891.00/4–2546: Telegram
The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:31 p.m.]
590. Following is outline of current political situation Iran as it appears to Embassy:
(1) Soviet evacuation of Khorassan and Caspian provinces seems [Page 438] to be nearing completion and Rossow’s latest reports from Tabriz indicate Soviet forces may at last be leaving Azerbaijan as well. However, there are persistent reports from all northern provinces of growing numbers Caucasian and other Soviet citizens in civilian clothes, many obviously soldiers. This together with intense Soviet activity with Azerbaijan army as shown recent Tabriz reports clearly points to Russian intention of maintaining influence that area despite military withdrawal.
(2) Although they have agreed to persuade Azerbaijanis to accept Qavam’s terms, it is quite possible Soviets may be in process of double-crossing Prime Minister by encouraging Tabriz government to hold out for full autonomy and providing it with arms and requisite military technicians to permit successful defiance of Tehran. Blustering style of public utterances Tabriz (Tabriz tel 131 April 222 gives one example) may be merely bravado or designed strengthen Azerbaijani bargaining position in projected negotiations with Iran Government but may equally be indication of intention to reject any diminution of present de facto independence. Rossow doubts Tabriz will make substantial concessions.
(3) Qavam is evidently attempting to appease Russians wherever possible but at same time endeavoring to stop short of position in which his Government would become outright puppet. He wants to convince Moscow his Government is “friendly” without making such concession that he could never hope to reestablish full Iranian freedom of action. In pursuing this policy he has: (a) made oil deal (b) offered quite liberal terms to Azerbaijan (c) vacillated in his position with reference to Security Council and ultimately yielded to Soviet pressure in asking that case be dropped (d) Arrested Seyid Zia-ed-Din, General Arfa3 and certain lesser lights hostile to Russians; suppressed most outspoken anti-Soviet newspapers and released from suspension all Left publications; transferred or dismissed many army officers and Government officials considered anti-Soviet. (e) Removed ban on Tudeh4 meetings; appointed or permitted appointment of many Tudeh members, or sympathizers to posts in Government; definitely recognized Tudeh labor organization (although labor unions have no legal status in Iran) and even appointed its leader, Rusta, as member of new Higher Labor Council. (f) Consistently been conciliatory in his public statements regarding Azerbaijan question and issued positive orders to security forces to refrain from attacking [Page 439] or provoking Democrats and not to enter Azerbaijan until given specific permission by himself.
On other side of picture Qavam successfully rejected most extreme Russian demands on Azerbaijan and oil, did appeal to Security Council and follow through up to certain point in face of strong Soviet pressure, and has backed up Schwarzkopf5 in carrying out program of gendarmerie reinforcement in Caspian provinces as Russians evacuated.6 (Schwarzkopf says Tudeh are greatly disturbed by this latter move and believes they had planned coup in Mazanderan.) Prime Minister has ordered all members of all parties in Caspian area to turn in arms by May 12 and has ordered gendarmerie to maintain order regardless of who may attempt disturb security. He has not appointed Tudeh members to any of highest Government posts and is evidently attempting restrain them from drastic action. There are definite indications he has no intention of cutting loose from old-line landlord ruling class even though he is trying modify its economic and social attitude.
Embassy is still of opinion Qavam is acting as sincere patriot and has not sold out to Russians in any way.
(4) Prime Minister’s internal policy is closely tied to foreign policy and consists primarily in attempting to remove grounds for foreign assertions that Iran is so backward she cannot manage own affairs or be trusted to maintain “democratic” (i.e. non-Fascist) government. To accomplish this he has: (a) Announced or caused to be announced programs of reforms in army and municipal policy. (This has additional effect of tending to placate Tudeh which attacks these organizations as instruments of reaction.) (b) Encouraged and assisted Schwarzkopf in making changes in gendarmerie looking toward greater efficiency. (He has not done anything to permit Tudeh infiltration into gendarmerie.) (c) Established new industrial and mining bank. (d) Created Supreme Economic Council and called for working out of 5-year economic plan. (Embtel 462, April 4).7 (e) Created Higher Labor Council composed of representatives of Government, Tudeh labor organization, business, university professors and Mayor of Tehran. Objectives this body as laid down by Qavam are to work out plans for adjustment employer-worker relations, [Page 440] draft new labor law, plan reforms in landlord-tenant relationships on farms, recommend projects to combat unemployment, and study means for effecting economies in government administrations. (f) Caused Ministry Agriculture to announce plans for agricultural improvements including new schools, irrigation projects, etc.
Whether or not these various projects will bear fruit remains to be seen, but Qavam is at least launching them with promptness (for Iran) and is in general conducting himself with more decision and determination than any other Prime Minister in recent years.
(5) Russians are undoubtedly better pleased with Qavam than with his predecessors in office, but Embassy doubts they will rest content indefinitely with his variety of “friendly” government.
Already Tudeh party, which can be relied upon to follow Soviet line, has begun to snipe at Prime Minister as showing reactionary tendencies, although party has not yet broken with him. It is conducting vigorous campaign to strengthen its position (has already reestablished itself in Tehran) and is displaying increasingly aggressive attitude toward national and international matters, party is pushing Bahrein issue8 insistently and seizes every opportunity to attack United States and Britain as imperialist powers. Recent violent press attacks on Schwarzkopf, full texts of which being sent air mail, suggest that Soviet-inspired drive to destroy American influence here is being launched.
Coming Majlis elections will be of crucial importance. There is much apprehension among moderates and conservatives here lest Tudeh gain such strong representation as to enable it to hamstring any cabinet which declines follow its dictates.
Danger is that Qavam, in pursuing his modified appeasement policy, will be forced to acquiesce in constant strengthening of Russian-backed groups to point at which he will be left only with choice of knuckling under entirely or being overthrown in favor of true puppet government. Collateral danger is that he will be physically unable to stand up under terrific burden he is carrying in his attempt single-handed to resolve critical diplomatic crisis and put life into moribund Iran Government machine. Some believe they already detect signs of weariness and feel PriMin is beginning to yield ground for that reason. In any case Qavam is walking tight rope and will need all his strength and political cleverness to keep his balance.
Sent Department 590, repeated Moscow 176 and Paris for Amdel.
- Not printed.↩
- Hassan Arfa, who had been relieved of his position as Iranian Chief of Staff in February 1946.↩
- The Masses (Communist) Party in Iran.↩
- Col. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Chief of the American Military Mission with the Iranian gendarmerie; raised to rank of Brigadier General in July 1946.↩
- In telegram 695, May 15, 1946, 3 p.m., Tehran reported that Iranian army and gendarme forces were being pushed gradually to the north through Gilan in the east and Kurdistan in the west but that these forces had not penetrated into Azerbaijan nor had they entered Astara, the frontier town on the Caspian Sea (891.00/5–1546).↩
- Not printed.↩
- See footnote 39, p. 45.↩