711.68/9–1246

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

top secret
personal

My Dear Mr. Secretary: I am enclosing herewith a copy of a letter dated August 28, 1946 from the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War, to which is attached a memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated August 23, 1946,67a entitled “Military Implications of the Current Turkish Situation.” You will observe that the JCS memorandum contains certain suggestions for improving the military situation of Turkey, including the granting of permission for Turkey to purchase from the United States certain arms and military equipment as outlined in SWNCC 202/267b and the giving of consideration to the advisability of supplying selected United States technicians including officers for the purpose of assisting the Turks.

This communication brings us face to face with a problem which we appear to have been approaching for some time. That problem is whether in view of the policy which the Soviet Union appears to be pursuing of endeavoring to undermine the stability and to obtain control of the countries in the Near and Middle East such as Greece, Turkey and Iran, we should make certain changes in our general policies, including those relating to the sale of combat equipment, to an extent which might enable us to strengthen the will and ability of the various Near and Middle Eastern countries under Soviet pressure to resist that pressure.

You will recall that on February 5, 1946, the Staff Committee recommended that certain restrictions be imposed upon the sale of [Page 210] military-type surplus equipment to foreign countries. A copy of the Summary of Action of the Committee67c on that date is attached hereto for your convenience (Enclosure 2). You will observe that this recommendation excludes the sale of such equipment to any countries of the Near and Middle East. Insofar as can be ascertained, no formal blanket decision at a high level has been made with regard to the sale abroad of military-type equipment other than surplus equipment, and the Department has consequently pursued no fixed policy regarding the matter, but has handled each request on an ad hoc basis. Sales to the Near and Middle East by private American suppliers have been limited to commercial aircraft, sporting equipment or small arms for personal protection.

You will also recall that on February 5, 1946 Mr. Acheson, in testifying before the Mead Committee, explained why the Department had decided to sell certain quantities of military-type surplus equipment to a number of selected countries and that the members of that Committee were inclined to be critical of our action in that respect. Although Mr. Acheson made no pledges to the Committee with regard to the future policies of the Department of State with respect to the sale to foreign countries of military-type surplus equipment, he made it clear that we had no intention of selling this type of equipment to countries other than those contained in the list, which did not include any Near or Middle Eastern countries. Mr. Acheson did not discuss with the Mead Committee what our policies might be with regard to new non-surplus military-type equipment. The Mead Committee has no jurisdiction over transactions involving sale of equipment which is not Government-owned. Shortly after the hearings in which Mr. Acheson participated, a sale of surplus airplanes was made inadvertently to Sweden by an FLC Representative and the matter was explained to the Mead Committee. The members of that Committee, while accepting the explanation, indicated that they reserved the right to criticize the transaction.

Mr. Acheson, however, did not consider that his action in offering an explanation of the Swedish sale to the Mead Committee established a precedent which would require consultation with the Committee on each subsequent proposal to sell military equipment. His explanation was given for the purpose of making it clear to the Mead Committee that he had acted in good faith in explaining our policy to that Committee on February 5 and that he did not know at that time that a sale to Sweden was under contemplation.

[Page 211]

On March 21 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee made a decision67d (SWNCC 202/2) in which it was suggested that “In accordance with the United States’ firm political policy of aiding the countries of the Near and Middle East to maintain their independence and develop sufficient strength to preserve law and order within their boundaries, it is consistent with United States policy to make available additional military supplies, in reasonable quantities, to those countries.” This decision also applied only to surplus and Lend-Lease equipment. It will be noted that it is not on all fours with the State Department Staff recommendations. At least one of these documents, therefore, must be changed.

During the period of more than six months which has elapsed since the formulation of the policies outlined above, there have been certain profound changes in the world situation. The Soviet Union has shown itself determined to continue to adhere to, and to pursue unswervingly, its policies of endeavoring to create instability in certain of the Near and Middle East countries contiguous to it or to its satellites and to endeavor to obtain hegemony over these countries.

In northern Iran the Soviet Union has equipped and trained a puppet Azerbaijan army said to number more than 20,000 men and is continuing to endeavor through this army and by other means to weaken and eventually gain control of the Central Iranian Government. It has made formal demands upon Turkey which, if accepted by the Turkish Government, would inevitably result in Turkey becoming a Soviet puppet.

It has aided its satellites, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania, in creating strong armed forces and is using these forces as a means of pressure upon Greece. Soviet agents are undoubtedly responsible for the smuggling of arms to, and for the strengthening of, groups in Greece which are endeavoring by force to set up in Greece a government which would be subservient to the Soviet Union.

