740.00119 Council/5–946: Telegram
The Secretary of State to President Truman
urgent
[Received 9:35 p.m.]
59. Delsec 482. For the President from the Secretary. Bevin has given me a copy of a memorandum prepared by his Govt for his use in discussing with me the Anglo-American Committee’s report on Palestine and the Jewish question of which the following is a summary:
- 1.
- A brief examination shows that the commitments involved in giving effect to the report would involve the expenditure of large sums of money and the employment of military forces to an extent beyond the capacity of His Majesty’s Govt to meet alone. Before any decision is taken as to whether the report should be put into force or not the British Govt must know what assistance they can count on, obtaining from the US Govt.
- 2.
- The military burden is the more important one. Before any decision could be taken to admit 100,000 additional immigrants as recommended in the report, the illegal Jewish armies must be suppressed and there must be a general disarmament throughout Palestine. Otherwise these armies would be swollen by recruits drawn from the new immigrants. The implementation of the report would cause serious repercussions throughout the Arab world involving additional military commitments which the British Govt could not undertake alone in present circumstances.
- 3.
- The British now have an equivalent of two and one-half divisions in Palestine. The British Govt considers that adoption of the Committee’s report would make necessary reinforcements of the [Page 602] order of two infantry divisions and one armoured brigade. There is no possibility of providing these reinforcements from British sources if they are to meet their inescapable commitments in other parts of the world. It would be necessary for American forces of the required strength to be immediately available before the policy recommended could be endorsed by the British Govt, and it would be essential to obtain a guarantee that American assistance would be sustained at full strength so long as the commitment in Palestine lasted. A token contingent would not be sufficient.
- 4.
- A conservative estimate is that the recommendations of the report would involve an expenditure of from 60,000,000 to 70,000,000 pounds in Palestine during the next couple of years if the new immigrants are to be housed and fitted into the economy of the country. Over a period of 10 years the expenditure involved would be from 115,000,000 to 125,000,000 pounds. The foregoing figures exclude the cost of development schemes such as the Jordan Valley project which is estimated to cost 76,000,000 pounds.
- 5.
- Zionists have suggested that expenditures of this nature be met from reparations allocation for the victims of Nazism but the total available from this source for both Jews and non-Jews is only about 7,500,000 pounds. Even allowing for a maximum effort by world Jewry, there will obviously be a much larger residue than the British Govt will be able to bear alone and it would be glad to know to what extent it can count on American financial assistance should it be decided to put these measures into operation.
- 6.
- The British are convinced that they would not be in a position to put the report into operation without substantial financial and military contributions from the US Govt.
- 7.
- Both the British and US Govts are committed to consultation with the Arabs and Jews before a new policy is adopted which fact would preclude the British Govt from giving immediate effect to the report.
- 8.
- Consideration should be given to the form of such consultations and whether the US would be associated with the British Govt in conducting them.
- 9.
- If the US Govt is unable to agree to assist in implementing the report the British Govt will have to consider what its future policy in Palestine is to be. Meanwhile some other state may refer the matter to the Security Council at any moment as a situation likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.
- 10.
- The British Govt considers that the Committee on Refugees and [Page 603] Displaced Persons of the Economic and Social Council should deal with the question of the disposal of the Jews for whom immigration to Palestine has not been suggested.36
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In telegram 2260 (Delsec 481), May 9, 1946, 6 p.m., from Paris, Secretary Byrnes informed President Truman as follows: “Mr. Bevin has discussed with me your message to Attlee as to Palestine. He says the problem of arranging for the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt is so acute he earnestly hopes you can delay sending your request to Jewish and Arab organizations.… I think it would be wise to delay request until 20th so we can have time to consider whether our course will commit US to military assistance. They urge they cannot act without assurances of our military and financial assistance. If after reading Bevin’s statement you are willing to make any commitment that would involve military assistance, I suggest asking Eisenhower’s opinion as to the number of troops that contribution might ultimately involve.” (740.00119 Council/5–946) For documentation on the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt, see pp. 69 ff. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower was Chief of Staff, United States Army.
In telegram 2266, May 10, 1946, 8 p.m., Mr. Acheson notified Secretary Byrnes that the President concurred in the latter’s view that it would be wise to defer consultations until May 20 and authorized him to so inform Mr. Bevin (740.00119 Council/5–946).
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