Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

868.00/10–1546: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)

top secret

Washington, October 15, 1946—1 p.m.

1336. Serious concern both War and Dept over worsening internal conditions in Greece and increasing tension along northern Greek frontiers have led to recent revaluation US policy towards Greece. Document⁹⁹ stating background present situation and suggesting specific steps to implement active US interest in Greece has been approved in principle by Secretary in Paris.¹ When redrafted in final form and concurred in by War, Navy and State it will be submitted to President for approval.

Dept feels that strained international relations focusing on Greece may result in early major crisis which may be a deciding factor in future orientation of Near and Middle Eastern countries. It is of importance to US security that Greece remain independent and in charge of her own affairs, and we are prepared to take suitable measures to support territorial and political integrity Greece.

Specific policies, some of which have been in effect for some time, are set forth as follows:

1. Make clear to world by diplomatic conversations, public statements, or other appropriate means that US strongly supports Greek independence and territorial integrity and actively encourages development in Greece of democracy and peaceable and reasonable policy on part of Greek Govt.

2. Direct US advice to Greek Govt that policy of moderation in internal political affairs should be followed now that regime question has been voted on.

3. Clear statement by US to Greek Govt of view that Greek frontiers should remain those of 1939 in interest of justice, peace and stability.

4. Active support of Greece in UN and Security Council when occasion arises.

5. Question of sale to Greece and by what country of sufficient arms for maintaining internal order and defending territorial integrity until UN military forces are prepared to undertake guarantee against aggression has been discussed in general with Secretary but final decision on policy awaits his return in near future.²

6. Recommendation to Eximbank and International Bank concerning economic assistance to Greece provided credits are expended on sound projects which will strengthen Greek economy.

7. Relief assistance following cessation of UNRRA activities. Methods of implementation now under urgent consideration by Dept.

8. Additional credits and if necessary priority treatment for purchase by Greece of US surplus property both in US and abroad.

9. Make available to Greece appropriate US financial and economic advice through advisers and technicians or through dispatch of US economic mission.

10. Appropriate US action when necessary to assist Greece in finding export markets and in acquiring essential goods in US market.

11. Appropriate action to relieve Greek shipping crisis through sale or charter of vessels.

12. Active attempts to inform American public through press and foreign policy associations of nature of US policy towards Greece and reasons for it. End of Summary.

Dept intends in near future to transmit to you letter for King George from the President. Although this letter will be couched in general terms you may use your discretion in expanding certain points orally. It should be made clear to King and key Greek officials that active US support of Greek independence and territorial integrity is based on assumption that Greek Govt will strive for policy of moderation in connection with divergent Greek political factions the basic loyalty of which to Greece is not subject to question, as well as in its relations with neighboring countries.

It is particularly important that Greek Govt distinguish sharply in its attitude towards opposition between those essentially loyal groups which differ with regard to the kind of govt Greece should have and those groups which are intent on depriving Greece eventually of its independence. Repression of former groups will tend to force them into camp of latter groups and will thus strengthen hands of those seeking to destroy Greek sovereignty. US would find it difficult to support strongly any govt by means of which Extreme Right would resort to excessive measures against political opposition expressed through legal and peaceful means or to repression of civil liberties except in conditions of emergency to maintain internal order and authority of Govt. Proper Greek authorities should be made to understand Dept’s view that measures for internal order have not been impartially applied in recent months but have instead encouraged lawlessness of Extreme Right groups. It is further the view of the Dept that although the vote in the plebiscite represents the will of the Greek people the percentage in favor of King was increased by falsification and unfair practices of Govt in power. Also, although Tsaldaris may be legally correct in stating that March elections gave Populist Party clear mandate to form Govt it would appear that this is not a time for narrow legalistic argumentation but for an enlightened and patriotic attempt to bring together all decent democratic elements in Greece in a unity equally important now for the continued existence of Greek nation as it was during the war. It is not to be expected under existing circumstances that Extreme Left could be included in such Govt. At the same time certain notoriously reactionary Rightists are almost equally to blame for objectionable features of present Govt policy and should be removed from power for the good of the Greek people as a whole.

We have suggested informally to Brit that they consider similar letter and oral advice.

Your comments and suggestions by urgent cable would be appreciated.³

Sent Athens 1336; rptd Paris 5539, London 7175.

Acheson

99. Entitled “Memorandum regarding Greece”, dated September 25, not printed; if or revised version dated October 21, see p. 240.
1. In a letter of October 1 from Paris, not printed.
2. In telegram Secdel 1108 (No. 5484 to Paris), October 11, 1946, 7 p.m., Mr. Acheson informed Mr. Byrnes that the reference in the memo of September 25 “did not mean that any such sales are now envisaged but was intended to provide for future eventuality in case situation develops in which Brit cannot provide minimum Greek requirements. It is Dept’s feeling, as it is yours, that US assistance should be primarily economic.” (740.00119 Council/10–1146)
3. Ambassador MacVeagh replied in telegram 1407, October 17, 1946, 4 p.m., as follows: “Cannot concur too strongly in revaluated general policy re Greece.” (868.00/10–1746)