This Government, as you are aware, has already decided that the establishment of a Soviet puppet government in Turkey would constitute a serious threat to the security of the United States and that we should endeavor to strengthen the will and ability of Turkey to defend Turkish independence and territorial integrity.

On a number of occasions we have informed both Greece and Iran of our deep interest in the maintenance of Greek and Iranian independence.

The Central Government of Iran has sent to the United States a Military Purchasing Commission to buy certain military-type equipment for the purpose of improving the quality of the Iranian army [Page 212] and strengthening the ability of the Iranian Government to maintain its authority throughout the whole country.

The Turkish Government has already indicated its desire to buy certain military-type equipment from us in order to strengthen its defenses.

Although Greece apparently has not approached us with a request to buy military-type equipment it is reasonable to expect, in view of the situation in which that country finds itself, that the Greek Government will eventually seek to make some military purchases in this country.

If we should categorically refuse to sell to these countries any military-type equipment, even though it be clearly demonstrated that such equipment is urgently needed in order to preserve internal order or to protect frontiers, the governments and people of these countries may well obtain the impression that our interest in the maintenance of their independence is not deep and they cannot expect any concrete support from us in their efforts to preserve their independence. If such an impression should be created there is a danger that the governments and people of these countries will gradually become discouraged and that their will to resist Soviet pressure will be greatly weakened.

All of us working on the problem, including General Hilldring, believe, in the light of the Dardanelles decision (See Department’s telegram to Paris 4122 of August 15.67e) that the time has now come for us to review existing policies with regard to the sale abroad of military-type equipment, both surplus and non-surplus. We believe it is clear that this review will demonstrate the necessity that changes be made in the recommendations of the Staff Committee of February 5, 1946 (SC/R–184). These changes could be effected in one of two ways. You may issue a statement of policy which would supplant the Staff Committee policy (SC/R–184) or, if you wish, the Staff Committee could issue a new statement in accordance with suggestions made by you. The advantage of the changes being effected by you personally would be that they would be known to a smaller circle in the Department and that the danger of a leak would be correspondingly reduced. It seems to us that in any event the new statement of policy should be broader than that set forth in SC/R–184, which covers only surplus property. It should cover the transfer or sale of all military-type equipment of United States origin, regardless of whether Government-owned or privately owned.

We are preparing a draft of a statement of a type which in our opinion will enable us to meet the situation which has developed since last spring and we are planning to send it to you under cover of another letter. We are couching this statement in most general terms in [Page 213] order that it will permit of a considerable degree of flexibility in application.

You will, of course, understand that it is not our idea that we should begin to sell military-type equipment immediately in large quantities to various countries subject to external pressure. We feel, however, that the new policy should enable us, with the discretion and restraint required by the circumstances, to supply military-type equipment to countries such as those in the Near and Middle East, the maintenance and integrity of which are considered to be of important interest to the United States.

In view of the national importance of this matter, you may care to discuss it informally with the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate who are with you in Paris. You will, of course, desire that a new policy, in case you approve it, should receive the approval of the President before it is put into force.

We have grave doubt that it would be advisable at the present time for the United States to send a military mission to Turkey. We understand that Turkey has not as yet asked for such a mission. We believe that it might be preferable not to endeavor to make a decision with regard to this matter at the present time. In case, at a later date, Turkey should request some kind of American military mission, we could make our decision at that time after taking into consideration the type of mission desired, the world situation and other factors involved.

Insofar as we are aware, no action has been taken so far as the Soviet is concerned, to implement that section of the memorandum contained in our telegram 4122 of August 15 to Paris which reads: “The implementation of this policy * * * will require in the first instance frank discussions with the principal nations involved.” We have assumed that you will probably care to talk this over with Molotov at such time, and in such manner, as you may consider appropriate. Although we consider the maintenance of integrity and independence of Iran and Greece also to be extremely important to the United States, we have not undertaken the preparation of a memorandum relating to them similar to that regarding Turkey since the Soviet Union has made no formal demands upon them as it has upon Turkey. It seems to us important, however, that in emphasizing to the Soviet Union our interest in the maintenance of Turkish independence and integrity the impression should not be left with the Soviet Union that we are not also interested in the independence and territorial integrity of Greece and Iran.

I have read this letter to the Secretary of War and to the Under Secretary of Navy and both of them have given it their full approval.

Sincerely yours,

William L. Clayton
  1. For these papers, see pp. 856, 857, respectively.
  2. Dated February 11, included in the documentation on United States National Security Policy, printed in volume i .
  3. No. SC/R–184, included in documentation on United States National Security Policy, in volume i .
  4. See footnote 67b, p. 209, and footnote 63 to reference there cited.
  5. Post, p. 840.