861.24591/4–1346: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:30 p.m.]
515. Jernegan saw Qavam at 7 tonight and conveyed in full message transmitted urtel 308, April 12.
Qavam was obviously still uncertain as to his best course and extremely reluctant to risk offending Soviets. He again pointed out that if he failed comply their wishes they might turn against him on Azerbaijan question, in which he must have their moral support to achieve settlement. They could withdraw Soviet troops from Iran as agreed but supply arms to Azerbaijanis and encourage them resist. Tehran Govt would be forced send troops and precipitate fighting, whereupon Russians could assert right to intervene to protect security their frontiers.
He admitted however that Soviets might also break their agreements even if he acquiesced in their demand to withdraw case from Security [Page 423] Council. Jernegan pointed out in such case Iran would be left completely defenseless and urged that in long run Iran would face fewer dangers if she relied on UNO and made it possible for that organization to become real force for security.
Ultimately with evident misgivings, after long discussion, Prime Minister agreed that he would not instruct Ala to request withdrawal of question from Security Council. However he did not want Ala to continue his aggressive tactics in opposing Soviet move. At Jernegan’s suggestion, based on final paragraph urtel under reference, he decided he would direct Ambassador that, if called upon by Security Council to make statement, he should say only that Iran left matter entirely in hands of Council for whatever decision it might choose to take.