Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

SWNCC File

Memorandum by the Acting Department of State Member (Matthews) to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee

top secret

Washington, April 1, 1946.

Subject: Political Estimate of Soviet Policy for Use in Connection with Military Studies⁷¹

For the purpose of this paper there is no value in attempting any exhaustive interpretation or analysis of the possible motives or reasons which underlie present Soviet policy. Recent despatches from the Embassy at Moscow (especially nos. 511 of February 22 and 878 of March 20)⁷² have set forth in full the most probable explanation of present Soviet policies and attitudes. The U.S. Government must take cognizance of actual Soviet policies and actions in the international field at the present time. As long as present Soviet policies and attitude in regard to other countries continue unchanged, the U.S. must accept the fact that it is confronted with the threat of an expanding totalitarian state which continues to believe and act on the belief that the world is divided into two irreconcilably hostile camps, i.e., Soviet and non-Soviet. As long as Soviet actions continue to support this thesis, the U.S. must accept that this policy of expansion by direct and indirect means will be continuous and unlimited.

The only interpretations of present Soviet policy which would be of value to consider in this paper are those concerning which there is current misapprehension in the U.S. The first of these is the belief that present Soviet actions and policies are motivated primarily by a legitimate desire to obtain security for the Soviet Union against the threat of hostile ‘action on the part of “capitalist encirclement.” The very use of the words “capitalist encirclement” as a justification of present Soviet action prompts the logical conclusion that Soviet expansionist aims are unlimited and not confined to areas of immediate concern to the Soviet Union.

Another misconception frequently held is that Soviet policies and actions can be explained on the basis of Soviet “suspicions” of the motives of other countries. Without going fully into this aspect of Soviet psychology it can be stated on the basis of experience that Soviet suspicion of the motives of other countries is a deliberately artificial thesis spread by the Soviet Government primarily for internal reasons, but for consumption both at home and abroad, and not a conclusion reached by an objective and honest evaluation of the actions of other countries. Soviet “suspicion” of foreign governments is thus not susceptable of removal by the actions of foreign governments since its source lies within the border of the Soviet Union. Ill-considered and unintelligent actions or statements by foreign governments or individuals, however, serve to assist the Soviet Government in developing or supporting this suspicion to its internal and external advantage. Moreover we must be prepared to face the fact that any actions or statements evidencing interest in various areas (bases, for instance) do form a basis which permits the Soviet authorities to use such actions and statements, internally and externally to place in as favorable light as possible unilateral moves they are making, or to interpret them as confirmation of their suspicions. They are already using the presence of American troops in China, Cuba, and Iceland, etc. in this manner, thus making it more difficult for us effectively to oppose Soviet unilateral action in other areas.

At the present time the Soviet offensive against the non-Soviet world may be divided into the following two categories:

1. The extension of Soviet power and territorial control by the use or threat of armed force. This aspect of Soviet policy is confined to the areas which the Soviet military power, composed principally of ground armies, can actually dominate, i.e., Finland, Scandinavia, Eastern, Central and South Eastern Europe, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, Sinkiang and Manchuria.

2. Concurrently with 1, Soviet political and psychological attack in areas in which the threat of armed force is either non-existent or as yet not fully effective. This attack, carried on through the medium of Communist parties and affiliated organizations, is psychological warfare designed to exploit every weakness in the non-Soviet world in order to render it incapable of resisting, on an international scale, the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union.

For the purpose of this paper considerations need be given only to aspect no. 1 since it is only in this field that the question of the eventual use of military forces of the United States would arise. The problem presented by aspect no. 2 must be met by means other than of military force.

U.S. Policy in Regard to the Soviet Union

The fundamental principles of U.S. foreign policy find their expression in many international agreements and statements and in particular in the Charter of the United Nations. In this sense the U.S. has basically no especial policy in regard to the Soviet Union. Such problems, difficulties, and in the last analysis, dangers as are present in Soviet-American relations arise from past and present actions and policies of the Soviet Government. Due to these policies and actions on the part of the Soviet Government, the U.S. is forced to regard its relations with the Soviet Union in a special category.

Whereas as outlined above the Soviet Government from all evidence is acting on the belief that irreconcilable hostility exists between the Soviet and the non-Soviet world, the U.S. together with other countries of the non-Soviet world believes that there is no objective reason why the so-called capitalist system and Communist system cannot peacefully exist provided neither attempts to extend the area of its system by aggressive and ultimately forcible means at the expense of the other. However, in order to provide any basis for such peaceful coexistence of the two systems, the U.S. at the present time must demonstrate to the Soviet Government in the first instance by diplomatic means and in the last analysis by military force if necessary that the present course of its foreign policy can only lead to disaster for the Soviet Union.

