Office of the Historian

Doc. No. 4 (P).

Memorandum on the Clauses of the Draft Peace Treaty Concerning the Italian Territories in Africa (Art. 17)

undated

Italy believes that she has sufficiently stressed the importance she attaches to the problem of her African territories through the political and technical documents submitted to the Nations taking part in the Conference.

The Italian Government has already stated that it adheres to the principles of the San Francisco Charter for the administration of territories considered up to now colonial, and has recalled the long record of sympathetic understanding of the natives’ problems which stands behind the policy of democratic Italy in the past, as well as the studies carried out by Italian scientists on the subject.

In particular, Italy envisages in a most friendly spirit her relations with the Arab countries and is prepared to consider her African territories a field for collaboration with all local inhabitants. Nor should one forget that many tens of thousands of Italians have long since sunk their roots there, becoming part of the population. They are naturally the first to want a most cordial understanding with the other inhabitants to whom they are bound by the common interests of the country.

It would therefore have been possible to arrive at an equitable solution of this problem along the lines of the proposal examined and favourably received by certain members of the Council of Foreign Ministers in their meeting of May 10, 1946, namely for the United Nations to entrust Italy with a mandate over these territories. In its present reading, Article 17 of the Draft Peace Treaty postpones instead by one year the final decision on the Italian territories in Africa following the proposal of the American Secretary of State to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The Italian Government fully realizing the spirit governing this postponement proposal, has the following remarks to make on the formulation of Article 17:

1.
The present position, both de jure and de facto, of Libya, Eritrea and Somalia is still that of territories under Italian sovereignty and as such internationally recognized. These territories are under British military occupation (for the major part) and under French military occupation with regard solely to southern Libya.
Under such circumstances, Article 17, as it stands adds to the postponement clause, two very serious conditions:
a.
Italy must renounce her sovereignty now, before any decision is taken;
b.
Italy must accept for one more year British military administration (and French for a small part).
In other words Article 17, as it now reads, imposes on Italy a renouncement to the only ties still binding her both de jure and de facto to her African territories. It is thus no longer a matter of simple postponement as proposed at first, but of a formula which implies a decision already taken against Italian interests.
2.
This surrender of sovereignty has no juridical justification. If Italy’s sovereignty is cancelled by treaty, through the formula of Article 17 (first part), these territories (Libya, Eritrea and Somalia-) become, according to international law, “res nullius”. Such a juridical situation is contrary to Italy’s interests as she would thus see all her rights voided, but it would likewise be extremely prejudicial to the general interests of the international community, and this in a part of the world so politically neuralgic as the Middle East. What would be the advantage of such a voiding of Italian sovereignty if the result is merely to increase the instability of the Middle East?
3.
The necessity has been mentioned for Italy to renounce beforehand her sovereignty in order that she may be later given the administration in trusteeship of her African territories. But in this case Italian sovereignty should cease at the very moment when the United Nations approve the trusteeship so that no solution [dissolution?] of continuity takes place between Italian sovereignty and the new juridical situation under the United Nations.
4.
It should be added that even though refugees now living in Italy at public expense or in Rhodesian and Kenya camps are not permitted to return home, two points can still be established beyond doubt. One juridical: Italy’s sovereignty; the other factual; the presence of Italians in these territories. Is it fair to ask Italy to sign away her sovereignty, which constitutes the last remaining link with the Italians in Africa whose labours through dozens of years have totally transformed Libya, Eritrea and Somalia?
5.
Concerning the provisional administration of these territories, it should be remarked that in occupied territories it is customary to maintain local administration under military control of the occupying Power. But in Italy’s African territories (Libya, Eritrea and Somalia) British Military Administration has completely taken the place of Italian administration.

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And even when Italians (mostly technicians) are to be found in British offices, they hold only minor positions, and never “jure proprio” (namely not as employees of the previous Italian Administration) but are considered merely experts attached to the British Military Administration.

Up to now this situation, contrary to the “droit de guerre” has been merely a de facto one, prolonged, in spite of Italian reservation, even after the end of hostilities.

The clause, now inserted in Article 17, reading “the said possessions shall continue under their present administration” would have two consequences: first, it would give juridical recognition to the present de facto situation; second, it would prolong it, under the new form, for one year.

Now that the extension of the occupation in Libya, Eritrea and Somalia is being sanctioned by treaty, the Italian Government asks that the administration of these territories shall be submitted to the normal rules of international law under the control of the military occupational Authorities.

In the Attached Doc. 4 bis (P) will be found the text of the proposed amendments to Article 17.