868.00/12–1646: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 16—3:20 p.m.]
1721. For Loy Henderson, NEA. I agree thoroughly with instructions Acheson’s letter71 enclosed in yours of November 1272 and all appropriate authorities have been informed. However I feel impossible exaggerate importance of adequately equipping Greek Army at earliest possible date. Since Montgomery’s visit (mytel 1668, December [Page 283] 373) local British Military including Rawlins seem no longer complacent or suspicious of Greek motives this connection as reported London’s telegram 9910, December 5 [4]74 but danger may lie in British tendency toward “too little and too late”. Have therefore secured [list?] of Greek equipment requirements for spring operations[.] [List?] is [to be?] forwarded London soonest with suggestion that US military authorities there be promptly contacted with regard to items British unable supply. I also feel direct query to London by US military authorities Washington might help produce much needed promptness. Time presses if Greek Government is to be sufficiently strengthened “before the fact” as advocated in admirable NEA memo75 enclosed your letter November 14.76
I also fear delays on our part in regard to prompt adequate economic and particularly financial assistance which equally necessary with military. Position Greek finances reaching catastrophic stage (mytel 1718, December 14) and problem facing economic mission of [at?] eventual arrival likely to be less one of long term rehabilitation than of immediate correction if possible of impending if not actual collapse.
Meanwhile since psychological factor of definite and growing importance in above situation believe much good could be done by forthright public statement of new policy at this time.77
- Presumably Mr. Acheson’s letter of November 8, p. 262.↩
- Not found in Department files.↩
- Not printed; in it Ambassador MacVeagh reported a conversation with British Field Marshal Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial Staff, the previous evening in which the latter informed him of his strong advice to the Greek Government and the Greek military to devote the coming winter to converting the Greek Army into specially trained and equipped forces for fighting the bandits and to take the field in the spring and totally eradicate banditry. This program, the Field Marshal stated, could be carried out; if it were not done, Greece was lost. He concluded that there was no sense in building up a mechanized army since it would not be adequate to withstand large-scale attack. (868.00/12–346)↩
- Not printed.↩
- The memorandum regarding Greece, of October 21, p. 240.↩
- Not printed; but see footnote 14, p. 244.↩
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Mr. Byrnes replied in telegram 1598, December 19, 1946, 1 p.m., as follows: “Dept entirely concurs your feeling adequate equipment for Greek Army is urgent. Please forward Washington immediately (with copy to Emb London) full list requirements so we may be studying items and determine in advance what US Govt could supply if Brit unable.
Your 1721 being rptd London as 8235 except first sentence and final para.” (868.00/12–1646)
No. 8235, sent on December 19, concluded with the following paragraph: “Please inform appropriate Brit official informally and confidentially we are anxious know as soon as possible extent to which Brit will be able to supply Greece with arms considered necessary for maintenance Greek independence and territorial integrity. It has been agreed with Bevin that Brit have primary responsibility furnish combat arms. In view of dangers inherent in situation we feel essential Greek needs for arms should be met. It would be particularly helpful for us to know (1) What specific items Brit Govt considers essential, (2) Which of these items Brit unable to furnish.” (868.00/12–1646)
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