891.00/11–246: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
[Received 1:27 p.m.]
1430. Deptel 909 October 30. Dept’s uncertainty concerning my attitude towards Qavam is fully understandable since on October 15 … I felt Qavam had to go, whereas 5 days later (Embassy’s 1391, October 20) I felt Shah had acted wisely in permitting him to form new govt. Answer lies in unexpected action by Tudeh in refusing to attend Cabinet meeting on October 16 which offered Qavam another chance. It is difficult to predict now how much longer he will wait, but wisdom of Shah’s letting him form another govt has already been justified in increasing attacks on him in Tudeh and Moscow press without any blame being levied so far against Shah, who has reserved his power for future use.
[Page 542]I have felt ever since my arrival here and continue to feel that Qavam has many characteristics which fit him well for position of Prime Minister of Iran at this time. He is indisputably able politician and while his conduct of foreign affairs has often been weak-kneed in face of Soviet threats, we must keep in mind his appeals to US for help have been answered by advice to depend on United Nations for security. Our advice has been best we could give, but Qavam’s problems are immediate and cannot await debates in New York on question of veto. I have been distressed and no little annoyed at Qavam’s failure to appreciate strength of world opinion in support of Iranian independence but he is old school politician who wants somebody else to test out how many army divisions world opinion is worth.
I admit certain sympathy for Qavam and my conclusion 2 weeks ago that he had to go was reached with considerable reluctance.… his apparently indestructible attachment for Mozafar Firuz, whose action in trying to blackmail Cabinet officers into agreeing to Soviet aviation proposal (Embtel 135413) was last straw. Qavam’s failure to throw out Tudeh even after he was convinced they were Soviet puppets was also annoying, but I was aware that action along this line involved risk of serious internal disturbances which Qavam might well hesitate to run. But Firuz is thoroughly distrusted by every class of Iranian and his dismissal would have been popular move at any time.
Qavam dismissed Firuz from Cabinet only under Shah’s strong insistence and Firuz retains considerable influence over Qavam. Minister of War told me today that Qavam had agreed with Soviets that Firuz could remain in Iran until after elections. Ahmedi said Soviets were not pleased about Firuz appointment to Moscow since he is much more useful to them here than in USSR. At the moment Firuz is able to do less mischief than when he was in Cabinet as Minister of Propaganda but if Qavam continues to allow him to wield great influence behind scenes, Shah may find it necessary (and possibly in not distant future) to dismiss Qavam. Even so, it is best that Qavam has assumed responsibility for recent change in Cabinet.
As for elections, I appreciate Dept’s reasons for favoring postponement and these considerations may well prevail here. However, Tudeh and Qavam[’s Democrats?] of Iran are becoming increasingly bitter in denouncing each other and Qavam’s followers are becoming more outspokenly anti-Russian in spite of Qavam’s efforts to tone them down. Firuz is capable of making deal with certain Tudeh deputies, [Page 543] either with Qavam’s tacit consent or behind Qavam’s back, but general elections will be contest between Tudeh and rest of country with Qavam counting votes.
Election will be farce. Press is now carrying stories that voting is expected to take place between November 10 and 15 but not a candidate has yet been nominated and nobody has openly announced his candidacy. If elections are postponed there is no reason to believe they will be any better as our idea of elections go. Cabinet in power will win, and question seems to be whether we should advise Shah to remove Qavam not whether we should advise postponement of elections.
Qavam told British Ambassador 2 days ago he planned to send inspectors to Azerbaijan to observe elections and if inspectors reported elections were not fair he would not let Azerbaijan Deputies be seated. British Ambassador feels this will not accomplish purpose since once Azerbaijan deputies are elected, Qavam will not be able to withstand pressure to admit them. Le Rougetel has requested London’s authorization to tell Shah elections should be held only in parts of Iran controlled by Tehran Govt. He admits his proposal, if accepted by Iranian Govt, would probably result in separation of Azerbaijan from Iran, but he is much afraid to let Azerbaijan stooges have voice in affairs of all of Iran, including southern oil fields, and would much prefer to see Azerbaijan severed from nation. I agree that Qavam would probably not be able to keep Azerbaijan Deputies out of chamber, once elected, but am not prepared as yet to admit integrity of Iran can not be preserved. British Ambassador’s suggestion smacks me slightly of 1907,14 although Le Rougetel would deny such an implication. Decision as to best course is difficult, but I still believe our best policy is not to assume responsibility ourselves for opposing elections. Shah and others who favor postponement but who do not have nerve enough to say so openly, would like nothing better than to be able to say United States has advised against them, in order to turn Soviet blasts against US. Soviets would say US was trying to block Soviet oil concession. We may have to oppose Qavam again soon, but I suggest we keep hands off the elections question, at least for the moment. I do not mean to say we should urge them, and if the Persians defer them, well and good. If Dept has instructions, from its wider vantage point, I would be glad to have them.
Sent Dept 1430 repeated London 177 and Moscow 301.