Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

867N.01/6–1946: Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

secret

Beirut, June 19, 1946—11 a.m.
[Received 8:20 p.m.]

292. Following are synopses of:

(1) Reply⁷⁴ to our memorandum of May 20; and

(2) Comment on Palestine Committee’s 10 recommendations, (reLegtel 290, June 17⁷⁵).

1. League is glad United States Government recognized recommendations as advisory only, considers Committee possessed neither legality nor permanency, believes some members lacked impartiality, nevertheless facilitated enquiry because of cherished friendly relations with peace-loving United States endangered by clamorous American Jewry seeking American support for Jewish state.

Interference by these American Jews in violation rights of Palestine Arabs and consequent investment Jewish-American funds for political objective merit censor [censure?] rather than favor of United States Government. Resulting Palestine question was not created by Nazi persecutions but by earlier mistaken British policy based on Balfour Declaration.⁷⁶ Palestine offers no solution to Jewish problem. Support of Zionism is persecution of Palestine Arabs. In confusion of two questions justice is lost.

Had United States attempted solve racial persecution on world-wide humanitarian basis, Arabs would have gladly lent support.

American material and moral aid have led Zionists to believe they can dictate their will in Palestine. To this end they have organized armed forces. While United States works for United Nations principles, clamorous American Zionists work to precipitate clash between Arab and American policies and interests.

If Zionist threat of force continues Arabs cannot stand supine. It is unlikely a clash could be localized. Mandatory power’s inability to disband Zionist army is already apparent. Surely United States does not support policy of might against right. Even worse, these developments and American support of Zionism is poisoning Arab thought and engendering hitherto unknown anti-Semitism. Had these energies and funds been directed elsewhere for solution of Jewish problem good fruit for all would have resulted.

We share sincerely American Government’s desire that firm good political, economic and cultural relations continue despite efforts of political Zionists and hope avoid necessity defend existence of Palestine Arabs.

We are sending British Government, now responsible for administration of Palestine, detailed comment on Committee’s biased recommendations. It should know that neither Zionist forces nor its own can free it from former pledges or basic policy of 1939 White Paper.

Finally, knowing Committee Enquiry does not constitute consultations promised by United States Government, we stress that this reply should likewise not be so construed. True consultation requires better opportunity for exchange of views and understanding. We recall Roosevelt letter of April 5, 1945 to Ibn Saud.⁷⁷

2. Partiality towards Zionist case has been shown by some members of Committee. Clearly too some came to carry out already formulated policy, such as recommendation that 100,000 immigrants be accepted this year, no more no less, same figure proposed by President Truman. In general, recommendations do not follow logically from fact finding.

Hurried enquiry precluded penetration to basic facts of Palestine situation. Due consideration was not given rights of rising Arab nationalism or of Arab League to speak for regional interests. Recommendations contravene interests of every Arab nation.

Committee was influenced by sentimental tides and failed give practical consideration to problems inherent in its recommendations. Those based on economic projects are impossible because contingent upon cooperation between Arabs and Zionists. Recommended immigration ignores legal and natural Arab rights. On fundamentals Committee’s apparent desire to impose particular policy by force cannot be reconciled with principles of democracy and United Nations.

First recommendation strangely reports hopelessness of finding homes for Jews except in Palestine when vast areas exist especially in British Empire and United States. Transfer to Palestine can only mean sacrifice of Palestine on altar of Zionist political greed.

Second recommendation. Another strange contradiction is recognition that 100,000 would be heavy load on Palestine, that even without immigration population density of its settled area will rise in 14 years to 450 per square mile, and that Palestine is poor in resources and industrial possibilities.

Third recommendation. Principles here enunciated would impair government by majority and envisage unjust equalization of position, Arab rights being based on over thousand years settlement whereas Jews rely on weak historical association severed 2,000 years ago. This is contrary to practice and law of nations, discriminating against Palestine Arabs and depriving them of rights enjoyed in other Arab lands.

Fourth recommendation. To continue present government until hostility between Jew and Arab disappears would violate mandate itself. Jews seek majority and Jewish state; Arabs will never admit this Zionist dream, now encouraged by Committee’s views on immigration.

Fifth recommendation. Palestine Arab living standard is not inferior to those in Egypt, Syria or Lebanon where no conflict exists with prosperous Jewish communities. Basis of conflict in Palestine is forced establishment of Jews of heterogeneous cultures; additional reason is mandatory budgeting of 5 per centums for education, health and social services against 30 per centums for security and officials.

Sixth recommendation. Continued immigration would ignore Arab rights; already percentage Arab population has been reduced to 69 from 87 in 1922. White Paper voiced decisive conviction that immigration had already injured position and rights of Arabs.

Seventh recommendation. Committee ignored fact that several earlier British attempts along lines now recommended resulted in complete failure; also that 1940 land transfer regulations were result studied British effort to afford Arabs just protection.

Eighth recommendation. Suggests projects requiring cooperation of neighboring Arab states, whereas no Arab state would further any project furthering Zionist expansion, a danger to themselves as well. No project for Palestine development can be considered unless guarantee be given that Arab character of Palestine will be maintained.

Ninth recommendation re education is reasonable, but so long as mandate and present policy continue sufficient funds cannot be envisaged. This is additional reason for Palestine independence.

Tenth recommendation. Whereas British treated Arabs with utmost severity when they rose to defend natural rights, Jewish aggression meets patience and tolerance and Jews are not disarmed. Arab Higher Committee was suppressed without due proofs, whereas Jewish Agency is unmolested although refusing cooperation in restoration of order and companion of terrorists. To put Arab and Jews on same level in this regard falsifies situation.

(Paraphrases to Arab capitals).

Wadsworth

74. By the League of Arab States.
75. Not printed; it reported that Secretary-General Azzam had handed to Mr. Wadsworth on June 15 a note transmitting the League’s reply (890B.00/6–1746).
76. For text of letter concerning a Jewish national home in Palestine written by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Arthur James Balfour, to Lord Walter Rothschild on November 2, 1917, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, p. 752, footnote 14.
77. Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. viii, p. 698.