811.20/11–145

Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Because of the interdependence of demobilization and U.S. foreign policy, it is believed the State Department will be interested in the War Department’s over-all demobilization plans. At the same time the War Department would benefit by State Department guidance as to State Department objectives and policies which require implementation by the War Department.

Under present accelerated demobilization plans the Army may be reduced from its peak strength of over eight million men in August 1945 to approximately one point six million early in April 1946, instead of July as originally planned. Our forces in Europe will be reduced from their present strength of about one million six hundred thousand to less than four hundred thousand. Similarly, the one and one-half million men in the Pacific will be reduced to about four hundred thousand men, with approximately half of them in Japan and Korea.

To accomplish this drastic demobilization, a separation policy has been established which permits men with the longest service to be discharged first. While this is the most equitable plan as far as each individual is concerned, it greatly reduces the experience level throughout the Army and will require extensive reorganization and several months of training before any one of the three major components of the peacetime Army can be considered an effective fighting force. During this period our national commitments will continue without fully trained forces to implement them.

If present demobilization plans are permitted to continue unaltered, every man now overseas can be discharged prior to September 1946.

Since a time lag of four months must necessarily elapse between the adoption of any major change in personnel policy and its service-wide execution, decisions as to our occupational requirements after 1 March 1946 should be made immediately. The rate of repatriation can then be adjusted to provide at all times the necessary occupational troops. This, in turn, will in large measure determine the planning assumptions on which to base the over-all strength of the Army. Realistic assumptions to support the planned size of the Army—which must be defended before the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress—cannot be made without State Department guidance on occupational policy and occupational requirements.

While it is realized that the determination of ultimate objectives with regard to occupied countries is complicated by many unknown and constantly changing factors, the trend of current State Department [Page 1112] thought would be most helpful in permitting the War Department to make plans to meet these occupational requirements and to determine the interim and ultimate size of the Army. The attached appendix contains questions, answers to which would prove most valuable to the War Department.2 To permit the expeditious completion of the necessary studies, it is suggested that partial answers be furnished when they become available. A complete reply by early November is necessary to permit the War Department to make the necessary arrangements to implement National policy after 1 March 1946.

In summary, the War Department is endeavoring to underwrite at minimum cost a National insurance policy. What is needed is the State Department’s estimate of the nature and extent of the probable hazards against which the War Department should be prepared to provide this insurance.

Robert P. Patterson
  1. The questions which comprise the appendix are contained in the reply (November 29, 1945, p. 1128) by the Secretary of State to the present memorandum.