Office of the Historian

867N.01/5–2746: Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman 50

top secret
[London, undated.]

Personal and Top Secret. In your message of the 17th [16th] May, you asked me to give you some indication of the subjects which, in the opinion of this Government, should form the basis of discussion between our expert officials. The following list enumerates the various matters on which decisions would be required before the report could be implemented and I think that a full and frank exchange of views between our officials on all these matters would be of great value to both our Governments.51

Recommendation No. 1.

(a)
The further efforts to be made by the two Governments in association with other Governments to find new homes for displaced persons generally.
(b)
The finding of new homes for Jewish displaced persons outside Palestine.
(c)
The steps that might be taken to secure that practical effect is given in Europe to the provision of the United Nations Charter calling for the “Universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language and religion”.

Recommendation No. 2.

(a)
The cost of
(1)
Transporting;
(2)
Temporarily accommodating and maintaining and,
(3)
Permanently housing the 100,000 Jewish immigrants proposed for admission to Palestine.
(b)
The provision of transport.
(c)
The supply of materials for housing.
(d)
The capital assets necessary to enable productive work to be found for the immigrants.
(e)
The financing of this immigration.
(f)
The rate at which 100,000 immigrants could be absorbed into the economy of Palestine without creating widespread unemployment.
(g)
The method of selection of immigrants.
[Page 613]

Recommendation No. 3.

(a)
The measure of self government, in the near future, consistent with the three principles laid down by the committee in this recommendation.
(b)
The possibility of devising a workable constitution in which, in accordance with the committee’s suggestion, a numerical majority would not be decisive.

Recommendation No. 4.

(a)
The nature of the administering authority to be defined in the trusteeship agreement for Palestine—a single state, two or more states, or direct administration by the United Nations.
(b)
The states to be regarded as “directly concerned” for the purpose of article 79 of the Charter.
(c)
The prospect of negotiating a trusteeship agreement for Palestine on the basis of the report with whatever group of states may be recognised to be “directly concerned”.

Recommendation No. 5.

(a)
The measures necessary to bridge the gap now existing between Jewish and Arab standards of living.
(b)
The cost of these measures.
(c)
The advisability of encouraging the formation by the Arabs of a communal organisation similar to that already established by the Jews.

Recommendation No. 6.

(a)
The possibility of defining more precisely than is done by the committee in the comment upon this recommendation the principles which should be observed in regulating future immigration into Palestine.
(b)
The prevention of illegal immigration.
(c)
The form in which the Jewish Agency should be required to cooperate in such prevention.

Recommendation No. 7.

(a)
If the Land Transfers Regulations of 1940 were rescinded, the nature of the legislation required to provide adequate protection for small owners and tenant cultivators.
(b)
The measures necessary to ensure that too large a proportion of the land does not become unalienable through acquisition by one or other community.
(c)
The prevention of illegal land seizures.

Recommendation No. 8.

(a)
The methods to be adopted in the examination, discussion and execution of plans for large scale development in Palestine.
(b)
The chances of obtaining the willing cooperation of adjacent Arab states in the execution of such projects.
(c)
The possibility of combining Jewish finance with Government responsibility and control.
(d)
The difficulties inherent in the legislation required to secure for the Government power to regulate the use of underground water and determine rights to surface water.
(e)
The consequences of omitting from the trusteeship agreement any provision of the kind contained in article 18 of the Mandate.

Recommendation No. 9.

(a)
The cost of introducing compulsory primary education in Palestine.
(b)
The period within which primary education could be made universal.
(c)
The cost of increasing facilities for secondary, technical and university education for the Arab population.
(d)
The measures necessary to increase the control exercised by the government over the Jewish educational system.

Recommendation No. 10

(a)
The preparations necessary for suppressing Arab or Jewish attempts to prevent by force the execution of the report.
(b)
The suppression of terrorism and the liquidation of private armies.
(c)
The form in which the Jewish Agency should be required to cooperate in such suppression and liquidation.

General questions arising from the report.

(a)
The probable reaction of the two communities in Palestine to the adoption of the report.
(b)
The repercussions in the Middle East generally of the adoption in Palestine of a policy based upon the report.
(c)
The additional military commitments which would follow from a decision to adopt such a policy and the sources from which these commitments would be met.
(d)
The incidence of the finance for the additional expenditure, capital and recurrent, required by the adoption of such a policy.
(e)
The effect of such a policy on British and American interests in the Middle East.
(f)
In view of the difficulties which may be foreseen in negotiating a trusteeship agreement for Palestine and of the fact that trusteeship system is not yet operating, the possibility of referring the problem of Palestine to the United Nations organisation in advance of the preparation of a trusteeship agreement.
(g)
If the problem is referred to the United Nations by a third party, the attitude of the United Kingdom and United States Governments.

2. I suggest that the discussions might conveniently be initiated about a week before the date on which we expect to receive the replies of the Arabs and Jews to the reference made to them on May 20th. This would enable the ground to be surveyed in advance. I hope with you that the consultations now in progress may serve to clarify the questions under discussion.

  1. Sent to Secretary Byrnes by the British Minister (Balfour) on May 27, with the request that the Department forward the message to President Truman. This was done by Mr. Byrnes in a memorandum the following day.↩
  2. In a memorandum of May 27, 1946, to Mr. Acheson, Mr. Henderson described the list of subjects as “very comprehensive and well thought out”. (867N.01/5–2746)↩