Matthews Files
Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)
I have read General Smith’s letter giving an analysis of a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Lindsay and Mr. Sobolev in New York.72 While in New York I had seen the memorandum of conversation in question (a copy of which at my suggestion was sent to the Secretary and is in his files).
I am basically in entire agreement with the Embassy’s analysis of the Soviet attitude. My only comment is that while it is certain that the Russians would try to exploit any international scheme for control to weaken the non-Soviet world without weakening the Soviet world, I feel it does not necessarily follow that we should permit them so to use any international authority. It seems to me that that is a question for proper and intelligent handling of the problem on our part. Indeed with proper implementation the international control of atomic energy might force the beginning of a change in the Soviet structure. [Page 1104] The Kremlin will obviously do everything in its power to prevent this, but the basic contradiction between a police state and an international authority does not automatically mean that the international authority would lose out. I gather that it was some such possibility that General Smith had in mind in the paragraph on page 3 that you marked which at first glance appears to be inconsistent with the considerations set forth earlier.
As to the paragraph on page 4 which you question, I think General Smith feels that we should proceed with the international control of atomic energy in cooperation with any nation that accepts it in good faith and not hold up international control because of the failure of the Soviets to join in such control. I am not entirely sure that I agree with that thesis since the net effect might be to water down our advantage as the possessors of the atomic bomb without any appreciable gain if the Soviets stay out. I am more inclined to the view that if a completely adequate arrangement cannot be made with the Soviet Union it would be better to drop any scheme for international control, which would only be partial if Russia were out, and leave our hands free to develop atomic energy on a national scale.73
- For Ambassador Smith’s letter, dated November 19, see p. 1016. For memorandum of conversation, dated October 21, see p. 955.↩
- Mr. Acheson, to whom Mr. Matthews transmitted the file copy on February 1, 1947, made the following marginal notation beside the final sentence: “In cooperation with UK and Canada.”↩