861.24591/3–1546: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State
us urgent niact
[Received 6:56 p.m.]
343. Confidential emissary from Qavam came to see British Ambassador and myself this morning with following message:
[Page 357]Soviet Chargé called on Prime Minister yesterday and said Soviet Government had heard he planned to make complaint to Security Council. Chargé said this would be regarded as unfriendly and hostile act and would have unfortunate results for Iran. He therefore advised Qavam not to take any such step.
Prime Minister replied that presence foreign troops Iran after expiration Tripartite Treaty was unconstitutional and that if he failed to act he would be called to account by his people and eventually by Majlis. Further cited fact that case remains before Security Council which can ask for report on basis London decision.
Apparently because of the stout resistance shown by Qavam during their long conversation Soviet Chargé finally shifted his position slightly and pressed Prime Minister at least to refrain from taking initiative himself and to await request from Security Council for report.
(Qavam asks that no reference ever be made to this conversation with Chargé, whether in Security Council or elsewhere.)
Through his emissary Qavam asked Sir Header and me for our advice as to his course in light of Soviet threat. Further asked what support he could expect from US and British if he took risk of bringing complaint to Security Council. Our visitor explained that Prime Minister feels his responsibility keenly and would be glad of any loophole to escape Soviet wrath while at same time protecting interests of Iran. He is therefore tempted to follow Chargé’s advice and leave it to Security Council itself to raise question.
Sir Reader and I replied that we could not give official advice on matter of such gravity without consulting our Govts. Personally, however, we felt Iran’s case would be gravely prejudiced if she did not herself speak out soon since Soviets would undoubtedly exert even greater pressure on Iran Govt at time of Security Council meeting to force her to keep silent and would then argue that Iran’s silence indicated all was well.
In this connection our visitor (who is highly intelligent and holds high position though not member of Cabinet) suggested that Soviets would probably send new Ambassador here in very few days to hold out hopes to Qavam and persuade him to renew Moscow conversations here. Having accomplished this he would advise Qavam that any recourse to Security Council in midst of negotiations would be highly improper and unfriendly and would destroy all hope of Irano-Soviet reconciliation thus at one and same time tempting Prime Minister with hopes of salvation and bludgeoning him with threats of utter distaste [disaster?]. Visitor also suggested as a possible alternative line of Soviet action that, after persuading Qavam to delay appeal, [Page 358] they would overthrow his Cabinet between now and March 25 and see to it that new Cabinet would be completely under their control thus eliminating all possibility of Iranian appeal to Security Council. I concur entirely in this reasoning and believe Sir Reader does too. Although I remain convinced, as I have told Shah and Prime Minister repeatedly, that Iran’s sole frail hope of salvation lies in quick appeal to Security Council, direct and ominous threat by Soviet Chargé makes immediate situation so grave that I hesitate to say anything further to Qavam without definite word from Dept as to its present position. I therefore request urgent instructions as to official reply I should give to his request for advice and his query regarding support he could expect from US if he defies Soviet warning.
Sent Dept 343, repeated Moscow 104, London 61.