Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

501.BC/5–2046: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

secret
urgent

New York, May 20, 1946—3:15 p.m.
[Received May 20—3:12 p.m.]

201. Ambassador Ala and Judge O’Brian³⁵ called on me today at Ambassador Ala’s request. Mr. H. Johnson and Mr. Noyes were with me.

Ambassador Ala said he had received no new information since Friday but expected a wire from Qavam today. Qavam had given him long and detailed explanations of his discussions with Pishevari and the reasons for Qavam’s refusal to accept Pishevari’s demands for autonomy beyond the Govt’s seven points. Ambassador Ala said that Qavam was clearly in a very difficult position. In the last of the conversations with Pishevari, the Russian Ambassador had been present and had unexpectedly sided with Pishevari in spite of previous agreement with Qavam on the Government’s seven points. Later the Russian Ambassador had talked of blood and iron and had appeared to threaten Qavam with serious consequences if he did not accept Pishevari’s demands.

Ambassador Ala indicated Qavam felt that the Russians were “riding” him and were right there at his doorstep in strength. He appreciated what the Security Council had done and hoped it could help Iran in her troubles. He apparently did not feel that he could take the initiative in the Security Council at this time.

Ambassador Ala then went on to say that he hoped that the Council could do something to help the situation. Latest newspaper reports indicated a situation bordering on civil war. Judge O’Brian indicated that he was very surprised at the report that the Iranian Government had attacked Azerbaijan since from the tone of Qavam’s cables it had not appeared that he was thinking of using force. He suggested that possibly the Iranian Army had gotten out of hand. Ambassador Ala interrupted to say that these reports came only from the Tabriz radio up to this time. He asked whether we had any information on the civil war and I said we did not. Both Ambassador Ala and Judge O’Brian made it clear that they felt the Russians were continuing to interfere in the present situation and that Russia was pulling all the strings in Azerbaijan at the present time. Her army might have gotten out of Iran officially but there was ample evidence that they had left behind soldiers in the Azerbaijan army or armed civilians and that they had equipped and trained the Azerbaijan Army with an eye to the present troubles. They thought that with the start of the fighting in Iran a new phase had been reached; that the Council could not ignore the present situation.

I asked Ambassador Ala whether he would report today. Ala said he would; that if he received no further telegram from Iran, he would have to report simply that he understood a Government commission had reached Tabriz but that no report covering Soviet withdrawals had yet been received from them.³⁶ I asked whether he would be able to make any references to continued Soviet interference. Ambassador Ala said he continued to feel that Iran had withdrawn only part of its complaint and that the complaint of interference still stood. I said I understood that and that Ala had indicated that to the press; I wondered, however, if this was the position of the Iranian Government. Judge O’Brian indicated that they had not received instructions on this point from Qavam and seemed to feel that it was rather doubtful whether Qavam could under the circumstances agree to take this position.

Ambassador Ala suggested that the Council might send a commission on investigation. I did not comment directly on this but in a discussion Judge O’Brian said that they were in position to present facts to such a committee. We indicated this was a new element since we had assumed that when the Iranians withdrew the complaint this meant that they would not present any further facts to the Council supporting their earlier claims. Judge O’Brian did not reply directly but said they had some evidence and depositions here in New York.

I then said that while we did not like the situation, it appears to us that after Iran’s action in withdrawing her complaint, it would be most helpful if she would take some affirmative step to help us deal with this difficult situation. I suggested that Ambassador Ala might come to the table at the forthcoming meeting on Wednesday and make some statements along the lines he had made in our discussion, which would make it possible for other members of the Council to take action without carrying the full responsibility on their own shoulders. Ambassador Ala said he would consider this very carefully.

Stettinius

[In telegram 720, May 20, 4 p.m., from Tehran, Ambassador Allen reported that the Iranian Prime Minister had “expressed hope to me last night that American delegation would state specifically at time Iranian case is dropped from Security Council agenda that Iran was free to bring to the Council’s attention any further information it might obtain regarding either Soviet troops which might have been left behind in Iran or regarding interference in Iranian affairs by Soviet nationals.” (861.24591/5–2046) In telegram 210, May 21, 1946, 11:10 a.m., Mr. Stettinius advised that he had informed the Netherlands Representative to the United Nations the same morning “that while we were still studying the situation and had no fixed position at the moment, our minds were running along the line of asking Ala to explain why his Government has not been able to supply the information the Council requested, and when he felt they could supply the information. By this means we might continue the item on the agenda until the Iran Government is in a position to make a firm statement.” (501.BC/5–2146).]

35. John Lord O’Brian of the firm of Covington, Burling, Rublee and Shorb. The services of this law firm had been engaged by the Iranian Government to assist in preparing its case before the Security Council.
36. Mr. Ala, in a letter of May 20 to the President of the Security Council, stated that there was not sufficient first-hand information available to his Government as to the true state of affairs throughout Azerbaijan to make the complete report requested by the Security Council. Information available to him indicated that the Iranian Government was still prevented from exercising effective authority in Azerbaijan and that Soviet interference in Iranian internal affairs had not ceased. He asserted that the course of events since his report of May 6 demonstrated that the threat to the integrity of his country and to international peace had grown more serious. He noted further that if the reports of armed conflict in Azerbaijan were true, the danger to international peace and security was serious and imminent. For text of Ala’s letter, which was sent also to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., supp. No. 2, p. 52, or Department of State Bulletin, June 2, 1946, p. 941.