Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Paris Peace Conference: Documents, Volume IV

Doc. No. 1 (M).

Memorandum on the Military Clauses of the Draft Peace Treaty

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II. Military Clauses

The fact of becoming a member of the United Nations carries with it, together with the obligation of performing certain duties, the faculty of enjoying the rights granted by Articles 2, 43 and 51 of the Charter of the United Nations to its members.

The draft Peace Treaty, on the contrary, prevents Italy from fulfilling the duties mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter and from enjoying the rights granted in Article 51. In fact, Italy will no longer be able to defend her frontiers, i. e. her independence, thus practically losing her fundamental rights as a sovereign nation (Art. 2). This fact is in contrast with the very interests of the United Nations because, in case of invasion of Italy, the United Nations would obviously find themselves unable to take advantage of the Italian territory for the purpose of joint military operations as foreseen in Article 43 of the Charter.

The inability of Italy to defend her own territory derives not only from the weakness and from the precarious character of the new frontiers drawn in the Treaty, but also from the one-sided demilitarisation of a band of territory along the frontier and from the military restrictions concerning certain stretches of her shores and finally from the limitation of armaments.

The drafters of the Treaty evidently planned these limitations with the aim of depriving Italy of any aggressive power. Such a possibility can, however, be altogether dismissed for the following reasons:

a. The democratic trend of the country is leading Italy towards the establishment of sincere, friendly and peaceful relations with all nations;

b. Economic and industrial conditions oblige Italy to devote to her armed forces the minimum possible amount of her financial resources;

c. While the present Italian frontiers afford Italy certain guarantees from the defensive point of view, they place her, from the point of view of offence, in a condition of marked inferiority in comparison to neighbouring countries.

In fact, to the west, on the French side, the mountain barrier is of considerable thickness and provides a series of successive defensive lines, while vital objectives are all far removed. In such conditions, an Italian offensive action is bound to failure. This is, moreover, confirmed by the fact that never, not even at the time when Italy was a party to the Triple Alliance (with the German and Austrian Empires), has the Italian General Staff envisaged on the Western Alps any operations other than of a strictly defensive character.

On the east one finds similar conditions with regard to the thickness of the mountain zone, the natural defensive lines and the vital objectives. The imperviousness of large waterless areas, thick with forests, should also be considered.

Hence, in the 1915–18 war, the progress achieved in eleven furious battles on the Isonzo was out of all proportions with the amount of forces and means engaged and with the blood heroically shed by the Italian army. On the contrary, in 1917, a simple local success of the enemy in the region of Caporetto was sufficient to force a general withdrawal of the whole front.

The frontier changes proposed in the draft Treaty are such that Italy, from a military standpoint, will be placed in a situation far more serious than the one existing in 1914.

Such a weakness might be compensated by the use of powerful mobile forces, but these are forbidden by the clauses of the Treaty and by Italian financial conditions.

In the worst case, if the frontier cannot be modified to render it slightly less vulnerable, it would at least be necessary to grant Italy the faculty of fortifying the frontier zone in a strictly defensive manner.

In consideration of the above, and independently of what may be decided on territorial questions from a political view-point the following minimum amendments of the clauses of the draft Treaty are here presented:

1. In order to give Italy a reasonable possibility, not of aggression but merely of defence, it is necessary to cancel in the Draft Treaty the demilitarisation clauses (Art. 40 and following) and, should this prove impossible, at least to limit them to fortifications and weapons of an offensive nature.

2. As regards the time limit established by the second paragraph of Article 5 and sub-paragraphs 1 (c) of Articles 40 and 41 dealing respectively with the determination, on the spot, of the exact line of the new frontier and with the destruction of permanent fortifications, the Italian Delegation points out that the time limit therein fixed is too short, considering the climate obtaining in the high mountain areas where this work must be carried out.

Seeing that, notwithstanding the best Italian intentions, this time limit would probably be overstepped (a fact which might give rise to controversy), it is indispensable that the time limit be reasonably extended.

3. The restriction imposed by Article 44 which forbids the possession, construction or experiments with self-propelled or guided missiles, should be attenuated in order to allow their use for strictly defensive purposes against aircraft, armoured cars and landing craft.

4. The limitation whereby the Italian Army may not possess more than 200 tanks appears too restrictive. The Italian Delegation suggests that an adequate reserve should be allowed. The same consideration applies to other war materials for the equipment of the Italian Army. (Art. 46 and 58).

5. The limitations imposed on the Italian air forces (Art. 55, par. 1) include in the equipment of auxiliary services even air-sea rescue, liaison and reserve types of aircraft. The Italian Delegation submits that the following aircraft types should be allowed over and above the amount described by Article 55:

a. Air-sea rescue and liaison types of aircraft. The former because they carry out humanitarian tasks of an international nature. The latter because their work is, in practice, similar to that of private tourist planes. These types of aircraft do not carry military apparatus of any kind and could not possibly perform any military activity;

b. Reserve aircraft, so as not to reduce further the very limited number of 350 aircraft permitted, and to allow the building up of a reserve not smaller than 40 p. 100. [per cent]

6. The necessity of meeting the task of “local defence of Italian frontiers” (as described in Art. 55, par. 1) is in contradiction with paragraph 2 of the same Article, which forbids Italy to have any aircraft with bomb-carrying facilities.

As it is impossible to conceive an effective cooperation of air forces with ground and naval forces without weapons capable of counteracting land—or sea—attack craft of a would-be aggressor, the Italian Delegation submits that paragraph 1 of Article 55 be drafted so as to allow Italy to possess appropriate arms for reacting against surface mobile objectives.

7. Questions relating to the naval clauses are more complex and, owing to their technical character, require a more detailed examination which will be made separately. It is sufficient here to point out—as it has already been done in the Memoranda presented in May and July 1946—the following fundamental points, namely:

a. The juridical and ethical basis on which the disposal of excess units of the Italian Navy should stand, in keeping with the principles expressed by President De Gasperi in his statement at the Luxembourg;

b. The fact that the naval forces left to Italy appear inadequate to the minimum needs of her legitimate defence, not only owing to the prohibition of certain types of vessel of a primary defensive character, but also to the smallness of the fleet in relation to the geographical and economic position of the country.

To sum up: Italy has not, and cannot have, any future offensive intentions. Consequently, she has no objection to the measures provided by the Treaty to prevent any offensive action, but she asks that these measures be limited to this eventuality and do not include restrictions in the strictly defensive field.

The clauses, as drafted in the Treaty, are conceived in such a way as to crush any possibility of defence. This is in open contradiction with the rights of sovereignty and of legitimate defence which should be granted to all Nations.

Such an unjust situation, which deeply wounds the dignity of the Italian Nation, could be improved, at least partially by inserting in Article 39 of the Treaty a provision to the effect that the military clauses are to be revised after a given period, in compliance with the governing principles of the United Nations.

In the meantime Italy should be given some precise guarantees against possible aggression, for, if it is fair that she should be forbidden to carry out aggression against other Nations, it would be also fair that, in turn, she should receive suitable assurance of liberty and independence.