767.68119/8–2046
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
The British Ambassador72 called at his request. He said that he had come to ask a question relating to our note to the Turks and the Soviet Union about the Straits. He said that two of our officers had had conversations with two of the British officers, referring to Mr. Loy Henderson, who had talked with Mr. Balfour,73 and to Mr. Matthews74 who had talked with someone in Paris. Both officers had stated that the United States took a very serious view of the situation and had used an expression, which escapes me for the moment, but which was something to the effect that the United States was prepared to see this matter through to the end. He said this had created quite a bit of excitement in London, and he was calling on me to ask whether this was an indication that the United States was prepared to resort to war if necessary to maintain its position.
I said that I thought that I understood what our officers had had in mind and perhaps the Ambassador could get a better view of the situation if I gave him some of the background. The view of the [Page 850] Department, which was shared by the War and Navy Departments and had been laid before the President and approved by him was that this was a most serious matter and that the United States should not get into the matter at all unless it realized fully the seriousness of it and was prepared to conduct itself in a manner appropriate to that realization. We thought, in the first place, that if this were not true, the United States might easily mislead other people into taking positions which would cause the very trouble which we wished to avoid, thereby inadvertently getting us into a position for which we would not be adequately prepared. We thought, in the second place, that if we thoroughly appreciated the seriousness of the step which we were taking, we and the others involved in this matter would conduct ourselves with restraint and seriousness, doing everything in our power to bring about a peaceful solution of the matter, and that this attitude would of itself be communicated by our very acts to the Soviet Union. I said that, of course, the Ambassador appreciated that not only constitutionally but as a matter of the actual operation of government in the United States no one could commit the United States to entering military operations and that in the long run the state of public opinion and the state of Congressional opinion were the dominant factors. It was with this in mind that we had talked with the press this afternoon for the purpose of impressing the seriousness of the matter upon them and urging them to treat the matter with solemnity and restraint. I thought that all the officials of the Government who were dealing with the matter understood all the possible consequences and were acting with all the care and thought that this understanding brought to them.
The Ambassador said that he had believed before he came to see me that I would say very much what I had said to him, but that some people in the Embassy and London were taking a slightly more excited view of the matter.