Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

867N.01/7–246

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee ⁷⁹

top secret

Washington, 21 June 1946.

With regard to the request of 7 June 1946 by the Acting State member, State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee (Appendix), following are comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on certain topics proposed by the British for joint consideration in connection with the recommendations of the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine.^* It will be noted that no definitive recommendations are offered on many of the difficult political aspects of this problem, on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not feel they should advise.

We urge that no U.S. armed forces be involved in carrying out the Committee’s recommendations. We recommend that in implementing the report, the guiding principle be that no action should be taken which will cause repercussions in Palestine which are beyond the capabilities of British troops to control.

Should the question of using any U.S. forces arise, we would point out that, under present War and Navy Department commitments to the Congress, only very limited forces could be spared from tasks in which we are already engaged. Such contingents might in theory be of a size to contribute to pacifying the situation in Palestine, but we believe that the political shock attending the reappearance of U.S. armed forces in the Middle East would unnecessarily risk such serious disturbances throughout the area as to dwarf any local Palestine difficulties. Such a condition would, among other effects, invalidate entirely any current estimates of required strengths of the Army and Navy. Further, the Middle East could well fall into anarchy and become a breeding ground for world war.

It is believed that implementation of the report by force would prejudice British and U.S. interests in much of the Middle East and that British and U.S. influence would consequently be curtailed except as it might be maintained by military force. The USSR might replace the United States and Britain in influence and power through the Middle East.

As to the importance of a stable Middle East, friendly to the Western Powers, it is obvious that this area is the buffer between Russia and the British Mediterranean life line. If the peoples of the Middle East turn to Russia, this would have the same impact in many respects as would military conquest on this area by the Soviets. Under these conditions, even if Turkey maintains her internal and political integrity, it is highly questionable that she could continue her stand on the Dardanelles⁸⁰ and maintain her position as other than a satellite Russian state. Also, for very serious consideration from a military point of view is control of the oil of the Middle East.⁸¹ This is probably the one large undeveloped reserve in a world which may come to the limits of its oil resources within this generation without having developed any substitute. A great part of our military strength, as well as our standard of living, is based on oil.

As to U.S. participation in a Palestine trusteeship, we consider that military advice must rest on our supposition that such participation would lead to military involvement, on which subject our views are stated above.

In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that in implementing the report of the Anglo-American Committee, no action be taken which would:

a. Commit U.S. armed forces, or

b. Orient the peoples of the Middle East away from the Western Powers, as the U.S. has a vital security interest in that area.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A. J. McFarland

Colonel, U.S. Army
Secretary

79. Circulated within the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee on June 21 as SWNCC 311. The Committee agreed, on June 27, to transmit the JCS paper to the Department of State. In telegram 3142, June 26, 1946, from Paris (DelSec 634), the Secretary directed Mr. Acheson to “make certain that the President sees the JCS paper on Palestine”. Mr. Acheson responded in telegram 3129, June 27, 1946 (Secdel 360), that he had handed the paper to the President. (740.00119 Council/6–2646)
80. A limited number of copies of this report was circulated to the State, War and Navy Departments with SWN–4393 dated 7 June 1946. [Footnote in the original.]
80. For documentation on the question of the Turkish Straits, see pp. 801 ff.
81. For documentation on this subject, see pp. 18 ff.