868.00/10–1946: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

top secret

1426. Mytel 1424, October 19.5 Prior to Premier’s return and in view of approaching political discussions of critical nature, I asked the King to my house yesterday afternoon and confidentially acquainted him with contents of Deptel 1336 of October 15, feeling that full knowledge of our thought at this time could not fail to encourage him as well as give him guidance. We went over every point together and the King thanked me warmly for my confidence, which he promised to observe. He thoroughly agreed that widespread arming of civilians against bandits is undesirable in country where too many people are already armed, though he thought villagers might be enlisted by Govt in connection with special defense missions, for which arms could be issued and withdrawn after completion. He was outspoken in condemnation of lawlessness in the administration of public [Page 239] order and said he is trying, against great difficulties, to determine the individuals responsible. He showed great interest in our findings as regards the plebiscite. I described these to him briefly, but I believe it would be a good thing if I were authorized to let him see the report of Amfoge II. He will be glad to receive the President’s letter and “listen to my exposition of certain points orally.”6 He welcomed the idea of our attempting to strengthen Greek economy through the selection and realization of sound limited projects, saying this is in line with his own thoughts. He made no criticism of Britain during the entire conversation and showed his realization of solidarity of Allied policy by saying: “This is just the way Bevin talks to me.” Regarding Dept’s advice that certain notorious reactionary extremists in the Govt should be gotten rid of, he accepted this to mean Mr. Mavromichalis in particular, whom he said he does not intend to support.

I believe the Dept may be assured that the King will strive, insofar as in him lies, to secure such a moderate govt as will justify US support. To help him he has the essential moderation of Tsaldaris and the apparent willingness of some minor opposition leaders to approach the problem of cooperation in constitutional fashion. Most unfavorable, however, is the attitude of the Sophoulis branch of the Liberal Party, which not only continues to refuse to meet the Populists on any other terms than its own, but has for a long time pursued a policy of flirting with the Communists, its paper, the Vima, even going so far recently as to propose Russia as Greece’s logical protector (see mytel No. 1424 of October 19.7). Mr. Sophoulis regards such dangerous opportunism as smart politics (see my despatch No. 1699 of October 13, 19457). But Porphyrogenis, the Greek Communist leader, told the King recently, among other things (see my despatch No. 3204 of October 157) that, “in our advance to power here we shall use old Mr. Sophoulis as a front.” With both the British and ourselves pressing for moderation, I believe the extreme Right must inevitably move toward the Center, but what can induce the Liberals to take a more constructive national attitude while under the leadership of Sophoulis and the anti-British editor of Vima (Lambrakis, whom the British imprisoned in Syria during the war), is another question and perhaps the most difficult one facing the King at the present juncture.

MacVeagh
  1. Not printed.
  2. In telegram 1430, November 6, 1946, 7 p.m., the Department notified Ambassador MacVeagh that it considered it unnecessary for the President to send a formal letter to the Greek monarch since the Ambassador had clearly and fully informed him of the United States Government’s views. The letter, the Department explained, was intended to lend weight to the Ambassador’s advice but the receptive attitude of the King indicated that such reinforcement was not needed. (868.00/11–646)
  3. Not printed.
  4. Not printed.
  5. Not printed.