Secretariat Files14

Minutes of the 167th Meeting of the Secretary of State’s Staff Committee, Department of State, Washington, November 13, 1945, 9:30 a.m. 15

top secret
Present: The Secretary (presiding)
The Under Secretary16
The Counselor17
Messrs. Clayton18
Dunn19
Hackworth20
McCormack21
Pasvolsky22
Russell23
Hiss24
Grange25
Lewis26
Rothwell27
Absent: Messrs. Benton28
Braden29
[Page 1119]

The Committee met at 9:30 a.m.

agenda item

Action on Joint Chiefs of Staff Statement of United States Military Policy. (Document SC–169a; Agenda Item 1)30

Mr. Pasvolsky requested Mr. Hiss to present document SC–169a, which included a statement of United States military policy prepared and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,31 and recommendations regarding the action to be taken by the Department with respect to the statement.

Mr. Hiss said the Joint Chiefs of Staff statement had come to the Department through the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.32 It was submitted for the comments of the Department of State and eventually would be presented to the President for approval. Mr. Hiss said that the statement had been studied by the Counselor and by the directors of all of the geographic and economic offices of the Department, and on the basis of their comments the recommendations had been drafted.

Mr. Hiss said that the first recommendation was that the general observation should be made to the War and Navy Departments that because of the necessarily general terms of such a statement, its application will require careful consideration and close coordination between the State, War, and Navy Departments.

Mr. Hiss also pointed out that a general criticism of the statement as drafted was its emphasis on the possibility of a breakdown in friendly relations between the Great Powers and its failure to emphasize the necessity for insuring that the United States has adequate Allies.

Mr. Hiss then outlined the specific comments which it was proposed to transmit informally to the Secretaries of War and the Navy and to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, as set forth in Annex II of the document. With reference to paragraph 2 of the Annex, he pointed out that the “four principal tasks” which President Truman, [Page 1120] in his address at New York on October 27th,33 had said determined the kind of armed might we propose to maintain, differed in order and emphasis from the determining policies listed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff statement. Mr. Hiss suggested that the statement might be revised to correspond with the President’s definition.

Referring to paragraph 3 of the Annex, Mr. Hiss pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff statement did not place sufficient emphasis on the task of enforcing the terms of peace upon Germany and Japan. In paragraph 4 the point was made that the responsibilities of the United States as a principal member of the United Nations should figure more prominently in any statement of United States military policy. It was also pointed out that the United Nations was built upon the power relations existing among the wartime Allies. If the balance of that relationship in military potential were to be impaired, the fabric of the United Nations would be weakened. Therefore, greater recognition should be given to our duties and responsibilities under the United Nations Charter as determinants of our military needs.

Mr. Hiss also referred to paragraph 6 and to his previous comment regarding the failure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff statement to emphasize the need for the support of our principal Allies in the event of future conflict. He also called attention to the several economic considerations mentioned in paragraph 7 which seemed to require further study.

Mr. Hiss informed the Committee that Mr. Benton had sent him a memorandum34 endorsing the approach taken in Annex II but suggesting that certain further points should be considered for possible inclusion in the military policy statement, including mention of the atomic bomb, military and naval bases, and compulsory military training.

The Secretary said that to refer the Joint Chiefs of Staff statement to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee seemed to be the best procedure. He asked who had prepared the paper for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Pasvolsky said it had probably been prepared under the direction of Admiral Willson and Generals Fairchild and Embick,35 and the general tenor of the paper seemed to reflect the views of General Embick. Mr. Pasvolsky said the critical question raised by the whole statement was whether we are to focus attention [Page 1121] on our independent military strength or on our new position in the world as a member of the United Nations Organization.

Mr. Clayton, referring to paragraph 7 in Annex II, said he agreed that the economic aspects of the Joint Chiefs of Staff statement would require very careful consideration, particularly the one calling for “the maintenance of a large merchant marine, both active and reserve”. He pointed out that before the war the United States merchant marine had amounted to about 10 million tons. The Joint Chiefs’ recommendation might mean anything—perhaps 25 or 30 million tons. He said no one believed we could operate economically a merchant fleet of more than 12 or 15 million tons, and one of 25 or 30 million tons would have disastrous effects on the merchant marines of such countries as Great Britain and Norway, and would adversely affect our international trade position. He said the references to the maintenance of industries essential to the war effort and to the stockpiling of strategic material also required further careful study.

The Counselor agreed that the several points mentioned by Mr. Clayton required further study but he pointed out that even greater difficulty arose in connection with the question of how the general policies set forth in the document would be construed in practice. He said he would hesitate to say that such a statement should not be put down on paper at all but he thought there were as many disadvantages as there were advantages in so doing. If the statement is to be put down on paper, however, The Counselor said it was important that the statement should clearly recognize the importance of constant cooperation between the State, War, and Navy Departments, and that some provision should be made for requiring reconsideration and revision of the statement at least once a year. He referred to Mr. Benton’s suggestion regarding inclusion of a statement on the atomic bomb and said, for example, that while it might be inappropriate to include such a reference at the present time, it might be possible to do this in the next revision of the statement. The Counselor suggested that clarification of the statement regarding the merchant marine was particularly important since any Army or Navy officer who had seen the reference to this topic in the general statement would feel free to make public statements in the same vein. The Secretary agreed with The Counselor that the statement as drafted was practically a mandate to go ahead with a shipping program such as that advocated by Admiral Land.36

(The Secretary and Mr. Clayton left the meeting at this point.)

