Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

891.00/6–1546: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

top secret
us urgent

Tehran, June 15, 1946—11 a.m.
[Received 12:25 p.m.]

844. Dept’s 512 [511], June 12,⁶¹ which reached here June 14. Some of views expressed in British memo⁶² are along lines British Ambassador has been recommending to his Government and some were thought up in London.

Suggestion that US and UK make joint approach⁶³ is not advisable in my view. Our effectiveness here is already weaker than it should be, due in considerable part to conviction in minds many Iranians that clever British, realizing Britain’s own vulnerable position, are using well-meaning but somewhat naive Americans to support Britain’s imperialistic aims. No amount of denials seems to have any effect in shaking this conviction. We can accomplish more for ourselves and for Britain as well by acting separately in Iran. British Ambassador is fully appreciative of this situation. He told me today how impossible it would have been for him to have stated to the press the few obvious truths reported in my 833, June 13.⁶⁴ His motives would have been impugned immediately by almost every Iranian from the Shah down. US is still given enough credit for acting on principle without selfish aims to enable us to do things British could not think of doing. We would lose this credit immediately if we began joint approaches to Iranian Govt.

British suggestions that Qavam be asked to take firmer line against Tudeh and against Russians and that Iranian Govt be encouraged to look to UN for help is of course excellent. This is exactly what British Ambassador and I are both doing every day, in every way we can think of. Specific instructions from our Governments might strengthen our hands but I have been acting on assumption I had such instructions, of standing nature. British Ambassador has already made suggestion to Qavam regarding supervisors for elections but PriMin reacted strongly against any such idea. Subsequently a report came to me through Colonel Stetson⁶⁵ that Qavam would actually welcome UN commission but that for political reasons he must appear to oppose. Stetson is inclined to believe from channel of report that PriMin intended for it to come to me but both British Ambassador and I are rather dubious. Qavam loves power too much to want any outside supervision. If he should come to feel internal situation had got beyond his control and outside help might assist him to stay in power, he might risk UN commission but he has given no indication as yet that he doubts his ability to keep reins. If we suggested commission, I fear we would give Russians first class propaganda weapon without accomplishing anything positive.

As regards British suggestion regarding more propaganda activity on our side, this Embassy is doing all it can along this line with ridiculously small means at our command (see Embtel 812⁶⁶). We are also encouraging native liberal groups.

British Ambassador is making great effort to work in closest harmony and contact with this Embassy but he naturally does not tell me everything he tells London. I suspect British suggestion of joint approach resulted from telegram he undoubtedly sent to London recently, reporting his suspicion that Qavam, at Moscow’s instigation, is attempting to drive wedge between US and UK in Iran. Le Rougetel reverted to this theme again today. His rather strained reasoning on the point is that Qavam has taken initiative in suggesting that Britain and Russia each state their aims in Iran. This in Le Rougetel’s mind could only lead to new tripartite Iranian, UK–USSR treaty. USSR is confident US would object to such a treaty on grounds that it would constitute division of Iran into spheres of influence. Le Rougetel suspects Russia intends to denounce whole idea, blame Britain for suggesting it, and stand firmly with us in opposition. British Ambassador believes joint US–UK approach to Qavam now would tend to counter Russian game. I concur that overall British and American policies in Iran have similar aim but I do not believe joint approach is most effective means of achieving it.

Allen

61. Not printed.
62. No. 29/ /46, June 11, not printed.
63. To the Iranian Prime Minister to take a firmer line with the Tudeh Party and the Soviet Union and that he be made to understand the danger of his present course.

64. Not printed; it reported remarks made by Ambassador Allen to a group of Iranian journalists, all of whom were anti-Tudeh. The Ambassador concluded his remarks by stating:

    “The responsibility of the press to keep the public accurately informed is particularly great at a time like the present, just prior to elections. It is important that all papers be free to publish various views so that the voters may have an opportunity to study the issues involved.

    “It is in my view regrettable and even unethical for any journalist to take advantage of the liberties of the freedom of the press in a democratic country to attempt to bring into power any government which would stifle that freedom.” (891.00/6–1346).

65. Col. John B. Stetson, Jr., Field Commissioner in Iran for the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner.
66. Dated June 7, not printed.