501.BC/1–146
Memorandum by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Special Assistant to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
Calendar Notes on Iranian Matters
Tuesday, January 29
In the afternoon Mr. Stettinius asked Mr. Hare to call on Ambassador Taqizadeh, Head of the Iranian Delegation, to find out if possible what instructions he had received from his government in regard to placing the Iranian case before the Security Council. During the evening Mr. Hare reported back that he had had a conversation with Mr. Kazemi, second man on the Iranian Delegation, who told him that there had been no changes in the Iranian instructions. The Iranians were prepared to continue to pursue the case. The Iranians stated that they thought perhaps the best approach would be for the Council to recommend bilateral negotiations under the jurisdiction of the Council. He asked if the United States would make this proposal. He indicated that the Chinese had agreed to do so, but that it would be preferable if the United States would do it. (See Document: USGA/la/Gen.30/Conv.45)67
Mr. Noyes reported this conversation immediately to Mr. Bohlen, and later in the evening to Dr. Pasvolsky. That evening a telegram was received from Teheran reporting that the new Prime Minister had told his Ambassador that he planned to open bilateral negotiations with the Russians both in Teheran and in Moscow, as well as having instructed Ambassador Taqizadeh (together with Mr. Kazemi) to make contact with Mr. Vyshinsky in London (see Telegram Red No. 173668).
At the last two conversations referred to, the main questions discussed were the position we should take in the light of the public position of the Iranian government that they were prepared to enter bilateral negotiations. It was considered likely that the Iranian delegate would receive new instructions, as reported from the press, either instructing him or authorizing him to enter into bilateral negotiations. We considered it possible if not probable that the Prime Minister of Iran had already been in direct contact with the Russians in Teheran or Moscow as the Chinese had reported to us privately. It was also possible that the Prime Minister might even proceed to Moscow himself. There was discussion therefore of the advisability of taking [Page 323] a position which would still be tenable if Mr. Vyshinsky announced at the meeting that his government had already begun direct discussions.
Wednesday morning, January 30
Immediately after the full delegation meeting held on the 7th floor of 20 Grosvenor Square, Mr. Pasvolsky, Mr. Cohen,69 Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Noyes, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Notter, Mr. Hartley,70 and Mr. Hare assembled in Mr. Stettinius’ office to discuss the United States position at the afternoon Security Council meeting. Mr. Pasvolsky read a statement which Mr. Wellington Koo had told him he proposed to make at the meeting.71 The general consensus was that this was a very poor statement and should not be used. Mr. Pasvolsky read a statement which he had prepared, copy attached.72 This was considered an excellent statement for Mr. Stettinius to use. Several minor revisions were made in the statement and in the accompanying resolution, (copy of revised resolution also attached)
At 11:30 the meeting adjourned to Mr. Stettinius’ suite at Claridge’s [Hotel]. Mr. Stettinius had just had a meeting with Sir Alexander Cadogan (this conversation is written up in ERS’ Calendar Notes for that day),73 Bevin was reported to be willing, after a full discussion of the meeting in the Council, to allow bilateral negotiations to take place under the sponsorship of the Council. He would not insist on a vote, but felt a statement from the Chairman would suffice. Mr. Stettinius had agreed to support a full discussion and said we also were willing to agree to bilateral negotiations between the parties, as long as the Council was kept informed.
Mr. Pasvolsky’s resolution was discussed and approved. It was agreed that Mr. Hare would get in touch with the Iranian Ambassador immediately, to urge him to point out in reply to the Soviet statement at the last meeting that the Iranians had sought bilateral negotiations over the issue of the Soviets having prevented the Iranian service forces from proceeding into northern Iran, but that the Russians had refused to negotiate. He was to suggest then that it would be the wisest course for the Iranians then to state that he was prepared to undertake bilateral negotiations with the Russians as long as the case [Page 324] remained before the Security Council, and the Security Council requested the parties to keep it fully informed of the progress and of the results of their negotiations.
Mr. Pasvolsky thereupon went off to see Mr. Wellington Koo to obtain his support for our resolution.
Mr. Hare reported back at about 1:30 to Mr. Noyes, by telephone, to the effect that the Iranians, as we had suggested, would seek the floor immediately upon the opening of the meeting, would make the argument that the Russians had never negotiated in good faith, would state that Iran would be willing to enter into bilateral negotiations under the aegis of the Council, if certain safeguards were provided. He also reported that the Iranians had received no instructions.
At quarter to two, Mr. Pasvolsky and Mr. Bohlen came in. Mr. Pasvolsky reported that the Chinese had agreed to our resolution. We met again just before the Security Council meeting.
- Not Printed.↩
- No Record of this message found in Department files.↩
- Benjamin V. Cohen, Senior Adviser to the United States delegation at the United Nations.↩
- Joseph E. Johnson, Harley Notter, and Robert Hartley were Political Advisers to the United States delegation at the United Nations.↩
- Statement not printed.↩
- Not printed; the statement was not made at the meeting of the Security Council during the afternoon of January 30.↩
- Memorandum of conversation not printed; Sir Alexander Cadogan was Principal Adviser to the British delegation at the United Nations.↩