CFM Files
Mr. Cavendish W. Cannon, Political Adviser, United States Delegation, to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)
Dear Mr. MacVeagh: I take this opportunity to send to you through Colonel Wachwitz a few notes on Greek affairs as connected with the Paris Conference.
First, let me say that the general situation in Greece is very much in our minds, and the Secretary has been giving particular attention to it. We have made it a matter of principle to support the Greek Delegation wherever possible, and, where we could not do so, to help them over the rough spots when their projects were rejected.
We have been thoroughly realistic about it. Keeping foremost in our minds our own national interest in the evolution of the situation in Greece, we have worked with greater vigor for the Greek interest than would have been expected of us if we had approached the problem only on the “gallant ally” theme.
It has not been easy. I feel that I should let you know that the chief difficulty has been the Greek delegation itself. They seem to have come here with no balanced program of what they might achieve at the Conference, and no discrimination between their major objectives and minor points worth taking a chance on. We knew, of course, to what extent they felt obliged to go the limit for the sake of public opinion at home, but we did expect a little more foresight in preparing the way for rejections on items which any reasonable observer would have discounted in advance.
Remembering the alertness, perception and resilience characteristic of Greek diplomacy in the past, I was disappointed with their lack of planning, their obtuseness in negotiation, and their panic when things go wrong for them. This may be a part of the general demoralization, and you probably are encountering the same thing at Athens; we marvel, though, that we have not found one able man in their delegation. Aghnides, with whom it would have been a pleasure to work, [Page 883] seems not sufficiently “safe” to please Pipinelis, so he has been “on leave” in Switzerland or elsewhere most of the time.
In presentation of their case they have been unlucky, too. Their proposed amendments, many in number and most of them of minor importance, have, for the most part been poorly drafted, and inadequately documented, and they have fared badly. Let us look at their three main aims: the Albanian frontier, the Bulgarian frontier, and reparations. We have fought a hard fight for them on reparations—which they could hardly expect in view of our general position on reparations policy—and the outlook is pretty good. On Albania, the Secretary went so far as to make a special speech for them in a plenary session,88 though we really felt the subject did not belong in this Conference. On the Bulgarian frontier, they have known for a year and a half, since they first opened the question with us, that we did not think it was wise to advance this claim, and it must have been clear to them from the time the Conference opened, that they could not get a favorable vote on it. Nevertheless we jockeyed it around through the Military Commission, in order to give them a bit more room for maneuvering a decent withdrawal, and in order particularly to give them time to prepare their people back home, through their press, for the disappointment.
They finally withdrew their Albanian resolution,89 though too late to do it gracefully. We built up an “out” for them on the Bulgarian frontier proposition in the form of a demilitarization obligation on the Bulgarians, based on one of their own amendments, but to our great astonishment their military representative repudiated it in the Military Commission as being entirely inadequate, and we must expect a nasty time of it when it comes up in the plenary session. Fortunately their statement is not textually in the record, and they may manage somehow to carry the amendment through.
And this is curious: The British Delegation has done less to help them along, both at the table and in the lobbies, than we have. Perhaps the explanation is in the general atmosphere of the Conference rooms. You will have guessed that whenever a Greek project comes up for discussion one must expect to hear a lot more about Bulgarian, Yugoslav and Albanian democracy as contrasted with Greek “reaction” and British imperialism than about the real merits of the proposition before the Commission. In such an atmosphere I can understand that the British are glad to have us step up. It is not so clear why they do not give the Greeks more guidance outside.
[Page 884]The foregoing may not be much help to you, but it seemed to me that it might be useful for you to know how things have been going here. Frankly, we are worried when we read that promises are still being made in Athens which cannot be realized at Paris. Twice in the last fortnight we have suggested that the publicity organs begin, at this late date, to prepare for the disillusionment, and now, we fear, fresh hopes will be raised by their bringing an enlarged delegation here. If it is a maneuvre to spread the responsibility to other leaders, it seems to me to be a rather discreditable project, the resources in political leadership being what they are in Greece.
Returning to the theme of our own broader interest, the Secretary wants to do something really constructive for the Greek people. Here at Paris we try to stick to our job, the treaties, but Tsaldaris, who arrived last night, will doubtless want to see the Secretary within the next few days and we shall then take up with the Department any proposal which might be helpful. I thought that you would like to have these notes for background purposes. You will see how useful it will be to us here to have the texts of your telegrams to the Department in the period before the Secretary returns to Washington.
- See the United States Delegation Journal account of the 25th Plenary Meeting, August 30, vol. iii, p. 321.↩
- The document under reference, C.P.(Plen)Doc.14, is quoted in footnote 93, p. 321, vol. iii.↩