740.00119 EW/5–1146
Memorandum by the State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee to the Secretary
of State
secret
SWN 4279
Washington, May 11,
1946.
In response to a request by the Acting State Member, State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee, dated 29 April 1946, for a study evaluating the
strategic elements which are involved in the Greek request for
rectification of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have advised the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as follows:
- “a. Greece desires to advance her
Bulgarian frontier an average of about thirty-six miles
northward to include the general areas of the
Macedonian-Thracian watershed, approximately doubling the
present width of her territory between Bulgaria and the
Aegean Sea. This would require transfer of a strip of more
than 6500 square miles of Bulgarian territory along the full
length of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier with a population of
about 400,000, the majority of whom are Moslem Pomaks or
Turks. There are no known important military establishments
in the area.
-
b. In all probability Greece could
not successfully defend her present frontier against
Bulgaria attacking alone. Greek forces in western Thrace can
easily be cut off by penetration to the sea through her
present narrow east-west corridor in this area. Acquisition
of the Macedonian-Thracian watershed area would materially
widen this corridor and strengthen Greek defensive
capabilities, possibly to such a degree that she might
withstand Bulgarian offensive efforts. However, Greece would
not be strengthened to the extent to guaranteeing successful
defense against Bulgaria or any coalition or combination of
nations.
-
c. Unless preparations to re-enforce
Greece have been made in advance of attack, it is improbable
that acquisition of the Macedonian-Thracian watershed would
strengthen her sufficiently to prevent a break-through by a
coalition or combination of nations before outside support
could become effective.
-
d. Advancing the Greek boundary at
the expense of Bulgaria, as proposed, would not strengthen
the Greek position sufficiently for her to participate
effectively with Turkey in defense of the Dardanelles. On
the other hand, in the unlikely event that neutrality is
permitted to Greece, her possession of the
Macedonian-Thracian watershed would be of some advantage to
Turkey in a defense of the Dardanelles. This might, however,
influence Turkey to accept the extreme hazard of defending
her territory in Europe.
-
e. Transfer of this territory from
Bulgaria to Greece would likely be followed by violent
resentment and partisan activities. The peace of the Balkans
would thereby be endangered without decisive strategic
gain.”
For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:
John D. Hickerson
Acting Chairman
