Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

868.00/10–2146

Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs¹²

[Washington,] October 21, 1946.

Memorandum Regarding Greece

1. Many signs indicate that Greece is becoming a focal point in strained international relations and that its fate during the next few months may be a deciding factor in the future orientation of the Near and Middle East. The importance of Greece and the desirability of supporting her have clearly emerged in Paris at the Peace Conference. Evidence to the above effect includes the following: the Ukrainian and Albanian complaints against Greece in the Security Council; increasing reports of incidents along the Greek frontier with Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania; reports of large troop concentrations in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria facing the Greek frontier; unceasing and virulent attacks by the Soviet and Soviet-dominated press against the “illegal” Greek Government and the “fake” plebiscite; statements of Greek leaders of the Extreme Left that the present government would have to be overthrown before Greek “democrats” would be prepared to defend Greek soil against aggression; outspoken Soviet protests against British and U.S. “interference” in Greek internal affairs.

If the present trend continues and a major crisis arises, Greece will be found in a weakened internal condition. Its economy is still shattered as a result of enemy occupation, and public order is at a low ebb as a result of hatreds engendered by partisan cruelties and strife. Those hatreds are now being kept alive by the harsh intransigeance of certain Extreme Right members in the Government and by the activities of an apparently well-organized and armed Communist-dominated minority supported by the U.S.S.R. and Soviet satellites. Although the Greek elections of March 1946 were considered fair by Western democratic standards (in spite of Extreme Left abstention), the resultant government is strongly royalist and is not averse to playing on the fears of the Greek public in order to brand all opposition as Communistic and foreign-inspired, with the hope of justifying strong measures to stamp out Left factions and to render impotent any real Center republicanism.

The relations of Greece with its northern neighbors are strained, in part, because of long-standing and vociferously expressed Greek claims for territorial adjustments at the expense of Albania and Bulgaria. Left elements in Greece minimize these particular claims and concentrate on demands for Eastern Thrace and Cyprus, thereby seeking to embarrass Great Britain and Turkey. On the other hand, Greece is historically justified in her fears that both Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have designs on Macedonia, though the only official claim advanced at this time by either of these two countries is Bulgaria’s recent bid for Western Thrace as a territorial outlet to the Aegean.¹³

2. It is to the strategic advantage of the U.S. that the world should not be divided into mutually exclusive spheres of influence, but it is apparent that the U.S.S.R. is aggressively attempting to bring under its control an ever-increasing number of nations. The strategic importance of Greece to U.S. security lies in the fact that it is the only country of the Balkans which has not yet fallen under Soviet hegemony. Greece and Turkey form the sole obstacle to Soviet domination of the Eastern Mediterranean, which is an economic and strategic area of vital importance. If the Greek mainland and the Greek islands were allowed to come under Soviet influence, the Soviet Union would be in a position to exert irresistible pressure upon Turkey. We cannot afford to stand idly by in the face of maneuvers and machinations which evidence an intention on the part of the Soviet Union to expand its power by subjecting Greece to its will, and then using Greece as an important stepping-stone for a further expansion of Soviet power. In the broader political sense, but with important military implications, it may also be pointed out that:

a. It has become clear and indisputable that the national security of the U.S. rests, to a degree which can hardly be overemphasized, on the maintenance of the principles of the United Nations and on maintaining the confidence of other nations that these principles will in fact become the effective guide lines of international conduct. This requires that those key nations not already under the control of the U.S.S.R. should be confirmed in their faith that the U.S. will give complete support to the UN principles so far as the nations in question are concerned. The moral strength imparted by high principles and the conviction that the U.S. is defending not only its cause but that of all free nations is a tremendous factor in world affairs and would contribute greatly to our strength should matters ever come to a military test. We must not, therefore, endanger our moral standing nor allow it to appear that the situation has degenerated into an ideological duel solely between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. or between the U.S. and British on the one hand and the U.S.S.R. on the other.

b. Greece was an early and courageous opponent of Fascist and Nazi aggression. The fact that she resisted to the end of her strength is widely known along the Soviet perimeter from Finland to Turkey. Likewise, it is recognized that Soviet hostility to Greece is not inspired by a sincere concern that the Greek people might be crushed by an undemocratic government, but that Soviet policy towards Greece is dictated by the clear intention of making it impossible for any country in the geographic position of Greece to remain friendly to the Western Allies and to Western ideals of democracy. If Greece were to be allowed to fall victim to Soviet aggression, which aggression would doubtless be delegated to Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and the Soviet-inspired Left Movement in Greece, there could not fail to be most unfavorable repercussions in all of those areas where political sympathies are balanced precariously in favor of the West and against Soviet communism.

3. If, in the process of trying to straighten out her own affairs, Greece falls into open civil war, there will certainly be outside intervention on the side of the Communist-dominated Extreme Left, although this intervention will probably be cleverly disguised to conceal its outside character. Such a situation would face the Western Powers, particularly Great Britain, but also the U.S. with difficult decisions as to what support could be given the established government involved in open internal hostilities. Decisions of this nature have been difficult in China, and may become more so; they were impossible in the Spanish civil war. It is vastly to the interest of the U.S. that the recognized government be assisted in becoming strong enough before the fact to handle its internal problems without requiring a sudden increase in assistance during a state of actual or near civil war.