Mr. Hackworth asked what use would be made of the paper after [Page 1122] its approval and especially whether it would be made public. Mr. Hiss said that he understood that there was no intention of making it public but he pointed out that it must always be remembered that it might be considered desirable at some future time to publish the statement. The Counselor said that even if it should not be made public, other nations would doubtless learn of it and he thought that even friendly nations might misunderstand some of its features as it was now drafted.

Mr. McCormack said he thought the analysis in the document was rather poor and needed to be strengthened. Mr. Pasvolsky said that one point in Annex II which should be improved was the reference to the regulation of armaments. He pointed out that we had built the United Nations Organization on the principle that the regulation of armaments could be deferred for future consideration. However, he felt that the atomic bomb had brought the question to the fore and that it required greater emphasis. He suggested that a special paragraph be included in Annex II on this point.

The Counselor suggested that in requesting the sub-committee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to revise the paper, it should be made clear that such revision should not be limited to the suggestions submitted by the Department (as outlined in Annex II) but that the whole statement should be carefully considered and revised in the light of staff study.

There was also a discussion of procedure in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in this connection. Mr. Hiss informed the Committee that the Joint Chiefs of Staff statement had come to Mr. Matthews, as the acting representative of the Department on SWNCC, and that SWNCC had held up action on the matter until the Department’s comments could be obtained. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not represented on SWNCC and asked whether the time had not come to provide for their regular representation. Mr. Dunn said the Secretaries of War and Navy would not agree to this since they wished to keep political decisions in their own Departments and had set up SWNCC for the purpose of excluding the Joint Chiefs of Staff from actual formulation of such decisions. He said the Joint Chiefs of Staff were, of course, consulted by the Secretaries of War and Navy before political decisions were made.

The Committee agreed that Annex II should be revised in the light of the discussion at the meeting. It was also suggested that members of the Committee should inform Mr. Hiss of any further suggestions they might wish to make regarding the statement. The Committee further agreed that the document, as revised, should be submitted for [Page 1123] approval at the next meeting of the Committee, prior to its presentation to the Secretaries of the War and the Navy and then to SWNCC.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

  1. Lot 122, a consolidated lot file consisting of records of inactive or terminated committees of the Department of State or inter-departmental committees on which the Department of State was represented. This material was retired by the staff of the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.
  2. The Secretary’s Staff Committee, organized in 1944 by Secretary of State Stettinius to formulate and coordinate Departmental policy, included the Under Secretary and the directors of the major areas of the Department. This body met thrice weekly from December 20, 1944, and continued to function on a regular basis after Byrnes succeeded Stettinius as Secretary of State in July, 1945. The Committee met 171 times in 1945 considering a wide range of subjects relating to the war, the liquidation of the war, and the establishment of the United Nations. The 30 meetings which were held in 1946 were devoted primarily to matters relating to the internal organization of the Department, Congressional relations, public information policy, and Latin America. The records of the Committee are located in the Secretariat Files.
  3. Dean Acheson.
  4. Benjamin V. Cohen.
  5. William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
  6. James Clement Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs.
  7. Green H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser.
  8. Alfred McCormack, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence.
  9. Leo Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for International Organization and Security Affairs.
  10. Donald S. Russell, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration.
  11. Alger Hiss, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.
  12. John F. Gange of the Central Secretariat.
  13. James H. Lewis of the Central Secretariat.
  14. C. Easton Rothwell, Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat.
  15. William Benton, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.
  16. Spruille Braden, Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs.
  17. SC–169a is not printed; SC–169b, a revision thereof, November 16, is printed infra.
  18. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this statement of military policy on September 19, 1945, and forwarded it to the Secretaries of War and Navy requesting that it be transmitted to the Secretary of State and the President. For text, see SWNCC 282, March 27, 1946, p. 1160.
  19. The JCS statement of military policy was submitted to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on September 26, 1945, by Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. Subsequently, at the request of Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen, the statement was republished as SWNCC 282, March 27, 1946.
  20. For text of President Truman’s Navy Day address, October 27, 1945, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1945 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 431, or Department of State Bulletin, October 28, 1945, p. 653. For the “four principal tasks”, see document SC–169b, infra.
  21. Not printed.
  22. Vice Adm. Russell Willson, Maj. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild, and Lt. Gen. Stanley D. Embick of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  23. Vice Adm. Emory S. Land, U.S. Navy (retired), Chairman of the Maritime Commission.