Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Paris Peace Conference: Documents, Volume IV

CFM Files

Memorandum by Mr. Cavendish W. Cannon, Political Adviser, United States Delegation^91a

Paris, October 16, 1946.

[Here follows a list of documents concerning Greece and Greek issues at the Conference, which were handed to Mr. Matthews for transmission to the Department of State, at his discretion.]

The Greek Delegation are gleeful over their success in rounding up enough abstentions to defeat Article 1 of the Bulgarian treaty in the vote before the plenary session.⁹² Their attitude, as gathered from conversations with Mr. Tsaldaris on Sunday and with Mr. Dragoumis, Mr. A. Politis and Mr. Stephanou yesterday, is that this “success” will strengthen the present Government with the people at home, while the “justice of the Greek case” which by this vote now becomes evident to world public opinion, will oblige the Council of Foreign Ministers to give at least some satisfaction to the Greek claim. They take no account of the fact that the real decision was the vote in the Political Commission a fortnight ago;⁹³ that blow having already fallen, it could have been arranged, with some management of their press, that the plenary vote confirming this rejection could be passed off as an inevitable consequence. They completely ignore the realities of the situation as expressed so clearly by Mr. Byrnes. (See memorandum of conversation of October 7, page 2.⁹⁴) They seem not to worry about the probability that the Bulgarians, who had been told by the Russians to drop their counter-claim, will now reopen the question, and they show no sign of making any provision for a second defeat when the CFM draws up the final text.

The British (Jebb, Lord Hood and Warner) are a little embarrassed. They do not admit to lobbying for the abstentions, and they privately agree that this device only prolongs the agony. They feel that even the smallest item that can help the Greek Government at this juncture is worth while, and as for later, well, maybe something will turn up.

Mr. Henderson will be interested in noting the Secretary’s statement that during this Conference he had given more attention to Greek affairs than to anything else, except the question of Trieste.⁹⁵ It should be noted that our economists, Thorp, Reinstein and the others, also gave long hours of their time to study and discussion of Greek problems. I know that the Greek Delegation appreciate this help, though they do not realize how much of our labor on their behalf was caused by their own ill-conceived projects. You will recall Diamantopoulos’ confession that he had not yet, as of the beginning of October, reported to Mr. Tsaldaris on Mr. Clayton’s suggestion, made in August, concerning an economic survey. It should also be noted that Jean Politis, who heads up the economic part of their delegation, goes his own way, seeking no counsel from the rest of the delegation.

To return to the question of Article 1 of the Bulgarian treaty, the Greeks feel no disappointment that we did not go along with them in abstaining on the final vote. They have known our position from the start, of course. Actually they declare that throughout the Conference it has been we, rather than the British, who have helped them over the rough spots.

1. This memorandum was directed to Mr. Matthews.
92. See the Verbatim Record of the 42nd Plenary Meeting, October 11, vol. iii, p. 796.
93. See the United States Delegation Journal account of the proceedings of the 15th Meeting of the Political and Territorial Commission for Bulgaria, October 1, vol. iii, p. 610.
94. Fourth paragraph of the memorandum, vol. iii, pp. 686, 687.
95. See ibid.