501.BC Atomic/12-946
The United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch) to the Secretary of State
My Dear Mr. Secretary: Supplementing my memorandum to you of December 8th, on the same general subject, I take the liberty of calling to your attention some disturbing elements in the present drafts of Paragraphs 1. and 2. of the “proposal concerning the general regulation and reduction of armaments”, as passed by Subcommittee 3 of the first Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.
The Russians have contended, before the Atomic Energy Commission, that the first step in control of atomic energy should be “a convention”, as they always call it, outlawing the production and use of atomic weapons and providing, within a short time after the convention has been executed, for the destruction of existing atomic weapons. They have contended that this should be the initial step and should be taken separate and apart from definite commitments in other respects. They also have urged the formation of two committees, one of which should occupy itself with scientific matters and the other with controls.
We have not opposed the inclusion of an international agreement along the lines of the proposed Russian “convention” in a treaty providing a full and effective system of control. We have, however, declined to accept any such convention, apart from safeguards in the way of an international authority, fortified with powers of control and inspection to supervise and enforce the system of control and the terms of the convention.
[Page 1093]Paragraph I of the proposals referred to above recommends that “the Security Council give prompt consideration to formulating the practical measures, according to their priority, which are essential, etc.”.
The last clause of paragraph 2 reads as follows “… The General Assembly recommends that the Security Council … expedite consideration of a draft convention or conventions for the prohibition of atomic weapons, … and the creation of an international system of control and inspection.” It will be noted that the last clause of paragraph 2. refers to two things:
- (a)
- a convention or conventions for the prohibition of atomic bombs, and
- (b)
- the creation of an international system of control and inspection.
Our fears in connection with this language, taken in connection with the instructions in paragraph 1. about priority, are that the Russians will continue to insist that the first priority belongs to a convention for prohibition of production and use of atomic bombs and their destruction promptly thereafter.
As you know, I am not authorized to concur in such a program, either by the President or by you, and you will, I am sure, agree with me that Congress would not in any event accept it. The language of the proposed resolutions, however, might give the Russians who, as you know, are very close readers and construers of language, a basis for insisting that the General Assembly had approved this order of procedure.
Paragraph 3. of the disarmament proposals of the Subcommittee of the first Committee in the General Assembly is now in draft. The Russian proposal there calls for two commissions under the Security Council, the function of one of which is to carry out the “decision on atomic energy”.
I appreciate the difficulties involved in changing the present language in paragraph 2. If the pertinent part of this paragraph could be changed to read as follows:
“That the Security Council expedite consideration of an international system of control and inspection including a convention or conventions for the prohibition of atomic weapons, etc.”,
that would bring clarity. If this is not possible, it seems to me that the American representative should at every stage where this resolution is acted upon in the subcommittee, before the committee, and before the Assembly itself, emphasize the fact that in voting for the resolution, the United States construes its meaning, not as recommending a separate convention, but as calling for a system of international control, [Page 1094] including safeguards by way of inspection and other measures of which system such a covenant would be an integral part.
I also feel that the final draft of paragraph 3., now under discussion, should eliminate all specific reference to the form of organization to be adopted for carrying out the control of atomic energy. Such measures should await receipt by the Security Council of the report of the Atomic Energy Commission which, I hope, will be completed and delivered to the Security Council very soon.
Sincerely yours,