Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

861.24591/3–2746: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

top secret
us urgent   niact

Tehran, March 27, 1946—5 p.m.
[Received 10:10 p.m.]

411. Mytel 395, March 25. During conversation which he requested be kept completely confidential PriMin told me late this morning that he had as yet made no final agreement with Soviets. Added that he had complained to Soviet Ambassador about statements made by Gromyko and Stalin to effect agreement had been reached. However he showed me two draft notes which I understood he intended to give Sadchikov today in reply to notes latter delivered March 24.

I gathered he had already discussed their purport with Sadchikov. Substance was as follows:

1. First note expressed appreciation for Soviet decision to withdraw troops and asked that this be notified formally to Security Council omitting qualifying phrase “unless something unforeseen happens”. (Qavam said he had asked Soviet Ambassador to write him letter stating this phrase would be omitted. Latter had replied he was sure Soviet Govt would acquiesce as soon as other agreements were concluded.)

2. Second note consisted of counterproposal to Soviet suggestion for joint Irano-Russian company to exploit Iranian oil. (Qavam remarked that this was real crux of present crisis, that oil was what Russians really wanted.) Points covered were:

• a. Participation should be equal for both countries instead of 51 percent Russian and 49 percent Iranian as Soviets had suggested.
• b. Iran should be called upon to make no financial contribution. She would furnish land which would constitute her share of capital. Russians would provide technical personnel and equipment.
• c. Duration should be 30 years instead of 50 years as proposed by Soviet Govt.
• d. Russians had suggested exploitation should cover provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazanderan, Gorgan and that part of Khorassan contiguous to Soviet frontier. (Virtually all of northern Iran.) Qavam suggested omitting areas of Azerbaijan contiguous to Turkey and Iraq arguing that otherwise international friction would be aroused which would be in interest of neither Iran nor USSR.
• e. Any security forces needed for whatever purpose in connection with exploitation should be solely Iranian.

With respect to third Soviet note dealing with Azerbaijan Govt, Qavam apparently had not prepared reply. He said however he had talked to Sadchikov on this subject and had said he was willing to negotiate with Azerbaijanis within limits permitted by constitution. He had thought it would be well for Azerbaijanis to send delegation to open negotiations. Soviet Ambassador had replied that if Qavam could go no further than that he considered it useless to attempt negotiations.

PriMin remarked to me that he did not want Soviets to interfere in details of his dealings with Azerbaijanis, all he wanted from Soviet Govt this connection was its general moral support and that he had so advised Sadchikov. Apparently this Azerbaijan phase of his negotiations with latter is still hanging in air.

In reply to my insistent questioning and to my surprise and disquiet PriMin said that he intended to keep word of his proposed agreements with Russians strictly confidential. He read me telegram he had sent Ala last night or today informing latter of negotiations but instructing him not to reveal them to SC or anyone else. If Ala were asked whether Irano-Soviet agreement had been reached he was to reply that he would have to inquire of his Govt and Qavam would then give him instructions as to what further statements he could make. (PriMin said he himself drafted telegram and I think it possible he even encoded it himself. It was marked to be decoded only by Ala.)

Qavam asked my opinion regarding this procedure. I replied that without instructions from my Govt I could express no definite opinion. However he should consider very carefully consequences of attempt to keep agreement of this sort secret⁵³ and should realize that he might run into serious trouble. He should be thinking of answer he would give Ala when latter requested directions on how to answer probable SC request for report on Irano-Soviet negotiations.

I think it probable Qavam’s secretiveness in this matter is result of Soviet pressure.

In course of talk I asked whether Qavam considered formal Soviet assurance to SC regarding troop withdrawal would be sufficient protection. He replied by asking my view. I suggested he might do well to instruct Ala to see that question remained one “of continuing interest” to Council even after present discussions should have terminated and until all Russian troops have been withdrawn. I believe he plans to follow this course.

Although Qavam did not make clear exact manner in which he intended to handle Iranian case in present SC debate I assume he will have Ala continue to press matter until he (Qavam) reaches what he considers satisfactory agreement with Russians in negotiations here after which Ala will be instructed to announce that Soviet assurances for troop withdrawal are satisfactory and Iran considers case closed provided assurances are fulfilled.

To Dept as 411; repeated Moscow 131, London 83.

Murray

53. In telegram 414, March 28, 10 a.m., Ambassador Murray stated: “If you wish me to do so I think I could convince Qavam at this stage that his best course lies in being entirely open and aboveboard with Security Council revealing his oil negotiations together with any agreement which may result from them. I believe this could still be done in such way as to save face for Russians since both they and Qavam could say with some degree of truth that agreement had not been forced out of Prime Minister but had been freely and voluntarily negotiated.” (861.24591/3–2846).