761.91/2–2246: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)
321. Top Secret for Kennan. In view of the Iranian-Soviet negotiations which are taking place in Moscow,91 we feel it is important that you should have a clear exposition of the position adopted by the US Representative on the Security Council and the considerations which led to the adoption of that position. The following summary is therefore for your information and such use as you may deem advisable in any conversations you have with the Iranian Prime Minister during his stay in Moscow, It is of course obvious in view of the position which the US Government has adopted before and during the presentation of this case to the Council, that we do not wish to give any impression that we are uninterested in the outcome of the negotiations or that we would view with favor any arrangement which might impair the independence and integrity of Iran. Conversely you will, of course, understand that under no circumstances should any impression be conveyed to him that the US is seeking to influence the course of the negotiations or to encourage the Iranian delegation to adopt an unreasonable attitude.
Begin Summary. The Iranian case as originally presented before the Council was in essence a charge of interference in internal Iranian affairs and of preventing the exercise of Iranian sovereignty on Iranian territory in violation of the tripartite pact of 1942. Had the case been pressed before the Council in the original form presented, the US Representative would have supported Council action. However, the resignation of Hakimi whose Government presented the original case and the appointment of Qavam on the eve of the hearings altered the basis of the Iranian case. Since Qavam had publicly announced on assuming office that he intended to seek bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Government and the Soviet Government was urging that the matter be so dealt with, the Council had no clear grounds for [Page 335] taking direct jurisdiction over the matter. The US Representative, however, considered it of great importance to make it plain that while accepting the willingness of both parties to negotiate, the question having been brought before the Council should remain its continuing concern pending settlement. The US Representative would have preferred that the question be left formally on the “continuing agenda” and so proposed. When this suggestion was not supported by other members of the Council, Mr. Stettinius withdrew his proposal but on the express understanding that the matter would remain the continuing concern of the Council until it was settled in conformity with the principles and purposes of the Charter. In view of the wording of the resolution, which it is assumed you have, and the statements of other members of the Council particularly the US and British, it is clear that ample opportunity is afforded to the Iranian Government to return the question to the Council either on its own initiative or through a third party in the event that the negotiations take a turn which the Iranian Government regards as threatening the integrity of Iran. This Government has publicly made clear its expectation that the results of the present negotiations agreed to by the Council will be in full conformity with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. End Summary.
In view of our position in this matter, it is of course extremely desirable that we be kept currently informed of the course of negotiations in Moscow, and in your discretion you may express to Qavam the hope of this Government that he will keep you advised.
- The Iranian mission by Prime Minister Qavam left Tehran by Soviet plan for Moscow on February 18.↩