of the new regime in the Straits. To judge from the Turkish note of August 22, the Government of Turkey has nothing against the taking as a basis of discussion the first three points of the Soviet proposals, namely:

1.
The Straits shall always be open to the passage of merchant vessels of all countries.
2.
The Straits shall always be open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea powers.
3.
The passage of warships of powers non-riparian of the Black Sea through the Straits is not allowed, except in cases especially provided for.

(There is no paragraph here in the French text—the text continues.)

The Soviet Government expresses its satisfaction with the fact that the Turkish Government is ready to accept as a basis the three above-mentioned principles although it pointed out that it had in view the making later on of certain reservations.

[Page 863]

The Government of Turkey made known its own opinion with regard to the proposals of the USSR embodied in points 4 and 5 of the Soviet note of August 7.

In point 4, the Soviet Government proposed to recognize that the establishment of the regime of the Straits should be a matter within the competence of Turkey and the other Black Sea powers. Since the Turkish Government has indicated a certain distrust regarding the proposal, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to dwell longer on this question.

In accord with this, the Soviet Government desires before all to invite the attention of the Turkish Government to the special situation of the Black Sea as a closed sea. Such a situation means that the Straits of the Black Sea represent a seaway leading only to the shores of a limited number of powers, namely: to the shores of several Black Sea powers. Therefore, it is entirely natural that the Soviet Union and the other Black Sea powers are the most interested in the regulation of the regime of the Straits of the Black Sea and, accordingly, their situation in this matter cannot be compared with that of the other powers. The destination of these Straits, leading to the Black Sea which is a closed sea, differs from that of world seaways such as, for example, Gibraltar or the Suez Canal, giving access not to a limited number of states, and which, as is known, are seaways of world importance. With regard to such international seaways, it is indeed necessary to establish an international control with the participation of the powers most interested which, moreover, has not yet been realized. With regard to the Straits of the Black Sea leading into the Black Sea which is a closed sea, it seems proper in this case to establish such a regime of the Straits which above all would meet the special situation and the security of Turkey, the USSR and the other Black Sea powers.

It is the Montreux Conference of which the insufficiency in this matter is evident, which established a preferential position for the Black Sea powers with regard to the Straits regime. On the other hand, the Turkish Government has agreed to recognize as a basis the first three points of the Soviet proposals of last August 7, in which the special situation of the Black Sea powers in the Straits was recognized in a much more definitive way than in the Montreux Convention. In these proposals, it is stated, on the one hand, the Straits shall be open to the passage of merchant vessels of all countries and, on the other hand, only warships of the Black Sea powers shall have access to the Straits, whereas the passage through the Straits of warships of countries not on the shores of the Black Sea is not allowed, with the exception of special cases. As is known, these principles, bringing into relief the position of the Black Sea powers in the Straits in relation with that [Page 864] of the other countries, have been fully recognized by the whole world, although they are not duly reflected in the Convention in force, adopted at Montreux.

With reference to the matter under consideration, the Soviet Government deems it necessary to recall that the special position of the Black Sea powers in the Straits was further recognized in the Soviet-Turkish treaty which was signed March 16, 1921.

In article 5 of this treaty the following is stated: ‘In order to assure the opening of the Straits and free passage through these Straits for commercial relations between all peoples, the two contracting parties are agreed to entrust a special conference of delegates of the littoral countries with the definitive drafting of the international statute on the Black Sea and Straits, provided that the decisions which it shall take shall not impair the absolute sovereignty of Turkey, and their [her] capital Constantinople.’

Thus the Turkish-Soviet treaty of 1921 is based on the recognition of the necessity of confiding the drafting of the international statute of the Black Sea and Straits, to a conference, composed only of the representatives of riparian countries. There is an analogous article in the treaty concluded between Turkey and the Transcaucasian Soviet Republics on October 13, 1921, as well as in the treaty concluded between Turkey and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on May [January] 21, 1922. The insertion in the above-mentioned treaties of the article containing the principle of the establishment of the Straits regime by the riparian countries of the Black Sea, indicates the great importance attributed to this principle by the said countries, including Turkey.

All this demonstrates that the proposal of the Soviet Government set forth in point 4 of its note of August 7 is in full accord with the above-mentioned treaties signed by Turkey. The subsequent postponement of the putting into force of the procedure regarding the establishment of the statute of the Black Sea and of the Straits, contemplated by these treaties, cannot be justified.

