868.00/11–2846: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 28—12:05 p.m.]
1642. Deptel 1503, November 24 [22]. I asked King’s political adviser Pipinelis to my house last evening and told him that I personally feel (1) that if Prime Minister goes New York in connection frontier disturbances before a government of national unity has been formed, he should be accompanied by opposition leaders to make clear that Greek case has full and not only majority parliamentary support and [Page 271] (2) that formation of broadest possible coalition government is still matter of urgent necessity particularly in connection with desired US assistance.
In regard to (1) Pipinelis replied that though King and he do not “feel very happy” over idea of Prime Minister’s trip, he could assure me that desirability of presenting a national front at New York is understood and that Tsaldaris is seriously attempting to assemble broad delegation. He added, however, that Sophoulis is against being represented and that Venizelos is “terrorized” by Sophoulis while Papandreou and Canellopoulos follow Venizelos’ lead. In regard to (2), he also assured me that King is continuing his efforts but added that Sophoulis is again the stumbling block. On other hand, he expressed hopes of being able eventually to persuade other opposition chiefs to come in even if Sophoulis is still out though he said matter will take time and will depend somewhat on present Government showing itself strong enough to carry on if necessary without opposition assistance. In this connection, he said that such outside expressions of opinion as Times editorial quoted in London’s clear telegram of November 26 are positively harmful here since they tend to confirm opposition leaders in idea that present Government is doomed if it has to stand alone and to cause the UN [opposition Chiefs?] raise their price for joining it. I told Pipinelis that it seems to be felt in US and Britain that time has come for King to impose his leadership on politicians and he replied that while King can require concessions from Government and can get them from Tsaldaris, he lacks power to command opposition which, however, must also make some concessions if viable coalition is to be achieved. When I pointed out that King could certainly call publicly on opposition to help save nation and that refusal on its part to respond loyally would put it in bad position, he said that basis of agreement which all parties could reasonably be expected to accept must first be found. He said he hoped this could be done and that then King might launch appeal. Pending such time he stressed that conversations must be kept private and not aired publicly lest this lead to “hardening” of views on part of some or all concerned.
Pipinelis then said that what Greece now chiefly needs is assistance in increasing her armed forces to wage “war” on frontier and against “fifth column” and I replied that her chances of getting such assistance would be greater if she had a broad national government. In conclusion, I again stressed my feeling that Government should show united front in New York while earliest possible achievement of coalition of nationally-minded elements here in Greece is of utmost importance.