With respect to the extension of Soviet territorial control the U.S. should use the best methods at its disposal to check the actual physical extension of Soviet power beyond its present limits. Diplomatic and other non-military action represent the only means at the disposal of the U.S. to check this extension of Soviet power until such extension involves the seizure of regions in which the power of the Soviet armies can be countered defensively by the Naval, amphibious and air power of the U.S. and its potential allies. The Charter of the United Nations affords the best and most unassailable means through which the U.S. can implement its opposition to Soviet physical expansion. It not only offers the basis upon which the greatest degrees of popular support can be obtained in the U.S. but it also will insure the support and even assistance of other members of the United Nations. If, as may occur, the United Nations breaks down under the test of opposition to Soviet aggression it will have served the purpose of clarifying the issues before American and world public opinion and thus make easier whatever future steps may be required by the U.S. and other like minded nations in the face of a new threat of world aggression. We must be sure, however, to conduct our diplomatic opposition realistically and with full realization of:

(a) Our military ineffectiveness within the land masses of Eurasia.

(b) The state of public opinion regarding the use of force or for full out use of our economic resources in support of foreign policy.

If, despite diplomatic action, Soviet territorial expansion should reach areas wherein our naval, amphibious and air power is potentially capable of interposing effectively, it will still be desirable to use such power through the medium of the United Nations Organization if that Organization has survived its use in the previous phase and continues to be an effective organization of the non-Soviet world.

The problem of opposing Soviet expansion first by diplomatic means and eventually if these prove ineffective by military force is not a problem of the U.S. alone. Thus, the question of U.S. relations with Great Britain and other non-Soviet countries assumes special importance and should be viewed in the light of this problem. If Soviet Russia is to be denied the hegemony of Europe, the United Kingdom must continue in existence as the principal power in Western Europe economically and militarily. The U.S. should, therefore, explore its relationship with Great Britain and give all feasible political, economic, and if necessary military support within the framework of the United Nations, to the United Kingdom and the communications of the British Commonwealth. This does not imply a blank check of American support throughout the world for every interest of the British Empire, but only in respect of areas and interests which are in the opinion of the U.S. vital to the maintenance of the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth of nations as a great power.

U.S. Armed Force as Required for the Implementation of U.S. Policy

In the diplomatic phase involving UNO the success of U.S. diplomatic opposition to present Soviet expansion will depend in large measure upon the Soviet estimate of U.S. military capabilities and the determination of the American Government and people to employ armed force in opposition to Soviet expansion. There is no evidence that the Soviet Union desires a major war at this time. On the contrary, there are many indications that it needs and wishes a period of reconstruction and development. The great danger therefore is that the Soviet leaders may extend their expansionist policies to a point beyond that which Great Britain or the United States in their own vital security interest, could tolerate. It is wise to emphasize therefore the importance of being so prepared militarily and of showing such firmness and resolution that the Soviet Union will not, through miscalculation of American intentions and potentialities, push to the point that results in war. In support of the American foreign policy it is essential that:

(1) Steps be taken in the immediate future to reconstitute our military establishment so that it can resist Soviet expansion by force of arms in areas of our own choosing should such action prove necessary and to protect, during the period of diplomatic action, areas which would be strategically essential in any armed conflict with the Soviet Union; and

(2) To create as soon as possible an informed public opinion concerning the issues involved.

Should the foreign policy of the U.S. be successful in checking physical Soviet expansion and in bringing about a reorientation of Soviet political thinking involving the acceptance of the thesis that the two systems can peacefully coexist, the U.S. could then put into effect the positive and constructive program of relations with the Soviet Union designed to produce maximum cooperation and harmony in international relations.

H. Freeman Matthews

71. This memorandum was prepared in response to a request submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on March 13. In that request, SM–5244, the JCS had stated that they were conducting studies regarding military support for governmental policies. In connection with these studies, the JCS asked the Department of State to “provide them with a political estimate of Russia and, so far as possible, an outline of future United States policy with reference to Russia, and any requirement for its implementation on the part of the armed forces.” (SWNCC Files)
72. Vol. vi, pp. 696 and 721, respectively.