On the other hand, the experience of the last war proved that the principle of the establishment of the regime of the Straits which was recognized in these treaties by Turkey as well as by the Soviet Union really meets the legitimate interests of the Black Sea powers and is not at all in conflict with the interests of other countries interested in the stability of general peace and the security of nations.

The Turkish Government also opposes point 5 of the Soviet note of August 7 in which it is contemplated that Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested and best able to assure freedom of commercial navigation and security in the Straits, assure defense of the Straits by joint defense means in order to prevent the usage of the Straits by other states for purposes hostile to the Black Sea powers.

[Page 865]

The Turkish Government states that the said Soviet proposal is incompatible with the sovereign rights of Turkey and would destroy her security. The Turkish Government reached this conclusion long before hearing several concrete considerations of the Soviet Government on this subject and without even having made an attempt to put under joint study the pertinent proposals of the USSR.

In declining en bloc all possibility of joint study with the Soviet Union of this important problem, indissolubly linked with the security interests of the USSR and the other Black Sea powers, the Turkish Govt is in complete contradiction with its own declarations regarding its desire to reestablish friendly relations with the USSR based on confidence by considering it possible to give voice to such suspicions which had no basis at all and which moreover are incompatible with the dignity of the Soviet Union.

Despite the point of view expressed in the Turkish note, the Soviet Govt is of the opinion that only the means of Turkey and the Soviet Union combined can assure the freedom of commercial navigation as well as the security of the Straits. Accordingly the Soviet Govt believes that the application of the above-mentioned Soviet proposal should not prejudice the sovereignty of Turkey and should at the same time meet still better the interests of its security, since the joint measures of Turkey and the Soviet Union can assure the safeguarding of the Straits in much fuller measure than those of Turkey alone.

The refusal of Turkey to assume [assure?] the defence of the Straits jointly with the Soviet Union deprives the Black Sea powers of the possibility of guaranteeing the necessary security in this region.

During the last war the Axis countries used the Black Sea for their military operations against the USSR, to which contributed the fact that they were able to send into the Black Sea certain warships and auxiliary war vessels. There is also well remembered such a fact as the sudden passage through the Straits to the Black Sea in 1914 of the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau which upon entering the Black Sea attacked the Russian fleet and the Black Sea ports. All this is taken into consideration in the proposal for the common Soviet-Turkish defense of the Straits having for purpose the assuring of a strong defense of the Straits in the interest of Turkey as well as in that of those of the other Black Sea powers, which cannot be fully assured by Turkey alone. On the other hand, if Turkey, after having declined the proposal of the USSR, were to set about taking (s’était mise a effectuer) military measures in the Straits by common accord with several powers non-riparian of the Black Sea, they [this] obviously would be in contradiction with the security interests of the Black Sea powers. It would be unjust to forget that the Soviet Black Sea shores, extending 2100 kilometers, give access to the most important regions of the country, wherefore the necessity for assuring their security with direct [Page 866] participation of the Soviet Union in the defense of the Straits has its origin in the vital interests of the USSR. All this explains the reason why the Soviet Government considers it necessary that the defense of the Straits should be carried out by the joint efforts of Turkey and the Soviet Union and have for its objective the assuring of the security of all the Black Sea states.

Regarding the reference of the Turkish Government to the UNO, the Soviet Government believes it necessary to state that its proposal set forth in the note of August 7 is entirely in conformity with the principles and objectives of that organization. This proposal assures not only the general interests of international commerce but creates also the conditions for the maintenance of the security of the Black Sea powers and thereby even contributes to the consolidation of general peace.

The Soviet Government believes it necessary to note that the remarks of the Turkish Government, relating to the procedure for the revision of the Montreux Convention, does [do] not take into account the decisions of the Three Power Conference at Berlin that the Straits Convention concluded at Montreux should be revised as not meeting present conditions. With regard to the Conference of the Straits regime, the Soviet Government is of the opinion that the calling of this Conference should be preceded by as fully possible a discussion of this question through direct pourparlers between Governments, as was envisaged by that same decision.”

Can Department repeat to Paris and also get to Ambassador Wilson who probably in Zurich.83

Bursley
  1. Repeated to Paris on September 28 with request to forward copy to Bern for Ambassador Wilson in Zurich.