761.91/3–446: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State
us urgent niact
[Received March 4—4:40 p.m.]
642. ReEmb’s 532, February 25 and 546, February 26.95 Having returned to my desk today after illness of nearly 2 weeks, I called this afternoon on Iranian PriMin Qavam. He appeared very depressed; said that he had been able to reach no understanding at all with Russians;96 that he was planning to leave for Tehran tomorrow, and that he was seeing Stalin for last time tonight.
Stalin, he observed incidentally and with some sadness, was very rough.
He inquired whether we were making a démarche to Soviet Government similar to that of British with respect to Soviet troops remaining in Iran after March 2. I told him this question had been raised in Washington by his Ambassador and explained why our Government was not in position to make such démarche following closely in this explanation the lines of Dept’s 366, March 3.97 He then informed me that he had himself entered protest with Soviet Government over failure to remove troops. I inquired the terms in which this protest had been made and he went out to another room to fetch a copy of the document. When he returned, he explained he had just learned that the note had actually not been delivered because the official designated to deliver it could not be received at Narkomindel98 until 6 o’clock this afternoon Moscow time. Nevertheless, he showed me a copy of the communication which he stated would be delivered. When entering Narkomindel at 6:15 this evening, I saw Iranian Counselor coming out so I assume note was actually delivered. Communication referred to Izvestiya report about troops remaining in Iran, (from which I gather that the Iranian Government had had no direct communication apprising them of Soviet decision) stated that this was flatly [Page 338] contradictory to terms of 1942 treaty, registered a categoric protest against this, and requested Soviet Government to withdraw troops at once. I told him I would inform my Government this step was being taken. He said he would inform Tehran telegraphically this evening along this same line.
He said that he had already raised with Russians in oral conversation this question of troops remaining and had asked on what ground they could justify this. They replied that Persian delegate at Paris Peace Conference in 1919 had raised question of cession to Persia of large portions of Russian territory and that Persian delegate had later and quite recently occupied a high position in Tehran Government. Russians could therefore not feel secure against Iranian plans of aggression and for this reason had to keep troops there.
He then inquired whether I thought they could count on our Government’s support if they failed to reach an agreement with Russians. I told him that I could only say that my Government took highly serious view of its obligations as a member of UNO and that if this question were returned to Security Council either by Iran or by third party, I was sure my Government would do everything in its power to see that questions were solved in conformity with principles and purposes of UNO Charter. I added that as far as retention of Soviet troops was concerned, I found it hard to conceive that Soviet reference to statements made at Versailles Peace Conference would be considered in UNO as constituting very weighty grounds for maintenance of Soviet troops in Iran in violation of treaty obligations.
In leaving, I expressed to PriMin the hope that perhaps in his final interview with Stalin there might still be some unexpected turn for the better and asked him to keep me informed if by any chance he did not carry out his plan of leaving in the morning.
British Chargé who called on Qavam this morning told me Qavam had given him following version of course of talks. He, Qavam, had requested Russian assistance in dealing with situation which had arisen in northern Iran. Russians had flatly declined to give such assistance. They had revived demand for oil concessions to which he had simply replied that he was unable to discuss this question in view of existing Iranian law forbidding such questions to be discussed with any country having troops on Iranian territory. They had also asked for recognition of autonomy of local regime in northern Iran and he had explained that he also had no authority to discuss this question. With this, discussions had come to an impasse and he saw no further reason for remaining here.
Although both my British colleague and I have heretofore been skeptical as to ability of Qavam to stand Russian pressure, I must [Page 339] say that I now have impression that Qavam came here so closely restricted by his own Government in what he could do that it was impossible for him to reach any agreement with Russians except in open defiance of his own Government which he was unwilling to contemplate.
Sent Dept 642; repeated Tehran Secret for Chief of Mission 39.
- Neither printed.↩
- In telegram 622, March 2, 1946, noon. Mr. Kennan reported information from a source he thought reliable that the “Russians have been putting tremendous pressure on Persian Prime Minister Qavam. They have advanced three initial demands, first that Persians recognize autonomy of area now in insurgent hands, second that they grant oil concessions requested by Russians in ’44 and third that they agree to continued presence of Soviet troops in northern Persia.” The third demand might be retracted if their demand for oil concessions were granted. (761.91/3–246)↩
- See footnote 92, p. 336.↩
- People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.↩