867N.01/9–546

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilson)61

confidential
Participants: Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Jewish Agency
Mr. Henderson—NEA
Mr. Merriam—NE
Mr. Wilson—NE

Subject: Refusal of Jewish Agency to Participate in London Conference.

Mr. Epstein called at the request of Dr. Goldmann, of the Agency Executive, to inform the Department that the Executive had reluctantly decided that it could not accept the invitation of the British Government to the proposed conference on Palestine under the conditions proposed. The decision had been unanimous and had included Dr. Weizmann and Dr. Goldmann. In order not to embarrass the British Government the Agency was not making the decision public, and Mr. Epstein requested that this information be kept confidential. He said that the decision had only been reached after the most serious consideration, but that the terms imposed by the British for the Agency’s attendance were not acceptable. The most serious obstacle in this connection was the insistance of the British on putting forward the Morrison–Grady plan as the basis for discussion.

In the light of the well-known position of the Zionist movement with regard to a Jewish state, it was impossible for the leaders of that movement to participate in a conference on any other basis than that of a Jewish state in at least a part of Palestine. The Zionist movement, Mr. Epstein said, was a democratic movement and its leaders had to follow the desires of the rank and file. Constitutionally they could not enter into negotiations on any other basis than that of a Jewish state without the consent of the movement through a Zionist congress. In fact, the decision of the Executive to accept partition as a basis for entering into the negotiations represented a very marked modification from the official Zionist position as enunciated in the Biltmore program.62 For the sake of entering into negotiations with the British which would give some hope of a settlement in Palestine, the Executive had been willing to proceed on the basis of partition, but [Page 693] it was entirely unwilling to enter into negotiations with regard to the Morrison–Grady scheme. Their objections to this latter scheme were chiefly in connection with its failure to give the Jews sufficient assurances regarding immigration and autonomy in economic matters.

In other words, Mr. Epstein continued, the Agency was unwilling to be placed in a position where it might have to compromise between the Morrison–Grady proposals on the one hand and its own partition plan on the other. This would inevitably result if the Morrison–Grady plan were to be considered first.

Mr. Wilson inquired whether it would be correct to say that the Agency Executive had now accepted partition as the solution for Palestine which it favored. Mr. Epstein replied in the affirmative, pointing out that the decision to do so had been taken with only one member of the Executive voting against, and with three members abstaining. (This apparently referred to the meeting of the Agency Executive in Paris last month when the Morrison–Grady scheme was rejected but the decision was taken to negotiate with the British regarding partition under certain conditions.)

Mr. Epstein said that the situation was extremely serious, both from the standpoint of reaching a settlement in Palestine and from the standpoint of the future course that the Zionist movement would take. He very much feared that as a result of these developments the extremists would take over in Palestine as well as in the American Zionist organization. He could not foresee what course events would take and he had no specific request to make of the Department. Dr. Goldmann and Dr. Weizmann were conferring with regard to possible future action and it might be that he would have some word soon as to what might develop. Meanwhile Dr. Goldmann was maintaining a very tenuous contact with the British Govermnent and it was to be hoped that this contact would not be broken.

Mr. Henderson thanked Mr. Epstein for this full account of the present position and said that he would inform Acting Secretary Clayton.

William L. Clayton
  1. A copy of this memorandum was transmitted to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton) by Mr. Henderson on the same date. In his covering memorandum Mr. Henderson noted that the decision of the Jewish Agency not to participate in the forthcoming talks in London regarding Palestine “is a most serious development, as it is not likely that a satisfactory settlement can result from a conference between the British and the Arabs only.” (867N.01/9–546)
  2. Program adopted by the Extraordinary Conference of American Zionists at the Biltmore Hotel, New York City, on May 11, 1942, calling for the establishment of the whole of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth.