861.24591/3–1746: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
[Received March 17—5:37 p.m.]
843. Moment is opportune, I feel, for an attempt to recapitulate implications of present Soviet activities in Iran as seen from Moscow.
First of all I consider it almost a foregone conclusion that Soviets must make some effort in immediate future to bring into power in Iran a regime prepared to accede to major immediate Sov demands, particularly continued maintenance of Sov armed forces in Iran and granting of oil concessions. This effort will of course be made through [Page 363] subservient Iranian elements without direct responsibility on Sov side. Sov forces in Iran will serve this scheme by sheer force of intimidation and if necessary by preventing any forceful interference with its execution.
Some such development seems probable because
- (a)
- Sov Govt has no intention of withdrawing its troops from Iran. On the contrary, reinforcements, even though not on large scale, have been sent in.
- (b)
- Sooner or later the Sov Govt must give some explanation to the world for continued presence there of their forces in violation of treaty engagements.
- (c)
- Delay in giving answer to our inquiry indicates Sov Govt is reluctant to base its action solely on security requirements of USSR and is waiting for some sort of development which will make possible a better answer.
- (d)
- Answer which would best commend itself to Sov mind would be that Iranian Govt had requested troops to remain.
- (e)
- Coming UNO session and string which SC still has to Iranian question make some early solution imperative.
I find it hard to conceive that Sov Govt could be planning overt Sov aggression against Turkey at this juncture. There has been no special political buildup for this here nor as far as I can see any attempt to create a pretext for such action. This is not to say that smashing of Turk power, achievement of Sov bases on Straits23 and establishment of “friendly” regime in Ankara may not be objectives of Sov policy to be pursued in due course and time. It is also not to say that Sov armed Kurds might not now begin to make trouble along Turkish border leading to disturbances which might later be cited as grounds for Sov interference. But there is not sufficient evidence here for concluding that present Sov military preparations in northern Iranian sector envisage an immediate Sov attack on Turkey.
With respect to Iraq, situation is not so clear. Here there is some evidence which points toward a Sov inspired and Sov armed Kurdish action to seize Mosul district with Sov forces in background prepared to back up insurgents in favorable circumstances and perhaps to come in after them, ostensibly at Kurd request. It must be emphasized that there has been big propaganda buildup here for difficulties with British and to extent such an attempt on Mosul district might cause difficulties with British, it may be considered a possibility from standpoint of psychological preparation here. But we here do not have impression that Sov Govt plans to push this to point of open break with London. Unless there has been some tremendous and fundamental decision taken here to forego all advantages of further cooperation with western world and to enter on path of complete defiance [Page 364] and armed isolation, a turn of events for which we have as yet no evidence, then I feel Russians will try in whatever action they may undertake in Middle East to keep just this side of the line which would mean a complete diplomatic break with British. They are doubtless prepared to face very serious diplomatic and political difficulties but to attain their objectives they will try to gauge their action, if our hypothesis is correct, in such a way as to stop just short of the decisive point. Naturally this involves a considerable risk that they may not estimate accurately the line of delimitation or that their action may automatically carry them farther than they originally planned to go. But I believe that these are risks which they have probably taken into calculation and which they have deemed to be warranted in view of immediate and ultimate objectives involved.
Thus it appears to me that whatever action may be undertaken in pursuance of present Sov preparations in that area, Russians must try to hold it down to point where it can be given a local character, i.e., where it should not place either Sov or British Govts in a position from which national prestige would not permit withdrawal. Any other line of procedure would, I must reiterate, imply a profound change of Sov policy on a world wide scale of which we here have no evidence. It is not like the Kremlin to blunder casually into situations, implications of which it has not thought through.
Sent Dept 843; repeated Tehran 67 and London 146.