560.AL/11–2346: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:30 p.m.]
4211. We have noted with interest several recent reports from London of conversations with Soviet officials giving various explanations why Soviet Government does not participate in many international meetings, particularly ITO. Reasons given for nonparticipation range from lack of personnel to Soviet preoccupation with questions of security.
While there may be some modicum of truth in these arguments, we believe that in regard to such institutions as the International Bank, ITO and PICAO, the principal, if not the only, reason the Russians do not join is that they do not wish to. Kremlin insistence on keeping its independence of action in world affairs has even on occasion been frankly expressed by certain responsible Soviet officials, and, in any event, is self-evident in every aspect of Soviet policy in action. Russians want to be able to act unilaterally as they have done in Balkans and will try to do in all areas where it is at all possible. Their attempts at exclusive aviation agreements is but one of many concrete examples [Page 1356] of this phenomenon. Another factor is that to join any organization which would require them to give statistics on national income, international trade, balance of payments and gold production, would imply a complete reversal of a basic and scrupulously maintained Soviet policy of state secrecy in such matters.
On the other hand, whenever they stand to gain something concrete by participation in an international organ or run the risk of losing something important by failure so to do, they appear to find no difficulty in effecting such participation (UNRRA, telecommunications, whaling).
It would appear unreal, therefore, in the absence of concrete evidence to the contrary, to base any policy on the belief that Russians actually desire to join such organs as ITO but are precluded because of personnel or other administrative considerations. It is difficult to understand how a nation of some 180,000,000 inhabitants and pretentions to world leadership cannot achieve the same degree of participation in international organs as a small country such as Belgium, with its population of 8,000,000. When one considers the magnitude of many Soviet diplomatic and consular missions and the personnel it employs in other open and undercover international operations, it would appear that the distribution of this personnel was one of conscious administrative decision.
Finally, it should be pointed out that by neither joining nor clearly refusing to join an organ, and by holding out hope that if certain changes are made, they might join, the Russians achieve a bargaining position which they often use to undermine and emasculate the organ, irrespective of whether they eventually do or do not join it (Bretton Woods and ECITO).
Repeated London 418; Paris 431; Berlin 264.