4. Withdrawal of British forces from Greece, as it progresses, will leave the Greek government with the complex problem of maintaining internal order and protecting her borders under conditions where none of her Soviet-inspired neighbors wish to see her succeed. The stability of the Greek Government in such circumstances must be regarded as questionable unless given vigorous external support, including support by the U.S. If the fall of the Greek Government should result in the emergence of a dictatorship of the Left minority subservient to Moscow, Soviet encirclement of Turkey will have gone a long way towards completion, and we will have allowed to go unchecked another step of Soviet aggression aimed at exclusive domination of the Eastern Mediterranean.

5. There can be no question that the U.S.S.R. is providing military assistance to elements seeking to cause the fall of the Greek Government. An important part of this assistance is the maintenance of large armed forces by the Soviet Union and her satellites in countries contiguous to Greece. Many armed bands operating in Greek territory are based in Yugoslavia and Albania and supplied from sources within these two countries. Such military threat against stability in Greece makes it urgent that the U.S. increase and intensify its political and economic assistance promptly, lest it come too late.

6. The U.S. should make it clear to the world that we are determined that Greece remain independent and in charge of her own affairs and that we are prepared to take suitable measures to support the territorial and political integrity of Greece as important to U.S. security. Our action in this regard should include, among others, the following steps, which will be taken only after consultation in appropriate cases with other Powers having interests similar to our own:

a. Clarification to the world, by diplomatic conversations, by the issuance of public statements from time to time, and in other appropriate ways, that this Government strongly supports the independence and territorial integrity of Greece and encourages the development of democracy in Greece and a peaceable and reasonable policy on the part of the Greek Government.

b. Exertion of all possible U.S. influence to counsel the Greek Government, following the return of the King, towards a policy of moderation in connection with divergent Greek political factions the basic loyalty of which to Greece is not subject to question, as well as in its relations with neighboring countries. It should be pointed out that the U.S. would find it very difficult to support strongly any government by means of which the Extreme Eight would resort to excessive measures against political opposition which is expressed through legal and peaceful means or to repression of civil liberties, except in conditions of emergency, to maintain internal order and the authority of the Government.

c. Continued clarification by the U.S. to the Greek Government that we believe the interests of peace and stability require that Greek claims to territories beyond the frontiers of 1939 should be dropped. (We should make clear, of course, that we equally oppose any claims by other countries for territory on the Greek side of these frontiers.) If confidential efforts are unsuccessful in convincing Greece that she should abandon or leave in abeyance her territorial claims, we should be prepared to make a public statement of our position.¹⁴ In any case, we should work in the Council of Foreign Ministers and elsewhere to see that the 1939 frontiers are accepted by all parties.

d. Active political support of Greece in the United Nations and the Security Council when occasion warrants.

e. Although it is recognized that Great Britain has primary responsibility in furnishing military equipment to Greece, the U.S. should be prepared, in case of British inability, to sell to Greece sufficient arms for the maintenance of internal order and for the defense of Greek territorial integrity until such time as military forces of the UN are prepared to undertake guarantees against aggression. Such sales would of course be made only after consultation and coordination with other countries from which Greece may seek to acquire arms.

f. Recommendations to the Export-Import Bank, as in the past, and to the International Bank for the grants of economic assistance to Greece, provided that such credits are expended on sound projects which will strengthen Greek national economy.

g. The immediate dispatch to Greece of an American economic mission, as requested by the Greek Government, with favorable consideration at a later date of the possibility of making available to Greece appropriate American financial and economic advice through advisers and technicians.

h. Appropriate action by the U.S. Government, if and when necessary, to assist Greece in finding export markets and in acquiring essential goods in the American markets.

i. Appropriate action by U.S. Government to relieve the Greek shipping shortage through the sale or charter of vessels, and in other ways.

j. Informing the American public through the press, American foreign policy associations, and the like, of the nature of our policy towards Greece and the reasons for it.¹⁵

12. Marginal notations indicate the memorandum was approved by the Secretary of State approximately November 1.
13. In a statement made by the Bulgarian Foreign Minister on August 14, 1946, in presenting to the Paris Peace Conference his Government’s views on the draft peace treaty with Bulgaria; see Verbatim Record of the Sixteenth Plenary Meeting, vol. iii, p. 200.
14. Mr. Henderson transmitted a copy of the “Memorandum Regarding Greece” to Ambassador MacVeagh on November 14 and noted, in connection with section 6c, that Secretary Byrnes did not think it advisable at that time to make a special public announcement of our position toward Greek territorial claims (861.24/11–1446).

15. On September 30, Secretary Byrnes advised Mr. Clayton: “I approve the revision of SC/R–184 enclosed with your personal letter of September 25 and agree that it should go to the President,” (Telegram 4906 from Paris, 740.00119 Council/9–3046) Presumably, the revision referred to section 6e of the draft memorandum sent with Mr. Clayton’s letter of September 25. This section read: “Sale to Greece of sufficient arms for the maintenance of internal order and for the defense of Greek territorial integrity until such time as the military forces of the U.N. are prepared to undertake guarantees against aggression. Such sales would, of course, be made only after consultation and coordination with other countries from which Greece may seek to acquire arms.”

    In telegram Delsec 1032 (5007 from Paris), October 5, 1946, 7 p.m., Secretary Byrnes informed Mr. Acheson: “As to three countries mentioned, my friend agreed with me some weeks ago it was his primary duty as to direct military equipment. If he fails to act then we can.” (740.00119 Council/10–546) Greece, Turkey, and Iran were the three countries; “my friend” was Mr. Bevin.