Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

867N.01/8–1246: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman)

top secret
us urgent

Washington, August 12, 1946—5 p.m.

5973. Section I. Premature leaks from London re contents recommendations incorporated in Morrison Plan gave groups in this country opposed to plan opportunity mobilize so much public sentiment against it that Cabinet Committee and President felt they could not agree accept recommendations at least until they had studied and discussed them in detail. Alternates of Cabinet Committee, American members of Anglo-American Committee, the Cabinet Committee, other members of Cabinet and various interested persons and groups have participated in the discussions. During discussions, it has become clear that it would be unwise for President to give his formal support to Plan in its present form. President feels that in view opposition to Plan, he would not be able to prevail on Congress to agree to financial contributions for its implementation nor to rally sufficient public support to warrant undertaking by this Govt to give plan in its present form moral backing.

Section II. We have now been informed in confidence by Dr. Goldmann,³⁸ acting behalf of Jewish Agency that on Aug 5, 1946, Executive of that Agency adopted following resolution:

• “1) The Executive of the Jewish Agency regards the Brit proposals based on the Report of the Committee of Six and as announced by Mr. Morrison in the House of Commons as unacceptable as a basis of discussion.
• “2) The Executive is prepared to discuss a proposal for the establishment of a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine.
• “3) As immediate steps for the implementation of Paragraph 2 the Executive puts forward the following demands:—
  • “a) the immediate grant of 100,000 certificates and the immediate beginning of the transportation of the 100,000 to Palestine;
  • “b) the grant of immediate full autonomy (in appointing its administration and in the economic field) to that area of Palestine to be designated to become a Jewish State;
  • “c) the grant of the right of control of immigration to the administration of that area in Palestine designated to be a Jewish State.”

Section III. In discussing this resolution, Dr. Goldmann has orally stated substantially as follows:

A. Executive and most of American Jewry object to Plan primarily because it calls for indefinite continuance Brit control of Jewish area, provides for boundaries which are unacceptable, does not give sufficient degree self-govt for area allotted to Jews, and does not provide for immediate control by Jews of immigration into Jewish area.

B. Executive would be willing accept plan which:

1. would provide for immediate partitioning of Palestine into three areas: Jewish, Arab and the holy places; the Jewish area roughly to include territory assigned to Jews by Peel Report,³⁹ plus the Negeb; Arab area to include remainder except holy places. (Executive would be willing, however, to negotiate with regard to Galilee);

2. would provide for termination Mandate so far as Jewish area concerned and for setting up of independent Jewish state within set period of not more than two or three years;

3. would permit Jews to set up their own administration and to enjoy considerable home rule in economic matters pending establishment independent Jewish state;

4. would permit Jews, immediately upon adoption of Plan, have full control immigration into their area.

C. He could guarantee support for such a plan on part of Agency and of majority Jews and friends of Zionism in US.

D. If such a plan were carried out, Executive would be willing consider Brit Govt as ally of Jewish State and would support granting to Great Britain of such military establishments in Jewish State as Great Britain might require.

E. In his opinion, Jewish State would be willing to participate in confederation of Near Eastern states, including Arab states, for purpose cooperation and under such conditions as should remove fear of Arabs that Jewish state might serve as spearhead for introducing external influences into Near East.

F. In his opinion, more moderate Arabs could be induced not to oppose such a plan. If it should be decided add Arab area to Trans-Jordan, support of King Abdullah might be obtained since Trans-Jordan might, with addition of some 800,000 Arabs, become viable state.

G. In his opinion, Jewish State could be set up and recognized as independent by Great Britain without detailed review by United Nations in same manner as Trans-Jordan has been set up;⁴⁰ naturally when Jewish State would apply for admission to UN it would be subject to scrutiny given all applicants for admission that organization.

H. Immediately upon reaching decision adopt plan immigration 100,000 Jews should commence.

I. Dr. Weizmann was authorized by Executive discuss plan with Brit Govt and Executive hoped without loss of time two Govts might be willing accept it as basis for coming negotiations Brit with Arabs and Jews and that American Govt would give any solution based on it financial support comparable in extent to that suggested in Morrison plan. It hoped in particular American Govt would find it possible give financial assistance facilitate voluntary migration Arabs from Jewish to Arab area. Jews were prepared give every consideration Arab population and would not bring pressure directly or indirectly upon Arabs to leave Jewish territory.

Section IV. Examination Goldmann plan indicates although Executive states in first paragraph resolution that it rejects Morrison plan as basis for discussion, counter-proposals of Executive as elaborated upon by Goldmann might be regarded as certain alterations and extensions in various provisions Morrison plan rather than outlines of an entirely new plan. Counterproposals, for instance, contemplate short definite rather than indefinite transition period, and extension of authority of local govt during such period. According to Goldmann Jews wish their area during period nominate its own ministers subject approval Mandatory; they desire this area should have authority deal with such matters as imports and exports and borrowing money even though they realize creditors would have to be persons or organizations willing rely upon credit of transitory govt. They also insist area have right fully control its own immigration. Boundaries which they apparently have in mind furthermore are much more liberal to Jews than those defined in Morrison proposals. They admit Negeb might be of problematic value but insist it is of great psychological importance in that it added many square miles Jewish area.

Section V. Brit Govt undoubtedly in better position than we to assess kind of reception which such plan would receive from Arabs. In our view this recent development offers hope that Jewish Agency will realistically join in search for practicable solution. As first step we suggest possibility that Brit Govt might let it be known that coming consultations will not be rigidly bound to consideration one plan and the possibility of early creation of viable state of Jewish portion not precluded. If Brit Govt, following consultations with Arabs and Jews, reaches decision which this Govt feels can obtain general public approval this country even though not satisfactory to extremists, this Govt will give it moral support and endeavor back it up with appropriate financial assistance.

Section VI. You are authorized discuss matter with Attlee, Bevin or Acting Minister Foreign Affairs. Please impress upon them importance of extreme secrecy.

Sent London 5973 rptd Paris 4037 (Secdel 657) for Secretary Byrnes and Ambassador Harriman.⁴¹

Acheson

38. In a conversation with the Acting Secretary of State on August 7; memorandum of conversation not printed.
39. British Cmd. 5479: Palestine Royal Commission Report, July 1937.
40. For documentation on this subject, see pp. 794 ff.
41. In telegram 4005 (Delsec 818), from Paris, August 13, 7 p.m., Ambassador Harriman stated: “I gave to Mr. Bevin the substance of your Secdel 657. Although Mr. Bevin indicated he was familiar with the proposals outlined by Dr. Goldmann as they appeared to be the same as those made to the British Government by Dr. Weizmann, he said that he would study the matter and discuss it later.” (740.00119 Council/8–1346).